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E:.;{POSITION Oli' THE PROBLEM

It is much easier to point out the faults and
errors in the work of a great mind than to
give a distinct 0nd full exposition
.
of its value. l
No thinking man today questions the wide-spre.:1d influence

which the publication of Irnmanuel hant' s
x~rnuR!.i

Y~i tik

del' Heinen

-~.-----~

had upon the philosophical world.

Many great problems

h,Jve arisen in philosophy and in (7Ven the day-to-day life of men
as a result of the new realms of thought 1',8nt'8 writings uncuvered.

!.iany of those problems arose out

implications of his teaching.

01'

the conclusions nod

But many problems also arose in th

interpretation cf Rant's writings, in trie precise purpose of some
of his ideas, and in the very meaning of his words.
"

.

Y.ant's thought is often of such profundity, so comprehensive
in its ramifications, that its expression on

pap~r

has seemed to

his reader a labyrinth of incomprehensible terminology and
flagrant contradictions.

But those who have read l<:t=lnt wi til an

open mind and a willingness to see his vi-aw have denied that such

lArthur 3<fflopenhauer, p,ritlcism.££. ~ I<~}ntia,n Ptli.l.0-fJ"£phZ,
quoted in s. l<orner, ~ (Harmonds'Worth. 19f)5), p. 5.

8

1s truly the case.

Nevertheless, the quality ot h1. thought 18

not solely reapoulble tor ,be contusion so onen met in attemp'
iDg to

tollow his reasoning.

Not intrequentlJ his .1"1 tinS

shOlllS

tbe detinite marka ot a hurried and s Qllewba t careleaa expre ••1on
Both tilese factors. the qual1ty ot his 1ihOlght and the manner 1n
which it

wa_

eXlB'essed, have resulted in the tremen40us arral of

:fu:lntian CO DllIEunar1, so 41_rae and. otten c cn:tradicto17. 'fil1cn is
ava1la ble today to the • tuden' ot Xan'.
Not least 1mportant in tile 41ft! Olltl.s ot interpretatim 1
the :ramons passage in 1be CE& tl@8

.9t. ll!t!. Bt!!9P entitled

Schema 1;i am of the PuN Concept S ot the Underst aDding. tt
pOint in the
Of !.

prior'

l1Ii"9. iant haa proved

"The

At 1ih 18

the existence and Decessit

ooncept •• the oat.ser1es, 1ilieh are the const1tuent

elements ot all cognitional experience and are 11mited for their
valid use to the realm ot sense knOllledge. 2 Theae categorles 81"

pure and I. PUSi (1n no wise empir1cal 1n or18in).
oould oo.r knowledge be necessary and ~n1v" sal,3

Otherwise h
•

But the 1n1m1-

20r as Kant expressed 1t, tt. • • th er",! san be no a pr10rl
1
e, 11911
Object. Sit. ])0111'6, expei,iiFFtt ImrAanuel
t,
0
e •
tres. orman em.p Smith, and 84.
(London .• 1955 f p. '14.t&llcs 1n orlginal. In Kantts or1ginal
ed1 t lan, B 166. All aubsequent reterencea to the text ot the
ClA!lSlP wUl include the pagina.t1m or both 1st aDl Ind ed1t:k>
'I anrespect1ve17. -- l t tbe text is toUDd In boUl editions.
Tbe p.lg1natlon ot the SJD.1 th translat10n wlll be 1ncluied 1n po re
theses. Thus a sample :reference to the Hf1tGeUG would be s1llP1y
"4 l39-B 1'l8 (laL).tt The clted text wo
on page 13'
or the 01"181_1 German t1rst ed1 tion, on page 1'78 of the orlg1na
German second edition, and an page 161. ot the sm.1th translatlon.

N..

n'S.

a

3ct.

B 2-4 (43-44). A

and many simllar pas88gea.

'la-a

round

104 (112). A 13'1-B 1'16 (180),

.3

tlonal 4 sense experience vlhlen tbese caagories make possl'ble

to which they apply in consc1 QUa judgment is completely ampul-

cal. 5

The oategories and sense intuition then, are th<rougbly

heterogeneous.

This, wlth a. brevi ty whlch makes almost a carie

ture ot the ttDeductions". 113 the development ot Kant's tb.ouejlt
tbe Cntlgue 1dlan he

a~.

up the probleDls.torwhlch sehematlsma

the aChemais. are 1ihe answer. 6

In the ttTraDsoenden1al Aesthet1c" and in the IfAmlytle ot

Concepts" Of the "Tran seendental Ana17tlc tt Kant baa shOlfn

lJ'Ael

there III1st be A Rlisi catesories to account tor our universal
neceaaa1'7 knowledge,
synthetlc!.

PI,g:,

:!;i!~

we apply these categorles to cbject1v

Judgments ot exp!tr1ence, aId tbat such an

application Is just1tle4.'
Now, 1n the "AJullytio

us

how

or Prine ipl • .-," Y.ant propose.

to ab.

these oateSll!' lea are used aDS. 8,lP118d, the mnner

they hang together with the

e18_nt.~ot

sensibilit,._

He

first by sb<»: in.g tbe sensible eonU tions under which the categ

les can be employed, 1.e. scb.ematism ot the :pure UllI1erslllnding.

'.ntuI,IS1l here and thl'Ql@lout this thesis 1s taken in the
:Kiln\lan. senae at that. thrw~ wbich knowledge 1s 1.m.Dl3d1atel,. 1'8
lated to objects. ct. A 19-*S 33 (65). Almost always In FAnt
means sanse intuitIon. In the German, Anschauung: Intuition or
singular representation.
e A 19-B 33 (66). A 6l--B '75 (93). AlZ'7-B 1'76 {laO} t

!l Ii

&rhe mere 1ntimate relationsbip Yil1ch schemat1am has to til
metaphysical aM transcend en tal deducti ons w1l1 be d1:5 cusaed 1
chs. II and III.
? See Aorner,
....-:--

P.

'70.

•

and secondly, in the "Principles of Pure Umera1andlng." be
demonstrates the rules of' Judgment in which the oa'tegcrles are
app11ed to experienoe. 8

It 1s. of course, 'he first of these two which involves the
precise problem of' this thesis.

Since ·the "deductions" have lett

the categories aId intu1tlonal e::xperlence so 18terogeneous, schema. tlsmmuat provlde some fttb. 11'4 thing, wbich 1s hcmogeneOQs an

the one hand with·tba ,cate80r7, and on the other hand w1 th
appearance. ft9

Th18 th Ire! thingi., 1n

Slnml8ry

tashlon tor the

present, ftthe $ranIS,nden'll 89hP,ft10 a "transcendental determinationat t1me."1l the "produot of imagimtion," a "universal
procedure of' imagination 1n prov1ding an image for a concept t ...12

and tta rule or ayn1bea1s ot the 1magina t1 en. ,,13

Schematism i. th

"procedure at the ullderstand1ng in tbaae schemata, ft14 and an ttart
concealed 1n the depths of the human swl. ft 15 Bes1des, the

schemta l1mit the eategones

~

sena~bUity
"

8 et•

illil. and

136-5 1'15 (179).
9A 138--B17'1 (181).

10Ib1d •

A

Italics in original.

114 138-139--B 1'17.178 (181).

12A 149-B 179 (182).
13A 141--B 180 (lSS).

14,A. 140-B 119 (18S).
15A 141--B 180 (185).

.

and are t.be p.benomeDa

5

or scmsible ooncepts

or

objects in agreement with the categorles:

All this. and tile cha.pter on scnematism as a whole. are con-

fusi,ng. even 'to one v4lo haa managed to inch his way through the

involve4 passagee of the mtaphysical. am transcendental
deductions.

But when the brain-weary reader looks to tbe commen...

tatora for aome 11gb. t in his intellectual contusion, be meets onl
a chaos 01' diver•• and otten contradictory interpretatlons.
Norman Kemp Smith, probably the most w1de.17 read F.ng11sh

mentator on the Or! tlgp.t 1n recent t1mes, forms the opinion that
Kant's trea1ment

or schsnat1sm

is

h1~ly

flrt1f1c1al, an accretion

which has been insplred principally by kant's 10V'e for the archl. tectonic at tradltlOD4l 10g1c.

The problan of t1» heterogenel.

ot categol"Y am lntult ion is no real problem at all.
are related 11ke matter and form w1th correlatlve
Datures. 1 '
Mntts architecton1c has
a m.Ost m1sleading manner.

forced'~hlm

!bese two

,..t d1rrerent

to state the proplem in

FQr scherratism. Smith maintains, is not

BubsumptiCll but raUler creati ve synthesis

rIb:)

reby the content of

knowledge 1s apprehended in terms of relations.

Further, tmre is

no need. ta! a "third th1ng, ft the dis cua.lon of wblCh is m.erely 'tb8
error of comp,j·ring the relat10n of oategory to intu1tion to the
16A146--B 186 (las). The above quotations lnc~ude all the
essent1al det1n1t1 ODS and descriptions ot schematism that Kant
ofters. 'l,'hey will be analyzied 1n detail in subsequttnt chapters.

'.

:a,'1Norroo.n Kemp arn1tb.. Ii con:unentar!:sto Kant', grltlgue.2tl!!£.t
R!!J.on, 2nd 84. (New York, l§SO), p.
r.

relation of a claas concept to 1ts particulars. IS
Nevet-thel.ss. Smith sdmi;s that Kant fa trea'tmltnt or schematlsm haa the value or cllarltylng his doctrine on produc"1 ve
1mglm tton, on the relat10n

~

image aId concept, and on the na-

ture 01' the elist motion between the categories and the pure fer me
of understandlng.19

It is evident, thoush. according to 9m1th,

that I<t.mt '. arohi teet (Ute has fer ced him to pretace tlu••• Insight.
wi th remarks which run

entirel, cCAln'ter to the point he was tl'ying

to Dike • .!!I.. the InseparabilIty ~ concepticn and 1ntultl0J1. IO
Althcugh Smithts ain concern in his canments on schematlsm 1s
pOInting out Kant's ... rars, the stand

.m

takes on the 1D.terpre'ta-

ti on or 8chematism's mean1ng seems to be a. mare S1bjectlve one •
.9m1 th ends by interpreting the schemata. as ecpl valent to the

categarlesl

He claims

'\;hey

are nothing more than tba pure logical

forms a s modi tled tlr ough the 1r re1a tl0 n t'o tImEt. 81

lSll!!l_. pp. 334

aid 335.

19~.t pp. 356-339.
20Ib!4 •• p. 340.

21 Ib1f ., pp. 359-340. It is difficult to show with cert1tude
that 3mi th 8 equlvalatlon or Kant's aohetMta Vi'1 th the categar les
places him def1nitely on a subjectivistic InterpretatIon. am1th
does not expand the im.plioatlons ot tb,is 1nterpreta'tlon. Perhaps
1t Is truer to say that Smith was 80 concerned w1th polnt1ng
what he saw to be the .-rore and dl:f't1cult1. 1n the chapter on
schematiam that be never nally stoOd on a subjective lnterpretat10n where the schalE woUld be a cond1 t10nlns process nor on an
objeotlve OBe where the schema would be a churaoter1stl0 ot
cons c1 Quane.s.

QQ"

'1

ludp.en' aa to wbet;her theae and other crit101sms ot smith
are Jus'1tie4, or to wbat extent. ,is being reserved till later.

Similarly with the o1iher oommentators that will be d1scussed 1n
this intrOduct !QQ..

For the

(i) .lect1ve

here 18 merely to point ou'

the existing opinion on the value aM _anlDg

or Kant's

cbapWr

sohematla.
One

or

the m.ost au'\b.oritaUve eXElJJl)les ot an opposing

oplniOD. on Kant 'a scl:uunat1am. is that ot H• .T. Paton.
leluf tban 1ihree chapt.. s of h1a two volUDle
halt ot the

Be

oommen~ary

SptDd8

no

on the til's

or ".lSU an.allz1ng Kant' areas on1ng 1n the chapter

Q11

scbemat18m aDd demonstrating lta importaDce 1n the Kant:lan a,at..
M1n1aizing tar the mOilt part Kant's view ot the achemata as
verlMl rules

~

1ag1.nat2t>n,tt Patcn'a moat fundamautal vin 1a t

the schemata are universal oharacteriatl ca of experi_co t belonging prec1sely to the known obJeata. 82 Thus at the outset Pa:tan'a
i8 a decidedl,. obJeotive view in

th.~

interpretatlQll at schematiam.
,

Moreover. he maintains the. t the cb.apto:t on schematiam is a n esse
tlal part ot theargumen t at the

ar J,tlgu,t

and ot much mare value

than merelYPointlng out iant's error•• 23
Adm1tt1ng the obsourity and artificiality

21a.J.

Paton.

at much of Xlmt's

IftS·fa!lMP_1 10 11t~ 'tI,'ftP

(New York,

spec
1:~U8 lOr
trans ceD4ental
schemata ue the u.ni veraal charaoteri.tles ,whlCh, he hope. to sb.
later. Il\1.8t belong to all objects aa o'bJeCj, J..!. ~ These uni ....
versal charaeteristlc. belong to oDject., not aaSIien to sensation. bu' •• !£ibiD1A by the transcenden'&al sy:o:theaia of imgiIl4 ....
tion :in one t •• "Ib14. 19 and 20. Italic8 in or1ginal. Far
the deliberate oveJ:'l"{S'Olt'g ot the ttrule or 1maginatiOn tt aspect of
schemat1am, aee 1b14-. 18, 110te 2.

1936). II. 17-8).

231!U:i_, 20 an4 21.

8

treatmen$, Paton 1s tirmll convinced tbat nevertheless the chapt.
1s by no _aDa euperfluoua.

We nee" the argu_nt tar the iapoal-

tlon ot unl"er_l characterist10s an objects 1n a sJIltbe.ta correspondiDg to the catesorles.

ae

cla1ma to retu.te the objec1;lons

ot many oamu8l1tatar., 1D.C1.ud1.ug 'the

JIB tter-torm

difficultl pro-

posed by smith whlch wa. discussed abore. 84
other oharac'teristlca ot Paton'.
been dl.oua.e" are 'the tollowlng.

pO.lt~CD

which ha.,. not le't

He 61., •• 1ih. reader car.:tlll

analrsea of the text on scbematl.m and weighs in detaU the possible lnterpretat101.l8:.
as

wm

lie goe. to great pllna 1n tbia matter and,

be ••en later, makes oarehl distinctions in Kant's mean-

iag ot achen:atl_ 1Ihloh are not noticed by other eo.entator••

The •• di.tinotlou are the toundatioD ot· his favorable 1nterpretation ot aChematlsm. J5

The t1r.t two cOI.IIentatar. just oDnsiderea. are probably the
most pOinted example. 1n df.Donsvat1q the dive .itl or
"

1;at1011 of tbe 8Cb.e.t1am pissage.

~terp:r.-

.

The other co__ tators 1;0 be

considered, although or lesser importance, will also aid 1n

84lliJe, 27 and 26.

atisesides the passage. already reterred to, see Ibid., 66,
note 2; also seotion 5 and 6 or OOe 34 lP.1Aet 75-78. For the en11gblen1ng di811ncti0ll8 mentioned (wh 1cli1iI'l ea'ter the argument.
ot this the.i. later) .88 especially section 10 ot ell. 32 and seotion 1 ot ch. 33. Ib3,.4_, 39-41 and 42-44; also seotlon 2 ot oh.34.

Ig&g.,

Ge.70.
It there i. allJ light thrown on the d1ft1cult subject ot
lantta .011e_t1.881 a. a re811t of thi. tbea1s, the author is aboye
all other. indeb1ie4 to Patan tor the elucidating argument. ot h1a
o Q1UI8ntar 1. aa should be evident from subsequent reterences.

9

h1ghlighting this diversitl_
Betore this path lead.

"00 great a d 1stanoe from Paton,

opin1on ot S. Korner ought to b~ cons14ered.

the

His interpretation.

of schemati8Dl i8 not greatly 41tterent trom Paton t ••

True,

KOrner doe. not attempt the extElls1ve treatment that Paton does.
In general he considered sohemata aa "re.terential rules" ooncerning concepts which link them to perception.

Non-reterentlal rule.

concerDing concept. tell about the eont. .t ot 'the
without relAtlC1l to objects.

but

For example. "BeIng a dog implies

being 8 aammal." 1.,8 non-reterentlal rule.
8

C(f1ceptSt

On the other band.'

reterentlal rule would make a concept appllca.ble to concrete

experlence.

Since the categories deal .. ltll reallt,. aa such.thelr

referent1al rule. or sohemata must be auch as to eraable their
appllcatl~t

not to particular objects, but to the experience of

objects as 8uch.

Now tb.e tea ture whlch

'8

common to every object

ot experience lncluding the empiricai:, sel. t 18 belng in tlme.

The

schemata are thus the tanporal conditions under which the oategories are applicable to exPerience.

This interpretatlon .eems tG

thls wrlter quIte similar to Paton's -universal characterlstios

ot exper1ence," and thus Korner also stands tae an objective interpretation at 8Cbematism. 1e

8GKbl'uer, pp. 70-75. "or a category, aooordingly,the schema,
and consequently the reterential rules, determine the specific
condl tions uder whiCh it is applicable to !mZ man 1 fold which has
the 81nthetio unit,. of an,"~lng wbatever thar-is an object ot experience. Now the only feature which 18 common to every object or
experienee. including the empirlcal selt, is Its being in time.

10
There are several ot the better known commenta. tors who take

a very definite stand tor a subjective 1nterpretatlon ot schemat1sm.

Most notable among them ls Edward Ca11"4.

That his posltion

would be a subjective one is not strange since hls whole :lnteJlpre-

tatlon ot :Kant is notably Hegel:lan 1n tone.
ls flBre17 a m.aDllel" of

expres~1ng

problem. mkes lt nOD-exlstent.

For Calrd .cherrati_

a problem and the anner tor tb18
The relation ot perceptlons an4

conceptlon ls audl that no mediatlng factor is really needed and
Kant's 8.l"gp.m.ent nec88sarU7 leads to an al teratlon ot his premises.

His scattoldlq talls away as unnecessary

ODCe

his struct\l:"e at

knowledge 1s built. 17 ADllytlC and synthetic 'are but two aspects

ot the same judgQJ:en t.

SUbject and

d)

jact are i • •parable.

In

judgment we separate tor the sake ot reunion what was mver distlne".

'rhus,

8S

far smith. the lBterogenietl ot category and

intuit1 Q1 does not ex1st.

Co:osequentlr. the problem of' hetero-

geneity does not exist. Ita answer. ~ schematlam.t was
the problem was proposed. as

know~

betore

The schema Of a cateSOrJ, Ulerefore. determ.ines the temporal cond1t10ns under 1ttloll lt 1s applicable to objects ot experience in
general. In :Kant's words, 'the scllematoa (ot the categorles) are

therefore nothing but

t~iral

determina..!1 QlS a Wlf-f: 1n accord-

anoe w1 th rules' • • • n b •• p. 72. Kt.l."ner 1'i als or the
opinion tbat 80hematiam a,a s1gnificant part of Kant's a7stem,
stating 1bat :KAnt fa poslti on seen 1n sahem t i . "Claritles the
function ot conceptual th inking. • • tt Ibid. t p. '14.
2714_1"4 Gatrell %rut Crt ttsJ!tolb1i!2'i! .2t. 'mmtl!!l.1.ti Kant,
2nd edt (Gla sgOfi t lvOvr; I, 4.
,
•
3.
a8 Ib1c1 • 405 and 406. ttReally. it suld be truer to say that
JudgmenT'""'rl ~he dlfferentia.tion of conception and perception in
order to their reun1on. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ii • • • • • •
As a consequence, we are obliged to concei va the Judgment, nat .a

11
II.A. Prichard's 'trenchant criticisms of Kan't'a Qr1tiqU! alao
contains a subjecti vlat1c interpretation of sohematialll, and th1.
1ntel'pretation forcea P:rieb.ard to the opin1on that the chapter 1s
baaed on contradiction aDd contua 1 on.

A.l t hWgb. be has le U

ob-

ject1oll1l11b sche-t1em than "lth the reat of the sectiOn cm.the
"Pri nci ple... " he con eei ve a wha t he cons 14 ar s to 'be .Kant t a

charao

tarlstics at the schema in general aa completely contrary to what

tbe transoendental soh-.a ta ot tb.e oategorlea must 1nvolve.
Tbe Characteristiea ot the schema 10 general are three:
(1) 1t 1. a thQJ.ght of a rule by which we combine the manifold, ar

a conception that 1a related to the subject. not to the character1st1oa ot the c;t)Ject; (a) althwfJl time is involved. the suee.sion
is a subjecti ve construct1on, not In 'the c:b Jeot; (3) the sohema-

t1z1ng process directly brings the .nItol.d of peroeption UJ3der
ita conception •. 29

.

The transcendental schemata cannot ftllt111 these oharacterI..

tica because (1) the sohemata ot the categor 188 must relate to
objects known. (2) tIme must be in the object.
ceS8

am

(3) It the pro-

ot schematIzat10n acWfiY.tbl subsumas the manifold under the

un1.

$ comb1nation ot what was preViously distinct. but a8 a separation, 1n order to a mare pertect
t of elements which W8re
preVioualJ undiatingu lshed, and whlch, even in 'being distlnguished
are never wholly separated." Ibil. Later 1t wl11 be seen that
Ca1rd t 8 tae Ue ins·1gb. t 1s not iO 'be d1 ... garded.

a'n.A..

p. 246-2ti3.

PriChard.

&mi'. Theorl!l£. KnqyledSe (OxtOX'd,

19(9).

category, then i1; perform.s tJl. ver7 Imposslb11ity (joining 'the

heterogeneous> wh1d! make
In the t1:rst place. 50

it l»cesaary to postulate sehematism

the third cOIUIlentaJ"3' we ehall cons:lder elch proposes a sub-

Ject1ve Interpretation ot schematlam is that ot Joseph Mar'cnal,
3.J.

JU. excelleD1 comm_ta17 on the t1rst .0:1,191. 1. tbe third.

volue of his .. ell mc.n

AI!. po,U .l!.

PIPs:, ,. l!. M' ta w,lgu"

At the out.e' the reader m1ght be surprl,sed at a subjectivistic

interpretatloD in Maredlal 'a vle.. at Kant. since it i8 eharacter1stic of Mar'chalts position to interpret Kant almost as a complete rea11.t., But the poin:t here is n~ that Marectlal makes a
subjectivls' out ot ].(ant, bu1; raUler that his interpretation of

the meaning of Kant'. sohema'tlsm mQa lt primarily a subjective
process and not essent1ally the product ot iDJl81m tlon nor an
objective char.oterl.tic ot experience.

Exploiting one ot .Kantts desorl~.t1ons of acherratism,.

Mar.Chal deflnes the schema in general as "a tormal and pure condition ot

sensibility

UDder.taJJding

t!a

cag of ti_). by which a calcept at

1s restricted (de'erm1ned) In 1ts objective usage,

tbat is 1n its application appearances_,,31

ae supplements this

definltion wi tb. s detailed psychological description ot the
3OIb14. pp, 253-255. Note the sim.llarl ty ,of the 18 't'ter
Object1151""111th tnat of Ca1rd's 1nterpretat1on Just 41scuss84 and
411.0 with Smith·a objection on the false problEm of heterogeneity. Obviously this 18 an important issue that will bave to be
resOlved In l1i1s-tb.e81s.
31HEnviaage dans ses conditions essentialle., ~~1 iel~vent
de 1£1 Deduct10n transcendentale, e schGme dolt se d.-rin r: 'Ulle

schematiam proce.s.

Be underscores h1s subjective vie. ot the

schema by telllna

the. t 1t 18 a process at imgimtlve con-

U8

structlon in ti_. that 1t haa no produced representation, tbat lt

designates only the me'Chod acctr41ng ,to 111 1eh lmasll1itlon constructs 1mage•• tIlat 1 t 1s !. :prl <1'& w1th respect to the part1cular
1mage. 51 He emphasize. the pos1t1on of Kant·. prod.uctlT8 lag1_tlon 1n schematism, calling 111e schema the speoifioating form, the
33
i.lDJIanent rule of 1.mag1natl". sJUtbesie.
And although he tela

us that the

s~theel.

1nvolved 18 an ob Jectlve one, yet he is cer-

tain ,hat both the pure (transcendental) 0.:04 the empirical schema
are 1nterme41a17 b."'.en the unity at consciousness, and, not the
object known, but ihe ac~al aynthee18 at illllS1natian .. 34
~

Although when speaking ot the sobena in general Marechal haa

emphasized tbe subjective imag1native construction involved, h1s
trea tlIent ot the a chema ta of pure reason or the transcendental
:"

/

ij

n .9.!.ll.\: ClJ temp;)
condition tormelle et pure de la sensibi11te
par laquelle un concept de l' entendemen test r stHlJ1t ~'t.rmrni
dans SOll usage objectit, etest-\-dire dans son ap~~lcatlon aux
ph'nom~nes~" Joseph Marlchal, 8.J., 14l..°i~t de
J!.l!.
M'., 1",. cahier I II: "La Critique de. an t;n Ii'
_,:Ririe,
1944 J , .

a1t

IfS

38Ib!d., 178 and 180.
33Xl!!~., 179-181. Martehal bases his description ot the ima·
ginative proce.s on the synthesis ot apprehension am imagination
in tranaeendenta1 apperception as seen In the first ed1tion of the
"Transcendental Dedu.cti on. fI A 96-UO (131-138) and A 119-123

(143 ...146 ).

54:uarecb.al, ,1014 •• 181-182.

schemata takes a d,ltterent turn.
a process ot abstraotion.

These schenata are obtained by

The synthesis whlch etfects the trans-

cendental schema <lepends upon the influence of past experience,
the pure images ot space and time, and conditions assuring the

nati va union b."'qn intellect and the form of internal sensth
In thi. third .spect the trall8cendental schena is the dJ'Dtlmic ex....
pre.sion ot \he categories 1n pure imagination.
the. t althwgh the first application

Mar&Chal tells us

ot· 1;hese pure schemata 18 pre-

corlSoloua (and th1s is oertainly consonant w1 th the subject! ve

processes ot illilginatlon he desorlbed in detal1), they are consoiously applied to appearances in explic1t and objective judgments.

The relation or each category to a determinate aDd cbarac-

terietic insertion ot appearances in time eDibles the schemata ot
~e

oategories to be abstracted by the Ullderatar.dlng through a

proc... ot retlexion.

'thls reveals "general. signa" in experience

and permits the application ot these ::cwttegor1es to appearanoe,,.35
" .

The las, ma1l'l cawaenta'ol" that will be considered here 18

Roger Dayal.

He is unique among the m.en whose positiOns have been

examined In the.. he has wr1 tten a whole volume on schena' ism.
His thesis 1s tlat schematlam is tbe key point ot all at Kant's

351))i". 182-185. The reader 1 s at once aware of the change
in position trom wba t Marecbal haa told \lS concern1ng schemata in
general to what he tells us here concerning the schemata of tbe
categories. Recalling PrJ. dlard'. objection a.bout a change in
l\ant fS posi tlon on the same po1nt, thls supposes 1ncons1stenoy 'W11:
prove to be signif1eant later 1n th1s paper. ct. 8.bove p. 11 aDd
Prichard, PI'_ 252-2154.

ph'llosoph1 and his work 18 an emauative study at the idea

~

schemat1sm as de"eloped 'throughout all or Kant's writingS, Including the .Qm1l PR!_.

Oonsequently, he is .".n'mare con-

vinced of the ......1a.l value of schara t:Lam than 1s Fa ton.

'lhe

unique po1llt of hl. posit ion 1s tba t be holds for nelther a subjective 1nterpr... t1on at sch..at1sm as do men like Oa1r4,
Prichard. al14 MarSChal, nor t~ a decidedl,

..

d;)

Ject lv. ataD4 aa do

'

Paton au Korner. but sa)'s tlll t by schem tism :Kant intended both
posi tions'
After elucidating d18ou88ion8 ot the relat10ns ot understanding, productive imagination, and reprcduet1ve 1.lIJ$S1natlon 1D. lant'.
gri~'s.ul.

Dayal adoptathe follow1ng h7Pothesia aa a 801ut10n to

the great 41ttiCl11ti. concernIng the sohematis.m passage: concept

a:Dd schema are t W'lder d1tterent aapects. the same law of knowle4se
The concept 1s the dei.ma1ng ractor and the schema i8 the prodUci
dewrm1ne4 cQrreapoDdlng to tbe

conee~
~.

or category-

He »ropos8.

'

to support his h)1)othea1a wlth text•• but this dee s not prove too
conv1nclng.

Neverthel«uuJ, the Inslgh t he fUm lshed, the distinc-

tions he proposes, and the synthesiS he a tterilpta to formula te are
truly praisewatthf_

The only crIticism of his book as a whole tho.

i8 valid will haT. to come fr em.

it

Jf.ftn mo" than ordinarily f'amll1~

with the wh016 ot l{antts philosophy and writIngs.56

.!

3~og.r naval, ~ MIl811111g1g.u, J!
(Paris, 1951). Far
rea scalna en t be impor til. nee or a ems t1_, se. .D!i.,
pp. 7-8; for the prec1se relationship ot understandlng, productive
and reprcduct1ve 1rJIl\g1m tion, especially pp. 88, 89, 92, 93; fer
Da val '..

1.
Now that the reader haa ploughed through theae dJ'7 summaries

or seconiary material. 57 he is pr ooably
cally is the problem or this thesis.

WOrld ering just

mat specifi-

The di Vel' sity of' opinion on

schf.nnatlsm that we have just reviewed, some praising, some condemning the chapter. a tew adopting an object1ve interpretation,

others considering schemat1sm as a aub.1ec't;lve condi t1 on, turnishes
the precl.e problem. of th1s thesi..
tation ot this obscure passage?
place in tbe

Cll)~9U!?

What is the correct interpre-

Is it really superfluous at its

It not. whose view of schenD.'tism 1s the

correct one, it any? And what is the reason tor the diversity?

lmat is a possible or probable war out ot th iainteluOiUal moras.
a clear

s~ry

ot DaTal's essentIal. hypothesis on schemat15 see

...' 95-96, espe ctally: nFour repondre ~ tOltes C,8 questions
s priciser la nature du sohaa. avangons una hJPothise, que AOUS

~
8"

v rif1erOllS par d 'autrea textes: cone ept at sehlme son" \lIte aeule
mi. 101 de ltespritt mal, we sous deux aspeets d1tl'rentaj 1e
concept est un ~ete mental determ1nant. 1e Bch~m.e est sa projectioo., o'e8t-a-411". 1e d§termin6 1"epondant hee d't.. m1nan ....
Nels, De l'oub11ons pas, determinant at d6termine coIncident."
For the relatlon ]):11'&1
between· the schema" aDd phenaaena alli
a. clear SUll.IIIIlry on the caaparativG tunctions of intellect and
1lra g1naticm . " illi., pp. 174-175.
Since this thesis treats on11 sahena tism as found in the
f1;rst Gr1tiiue. no attempt w111 be made to correla"e or criticize
eal
Daval.a am 7aes 01' aeheDll tism as he interprets it 111 the
of the cr't~UJ J1t'~ Beatel alld 1n the rest of Kant's wrtlnga.
The reader a retirF'i(1to
reviews of Daval '8 book., especially
that at Paton 1:0. P!!11olPphlcal QNAFHll;l. 1952 (2), p. 372.

_ke.

1

3'There are other oom.men_r1es on Kant's sch8lll tiam which
might be cited. but because 1hey are 01' lesser 1mpc.rtance and do
not say an1tb,1ng tba t haa not been sa 14 in one way or another by
the authors that bave been treated here, they will be simply referred to in the bibliography appended
this t1».18.

'0
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Certainly. wher$ so many of the best :t\tintian experts disYet it 113 the precise

agree, we oarmot hope far certitude.

pomt

ot this thesis to offer an hypothesis that will at once afford aa
clear an explanatIon of !<ant's obscure chapter as can be hoped

:tor.

add llghtto the place and significance of sehematism in the

Kantian system. of knowledge, and.

a certain degree, reconcile

1;0

the apparent d1vergencies among the standard oommantators.
C1ear11. 1t th1s hypothesis is proven to 'be true, an important
gain w111 be attained 1n the understant1ng of Kant.s critical

system.

The ke1 idea of th1s hypothesis i8 tbit Kant meant two d1fferent th1ngs 111 the chapter on sehematism, the subje ot1V8 and
preo011acloua conditioning process whereby the schema 1s prodUced
and the categories are synthesiZed with the manifold

ot sense.

and, secondly, the objectIve schemata of consc1c:usness, universal.
~

.

characteristics of' r6411t7 which are t!le product of the imaginatlve process wh1Ch cond1tioned than.

Because of the obscure

term1noloey Kant employed, the ambiguous way be eta ted the problem.
for Which schemat1sm was Ule anner. aDd because of a confusiD.g
expOsition ot the elements involved 1» achamatism., m.ost at: tp.e
cQJU1lentatcrs d14 not perceive this dualitJ.

or

_en this solution

was seen, it was perceived only vaguely38 and consequellil1 it

wa_

3SSee fer example wbere Prichard rejects in a note (1'. 2M)
the !)osslble objecti Ql of an interpretat10n at scheJm tlam. tm t is

18
not exploited.

Only Daval clearly recognized the 1m.p11cati ona 01'

this solut ion. 39
The method at proviDg th is thesis ... ill be three-told. lirst.
since it is an hypothesis, it is proven valid when. and only when.
it is shown that this theory
this case the

rAxli'

and only it, explains the facts.

In

are Eantts text, the obscure definitions and

descriptions of schematlsm whlch he g1ves in the chapter on that
subject., The hypothesis will explain these tacta by offering a
clear exegesis and coherent explanatlon of the problema arising in

the text an schematlem.

It is hoped that this interpretation wiU

proVide. or at least a1d in prOViding, a more intelligible explanation 01' thls important subject than has been heretotore given

Secondly, this hypothesis will be supported by texts from bot)
the

m3

taph,yslcal aD! the trans ceo. den tal deductions ot tbe oategorAny explana ti on

01' schematism can

only be valid 111 the: light of its consonance witt
•

•

similar to the one ottered in this thesis.
39the similar1ty between Davalta solution and the one that is
proposed in this thesis i8 at once evident. It is to be noted.
however, that the solution ot this writer was arrived independentll
01', and snteri or to, discovering M. Daval t s hypothesis. Besides.
there are notable ditferences in the two solutions as well as
similarit1es. M. Daval spends Ii oomparatively small amount of tias
on sche!l'latism ot the understanding as found in the first Crit1que
since he is writing about schemat1sDl 1n all of Eant's writi~s . . .
very small porti on of his treatmEm t is spent on proving his hypothesis. ~ost of his consideration 1s concerned with expounding thE
consequences of this solution. ar, mare exactly, in explaining the
notion or schematism in the whole Kantian philosophy.

19

this center of the critical system.
Thirdly, this hypothesia will be conf1rmed by reference to th

standard eanmentators, most ot whom we have reviewed briefly.
Often, even when this thesia disagrees with the interpretati on

or

one or other canmentator, we shall find confirmation for a particu
lar point.

In some iIlStances, the very diversity amoo.g mny of th

commentators wUl, because of the synthetic nature of the solut1on
offered by this thesis. support that solution.

Those commentators

will be mOe t extensively used whose reputatlon

for soholarship is

mos t widely acknowledged, vii-, .Fa ton, Mar/chal, a.nd smIth.

The s.

methods of proof will not be employed successively, but simultaneously for each text aIalyzed, as instruments ready tor the surgeon t s hand. at

efl

en

moment of a delica. te ope ..atlon.

Because the terms lubjectlD and obje ctive wIll come up so
frequently in the proof of this thesis. it will be convenient to
inolose here a brief definition of both terms, to make

cle~r

the

"

By subjecti V! is meant all tha t is logicall

subsequent arguments.

prior to oonsciousness.

In .Kant it involves the categories and th

transcendental activities which oonstruct

~)n

object of knavledge b

synthesizIng the materIals of sensIbility with the determinations
of the categorIes.

By 9b.1eSi,ive Is meant consciousness

ject Just const1tuted.

ot the ob-

It involves intellectual awareness of an

object terminatIng in e judgment ooncerning 1t.

In the example.

"Fire causes smoke, ft the objective side is the consoi ous positing

ot such a JUdgment.

On the subjective side. the object about

p
20
which I make this judgment 1s canstructed

~

priori in its intelleo

tual elements and in space and time, because tor Rant I know only
wbat appears.

Only the sensible

content (e.g. flames and smoke)

is empirical.

In this constructi on, the categories, imag;im tion,

and the materials of sensibility are combined to torm an object

wit.ll ch'3racteristlcs such that onacious1y I Vw'111 make the above

ju<lgm.ent.

But both sub jecti ve and object1 va are one synthetiC cog

nitlonal act.
Atter much consideration, it seems best to divide the treatment in the following maImer, the seoond chapter will treat the
sUbJecti ve schematizing process by which t before all experience,
the categQl'ies are cQ!lbined wtth the manifold of sensibility.

The

third chapter will explain tbose texts which concern the products
of the Flchematlsm of the categories, i.e. the transcendental
schemnta, which as universal ch,"lracterist.lca ot experience EU18ble
the application of the categories to:ob.Jectlve
experience ..in con...
.'
.

scicus judg,ment.

It is true that it \,111 not always be possible

to abstract completely the schemat1sm from the schemata f the production from the prodUct.

But at least in point at emphaSis, and

f'or Clarity, this arrangement is better.

The fourth am last

chapter will ahow how this interpretation of schemati am points up
the consistency o,t l"ant's thw ght.

Th1. will be accomplished in a

su1'!l.Jllary of the arguments of the preceding chapters in the context
of the "Deducti ons."

Chapter IV will also make a few ccmparisons

between Kant's schemat1sm and Thanistic thou€ht.

,
CHAPTER II

mE SOLUTION, PART I:

THE TRANSCENDENTAL

AND PRECONSCIOUS SOHEMATISM
OF THE CATBXlORIES

'·Thls soh.matlsm of

our

UDl81!'8taDd 1mg • • •

Is an art concealed 1n 'the depth8
of the human soul."

The opening .ordsor

f~t's

chapter on scnema't1am at once

puts batere the reader Kant '8 view ot judg."Jl&n't as s'bl wd In the

"AnalytIc of Principles."

.Tudgaents are "au bsu.m.ptlons at an ob-

ject under a concept • • • ,,1

In the introductIon to thettPrin-

e1p1es" Kant explaIns thls more in deta 11.

The understandlng 18

the faculty whloh torme rtllea or concepts,S while subsuming under
rules belongs 'to the ,1\ldgment.3 The, faculty or judgJ.1ltnt also d1stinguishes whether

Cl"

not a partloulAr" ,object talls UDder 'a given

concept.
Kant also sta te8 111 the openIng paragraph otthe chapter at

lA 137--B 176 (180).

2A 132-- B l71 (177). That the "rule a" are concepts or cat ....
f$orlea throughout the transcendental deduction. see e.g •. .A 106
(135), A 110 (137), A. 126 (147). B 1,63 (172) and many oUler

pla ces.
3:Kant's word tor judgment is wteila!S£att. or the pcwer of

Judging.

ct. p,a'on.

II, 21, n. 3.

21

-

28

schema't1sm that the representat10n

ot the objeC't 4 must be homo-

geneous w1th the concept UDler which it talls.
an example.

He goes

Oll

to give

"Thu.s the empirical concept or a plA!e is hom,ogeneou8

w1th the pure geometrical oonClitpt at a Cll"ele.
I

III

The roundness

which 1s thQIght in the 1& tter can be 1ntu 1t" in the tormer. n
'rhls first paragraph 1s a 80rt

schema 1;1..

ot prelude to tho discussion ot

Whether 1 t is an accu.rate 11'ld1oat10n .ot the me an 1XIS

of 8cnemat1sm Kant otter. remains to be ,Been.

At the outset

Kant·s reader is puzzJ.ed by the notion bare that jUdgment is d1stinct :rran uadel"sta;od1ng.

He at Ul has fresh in h1s mind the

metaphfsical and transcendental deduct1ons.

There Kant evidently

thQIght that the preCise end of the uDders 1nnding and the act

i'orm1J:lg conoepts wa. fwD! in the pltl C1~ at a jUdgment.

at

This

apparent contradict1on w111 occupy our dis cuss10n shortly. o
In the secantS parasraph ot the sahem tism. chapter l(ant poses
the problem of heterogene1ty which wei '&poke ot brieflY' in .

Chapter I.

The pure ooncept. ot the understa D41ng do not posaoss

the hamegene1ty with emp1rioal 1ntuition which anp1r1cal concepts
do 1n the example Just <poted.

For siooe pur., the categories caa

never possess fUlythlag empirical.

No one, l'\ant ma1ntdinS, could

find anything of causality, tor example, 1ntuited in senae or
tained in mere appearances.

!<ant'a meaning seems

COll-

tbViOlS ellQ1gb.:

'supposedly Kant means the actual ooject dS ·well as tile idea
or representation ot th .... object-, tor he mkes such an oquivale.n.ce
later 1n the paragraph ~ 137--H 176 (160)). Cf. Patou,II.26.n.l.

OSee pp. ~ and 32.

the intel1 191bill

t,.
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of causality 18 not to be found in the sensl-

ble characteristics ot :reality.

Therefore how can there be the

subsumption or intuition under pure concepts or the application

ot the categories to appearances?6
The que 81;1 em 1mm.edla tel,. a 1"1 sea:

what i

l3

Kant referr1 ng t 01

Is this subsumpt10n ot appearance and appl1c ation oi' the eel tegory
to be oonsidered an expllcit and consc1 oUs Judgment. fer examPle,
in ph1losophlcal ju.dgment:
human experience. tt
smol'l.Eh"?7

OJ;'

tfOe.usallty is a <b.aracterlst1e of

in the empirical Ju.dgment:

·'])"1re causes

Or, on the other hand, is this su'bsumpt1on to be con-

tddared the relation 01' category and intu1tion found 1n the very
act of const1tut1J:lg the object of knowle4ge tn experience?8

The

former wculd be an obJeotive and conscious judgment abtllt the already constituted object ot knowledge.
subjective and !.

:ptl9J~

The la tter would be the

oon8t1tut1 Q1 of that ob Joet.

Because of

Kant fa own ate. tement of his problam r.u!'e, name 11, that at' , the
"

heteroganei ty of category and intu1tion, the obJect1 'Va and conscious jUdgment would seem almost certa1tU.y to be his meaning.

6A 137-l36-B 176-177 (180).
tion8 equivalent.

!<ant makes both the se dasor1p-

'The reason tor Choosing first an example or an abstrac~
ph1losophical judgment and then also an empirical one will beoome
ancient later in this chapter whan discussing the problems ot em..
p1rieal schem;atism and espeCif11ly in the di scua8ion o:f th1s matter
in etl. III.

S'Kant haa told U8 in the ltdeductions" that the cat.serles
make experience possible and impose their laws UpOl1 appearances.
See for example B 163 (172).

But _;Vb. iant meant the subjecti ..e alternat1ve. or e.,en both the

subject1 .... and the objective interpretations.

This ambiguity is

exactly the rundemental p.roblem. or the schemat1 •• chapter and 1s
also the beginn1ng at 1t. solut1on.

But betore sketch1ng this

answer 1n detail we must bear Kantts own :er1g tacie solutlon to
the p1'Oblem.
He tells

Us

that

8.

"transcendental' doctrine ot jUdgment ls

necessary" to allSwer th1s vel Important problem.

Th1s is not

necessary t Kant tells us. 1n the other (presumably non-transcendental) sc1ences.

Far in these, their ccnlcepts are not so com-

pletell dist1nct trom the obJeots to whlch they are applied and
thus no discussion

required. 10

ot the appl1cabl1it7 of the one to the other 1

'fhis statement or Kant wl11 be the source of many

difficulties whan a

re.

paragraphs later he begins an unexpected

d1scussion ot schematlsm of emp1rical and mthEmat1cal coreepte.
The answer, Kant teUs us at the beginn1ng ot the third
graph, is "ObTiously • • •

80me

pa~a ..

third th1ng," whlch 18 homogeneous

with both the categorl' and appearances cd m,lch consequent1)'
iThe term traMcgdln~ 1s used here and thr Q1ghout the
chapter on aehe!ootiam. and n.th 1s paper as well 1n ita most typlcal.ly Kant1an sense of the !. R£
cond1 ti en or knowledge. "I
entitle tranacenden'tal all knowledge Wbictl is occupied not so much
with objects as with the mcx1e or our knowledge ot objeets1n sO
tar as this mCX1e ot knowledge 18 to be possible !. priori. n B 25
(69). Ct. Paton, I, 229, n. 3 and 230 as well as smithts excellent history ot the term, pp_ 73-7&.
104137-138.-B 176-177 (180-181). ~in, "those Whioh represent lt ln concreto" must be cCIlSidere4 the object it self /I both
beoause ot the rea sou g1 yen abO'V'e 1n n. 4 and beoause the Kantlan
~~ega_a!taal!18.a r!presentat1S!! anyway. ct. also below pp. 73-

im
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makes the applicat10n

~f

the tormer to the latter possible.

,tthird thing" lant tells us by way

at

This

aUIlllll8.17 and title is a.

"mediating representat1on" whidl. IlUst be both lntellectual and.
sensible and is in tine, "the transcendental !chema, ,,11
We bave already seen briefly in Ohapter I how sane ot the
standard eouenta1tors object to }(antis a1atement of his p.roblem. 12
Smith tells US that 8e.henatism 1s nat IIlbsumpt10n but synthetic
interpretation by whim conten t8 are apprehended 1n terms of tunei10ml relatIons.

The category 1& not used as a predicate in a

judgment but it articulates the whole jUdgment aa such.

31.m.l1ar17

conceiVing the tranaeendental schema as a "t..1.ird thing't 1s treating tbe categories as if they were related to appearances in the
sde mn.r in whioh a universal coucept 1s applied to 1 i8 pa.r-

t10ula 1".13
'.to smith '3 tirst objeet1on the most po1"t100nt al'l8wer is that

Kant does not say tba t scilema'tlsn 1s

·~$Ubsumptiol1.

He says it is
•

a mediating procesa in Sllbsumpt10n (judgment), and that 1s a different tlling.
tion of

til

Nowhere does Kant equi valate schematism to subsump-

part10ular uDiel" a universal.

But it smith '5 first ob-

jection 1s ult1matel,- leveled at calling Ule

-

UA lZS-B 177 (181).

ScilGma

a "third

Italios 1n Ot'i g1nal.

8.

12Paton well renarka that to understand Kant

we must allow

him. to state his problem in his o. wa7- Kant
tea this probl-.
sharply wlth no indicat10n 01' the proposed solution, one which. 1.
general t we know trom the transoendental 4e4uo1;10. 'to be the doctrine accord11'l8 to which objects are com lmd in the manitold 1n

time.

II, 28.

13880 pp. 5 and 6 ot this paper and Smith, pp. 334-335.
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••

be probablJ fundamentally interuled, then the answer to

1i1le fire' objectiCl1 i8 1b.e same aa that to the .econd.
Smith's aecCCld Objection eJ;Pllc1tly concerns the use at a
ftthird thing."

And whe141er the relat1cn of category and 1.l'l:tult10D.

adm1 ts at such an idea as a

tttb. 11'

d thing" can only be

a.naw~n·ed

later in this paper. wben the mean118 at 8cmmatlsm is more ruJ.l.y
cla1'1f'! ed.
whole.

It is a quest! Ql to be solved in this thesis as a

Thls much, though, can be said here 1'ar Sm.i tb.:

1'lrst, he

haa touched the cent e1' of the whole p:.ooblem. concerning sehanat 18m,
and secondly, Patonts anawera to sm.1th 'a db je etlan on this subject

are by no means convincing.14
At this point then in Kant's d1scu.saioll of sehemat1sm the
precise problem. 11$ this:

sst1g?

what did Kant DEan by the 'trjlnscendental

Is 1t a l'lBdlating faotar 1n the subjectlve and precon-

scious synthesis or cateso1"1 and appearance, the transcepdm tal

constltutlcn ot the phencaenal

objee~?

Or is 1t an element 1n
•

consc1 Ql.8 experience, such a 8 when we ''Predic at e the categorles ot
that experience? The answer wh1ch this 'thesis proposes 18 that
14Paton cla1ms that sm1th's .etter-torm Interpretat10n ot
category and intuition is false and consequently hia objection 18
not valid. The categol!7 18 1ihe tom ~ thought. Dot at 1ntul 'tl0D,
whQie torms are 8Ploce aId time. This:Js a bi t too facile and does
not tUls ... r Sm1th '8 Objectlon. The oategorles are not the torllf_~
tQOlWt in the .Y In wh1ch torm determines DIltter. They areb.
t91~ _~
1n the sen.e they are tile ditterent ~~•• ot cancep anza on and judgn'Jent. On the oUler hand. the e uctlons
lead us to belle .... that the categorles do mve a relation !2. sena.
intu1 tl91 or appearances in a ne nner analogousl,. the same as n¥l t'Ce It
and torm. Nor does Smith's objectlon 1aply a t_paral succession
between appearance and category. as Paton nPintains. See Paton,
II, 27.

ftPoli!
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IRM D4el1 botD'

We saw that the hypothesi.

this thea1. 1s 'based on a duall1il 1n Kant·s thoUl#lt.

ot

It 18 one

wh1ch 1s evidenced througJlou tat leas t tbe wh ole "Transcendental
Analyt1c,n a dua11ty whlch in _n7 1Dstanee. ea8111 begets con-

fus1on.

This dUality 1s expressed in the d1sj\WCt1on jUst out-

lined in tile ambiguitJ of schem.atiam:

the preconscious and

transcendental coasti tutlon ot the obje ct. and the empirical and
exp11clt cognit1ve experience.
DUe 1;0

the nature ot Kant ts purpOSe 1n W1'1 t1ng 'the P11f 19"ue

he was muoh CODCel'ned w1tll the tormer.

But slace the transoenden-

tal processes are a condlt1on ten: all knowl edge and ot all experiencej as !\ant tells us, he oannot avoid speaking abOlt the
knowledge or expert_ce 1 tselt.

Indeed, the oomplex organlzat1on

ot transcendental. coDdltlona and aotiviti.s are postulated simply
to explain aDd jUB'tlty the neceasU'Y aspects or conscloua tho\l8ht.
The me tapb,Ja1cal aDd transcendental aeductions-e.peoia
UJ the
,..
forf18r ......beg11l wl~h ttl. "given" 1n conscious experience an4 f'rca
tbis argue to the transcendental Betivi ties wh1chalone can give a
suff1cient .Xl}lanatlO21 ot this experi.me.

Often Kant 881s thiDg$

about oae pole of 'th1s eO@Jllt1ve relationship whioh he means for
~e

01l1er.

This: 1s one of the principal sources ot cantua! on and

misunderstandiDg both 1n the "Transcend_tal ADll7t1c n as a whol.e

and 1n the chapter on schematlam in p1lrt1cular.
This correlative duality and 1t ..8 au 1 ting confUsion must be

kept 1n min4 aa the restor the d).cure chapter on sohemtlam 18
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discussed.

It 1s imperat1ve, therefore, before this is entered

upon, that the ex1stence ot: suell a duality in:Kant fa thought be
clearly justified,

Only then will ita imp;>rt on the schemat18Dl

chapter and the schemata correct interpretation stand out olearly.
Because the subsequent arguments CIt this cnapter are neoessarily long and sometimes complex, 1t is ne cessary that at thi.

point we ha ve a. clear map ot where our raid is heading and over
wbat sort

at

ter~a1n

1t 11e..

We

bave seel1 Kant's sta tamant ot

his own problem. hls R;1- flCl! .oluti on, the problem of this

thea1•• and last11, 'the pr oposed solution.

Betore we take up

Kant's tirst detln1tion of' the transcendental schema, we must
first prove t1l1t the duality which 18 'the essence ot this the.is
18 a slgn1tican t element ot Kant·8 thought.

First then this

duality will be explained and its existence jUBtit1ed. as a
legltimte distinctlon ln philosophy in general and lnitll parti-

cular Kantian development.
stances:

This laticnWill be seen in three In...
"
.

the "clue" ot the metaphysical deduction. the purpose

and conclusions ot the transcenden tal deduction. and in the twofold tendencJ to subject1 " ism. and phenomenalism attr1 buted to
Kant.

Then, secondlY'. with this dua11ty clarified, the text ot

tlle sc.b.emst1s14 chapter w1ll aga1n ocmpy our attention. from the
f1ret definition ot the sohema throu@',hout the rema1ning texts as

Kant

Pl"esent8~

the.m. But in this chapter cnly those texts w111 be

exploited which show the preeonsci QUS side ot the schena tism
duality_

First to the duality then.
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The distinction bebesn the precoDed. ous and the conscious is
not peouliar to Bant..

Tho tradi ti onal schola etic philosophy bas

its own preconscious and "t£9!oendent.,ln acti vi t:las in the Uluminat10n of the agent intellect. the mediation
the aotivities at the internal senses, etc.

or

the pmntaSln.

The preconscious is

often reterred to, not only in philosophy t but in poet1c inspiration and other artIstic endeavors.
~~.

;poeta

In his Ql!atlve Intu.ltioo

~

the sCholtlstic philosopher Jacques Maritain nnk.es

much of the "spiritual unconscious or preconscious."

He maintains

that these preconscious acti vitias are not purely unconscious but
principally so, or the exaot point where tbe preconaeious emerges

into the conscious.

Poetic inspiration is born at this point.

'rhere are two gr-eat domains of the precons oi cus, :Mar ita in affirms,
the spiritual

aad the blindly instincti ve or Freudian.

not mysticisfn, whether

This is

natural or supernatural, but the tunction-

ing of everyday 1ntelligence as seen·JJl sCient1fIc discoveries

the 1nner activities 'beneath fl"ee decia1ons. l5

am

It is evident then

that the d1stinction so. important in this thesia 1s valid also in
realms outside of th.e Eantian or1 tiC'll system.
The tirst important tactor in the IUmt1an development of this

distinction 1s the "clu.e" of the metfIPhlsical deduction. 16
15J'acq.ue! Y..aritain. ~a'lI~ Inm1,tlS2.Q

(New York, 1953) pp_ gl·9 •

Kant's

111 ~ and Pce1;rl.

16Kant gives the name t~Metaphys1cal Deduction" only in the
second edition, and then only by reference
subsequent to this
deducti w. "In the
ta h lcal d!dU<ttlon the !omOri origin 01'
to oategor1es
been p ove t %'0
e i com: e· a
ent
¥'I~~h the eenerar!OgiCal lunc ions ~t!u(~
t." ~
\} fi~8~.

~----------------------------~
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purpose in this deduction 1$ to show that the torm.s ot Ju,4gnen't

0

traditIonal logio ra"eUl 1n a h1dden ma:nDer the Olteegol'lea aa !.

l1.£1ori sources

or

thea. JUdgm.ents, \ll1ih a one-io-one correspondene

between the types ot Judgment and each category.l.,

Admltted1J 1Jl

the oplnicm. ot even the aoat S1I1Pl tb.eUo commenta1tors the ooo-toono cQrrespondence 1. moat artificial at.4 1n th1e point y"ant bas
decldecUy fS.lled. 18

But tb.la dOOR not d88t1"01 his pOint

at 1'1114-

in; necesMrzr and !. ...... pr1r.clplea in cur cogn1tlve activit1••

'flh.Ich accoux.'t tor tho necesaary torma of Judgment 1n gemral.

J'urtnermare 11t aervea to shQl'l Kant'. m.lal on the relat10n of
tranacendental act1v1t1•• and the categories to consclwa intel-

lectual eXpert.noe.
Atter an elAbo:re'. lntrodUotlon19 l.ani giv••
f

U8

the "clue" t

[

l'"In the .'apb,Jalcal Deduction the !. S:&SE'& origin ot the
eate€?"Orlea 11.11 &atabllshe4 by thelr perteot a greemnt w1 tb. the un1
verael log1.1 tUDCtlone (that b. t'Cl"r.us) of tb.O\li'ht. In the
rrransoendent4l DGduetlon C!'lt 18 mown·1. their R~S'~&.f" aa !.
cognitions of object. of Intu1t1on. More precaoy, the
hictap 1$10al DeductlOl1 1s concerned w1th determIning the llL.t ot
the cat.gorles, ard exp!Ii1n1De \heir ftl'~ 1n the nature'OT'""
url.derstanc.U.Ilg." Paton. lI.!40. Ite os n orig1:r.ral.
.

12£'5:

lBThe one-tv-one correspondence 1s #l.rtU1.clt:ll because the
forms Of JUdgmen' &re artificial. .Rrton 1n tnaUn.g the mtaphr·
physical deduction defends the correspondence between each torm.
and os.sor,. lI, 203-297), 'but adm1ts lflter when speaklng of 'the
s1enltlc(,;~nce of the transcendental scherzts that the table or
Judgments has been undermiDe4 (II, 77-70).
19,.. 66-79--8 91,..104 (lQ4-112).
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the intlm te relation between form of.' judgment and category in the
following words:

"The

~ :u~erst am

lath t,hrOl1Eih.l!!!. same O;eel"l-

-

tion§ by which in concepts, by means of analnI0 unitl. it pro-

duced the logical form of jud@1l6rlt. also introdUces a transcenden-

tal content into 1 ts representation, by nrH'tns of the
.YBitZ of the manifold 1n intuitIon in gen.eral. ff20

The mean1ng 1s this.
1ng.

~lnthetie

'l'here are two functions to undors1:13nd-

The one 1s transcendental and synthetic, the oiber analytio

and characterized by the propositions of general logic.
functions of the

s~:we

the same operation.

:loth are

unity of unders'tanding and are produced in
The synthetic unity 1s prior logically and

psycholOgioally (but not temporally) because it is the cause
the analytic unity.

at

The former is the a,-nthesis of the manifold

of intuition through the 1ntroducti on of trsm.scenden tal conten't,
namely the unity and nac8ssity

or

the category.

In conscious

aOA 79--B 105 (1l2). Italics not in origim 1. Paton f;1ves
this excellent paraphrase of ttia 1tclue": tiThe same uXlderstandlng.
and by preCisely the same acts, produces two results. Firstly in
concepts, by means ot the analn~o unity, it brought Into being
the l(}gical form ot a jUdgnsnt. Secondly, by means of the !l,,!!ta!i~s unit~ of the manifold of intu1t~on !B ~~eral, it introduces a tratJ..3cendental content into its ideas. Renee we caD call
these Idoas-·prasumably the ideas into which the transcendental
contant has been introduced--pure concepts of the understandIng
which apply A peiar! to ciJjects. This 1s a serVice which :B'ormal
Logle cannot perform." II. 287. Italics in origInal. concerning
the a.tamant of the final sentence, cf. this paper p. 34, n. 28.
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we analyze the cbject accordlng to the unities of

judgment

ganer: 11 logic.

The discovered unities are synthetio ones. 21

We recall too t in the introduction to the "Analytic of Prin-

ciples n Kant detined jUdgment as the faculty

o~

subsuming objects

as distinguished from the understanding whc.ee function 1 t was to
foral concepts.
contrad~.otlon

itself.

Here in the met3physlcal deduction an apparent
arises in tll<'it -the p.al§:1:trtan£l.iM forms judg):uent

This is not really a contradiet1on.

In the logically

prior cOllsti tutioll ot the object the understanding forms the totallt,Y vm.loh in conscious jUdgment hill a1 ther be broken apart

(negatlon) or separated in crder tho. t the parts may be reunited
{afflrraatlon).

~'Ihen

speaking or c01leclous judgmnts. bebause the

concepts are empirically abstraoted from the object at exr..er1ence,
'we can in

it

sellse "subau.m.e!t an object w:.ier that concept.

But al-

ready here it must be admitted that this OO!tcern i'or subsumpt10n
will be found more a. result of' };;ant t eflove I'cr the arch it a,ctoniC
"

of traditional logic than anything 6188. 22
In the sentence 1m.m.ediu'tely preceding the ab ove one elaborating the !'clue tt Kant tells us Vt'hi.lt he mans by flPA1:t.lc

tylJ. tl

and

s:artE+!at1c Witx although he d<..es not give than auch mnes until
t.fle following sentence.

';'llhe same function which gives unity to

2l.Note the sim.ilari ty with Cs ~:rd t S analysis of jUdf~nt in
conjunction wi th sehematlsm. See this pa~r pp. lO ...ll and Cal rd.
It :PI'. 405-406.

22Cf. Smith, pp. 332-333.

See end of chp. III also.
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the various representatlons All i. Jy.dS!:!nS G-nalJtlc un1 t~ also

l!.

gives unity to the lnere aynthes1s of' various representations

!Ii

iP.tM&$&9.i ~ynth.t10 un! tyJ; and this unity in 1 ts most general

expression, we entitle tbe pure concept or the Ullderstand1ng. n23
The analytic un1ty 18 the procedure ot bring1ng different ideas at
objects under a ooncept. 24 The S¥athet1o unity 1s, aa Paton at-

firms, the same doctrine elaborated in the transcendental deduc-

tion.

Every object of knowledge has besides the particular in'"

tell1g1b111tJ wh1ch

w.

recognize through empirical concepts an

universa.l structure wh1ch is imposed by

thQl~t.

Paton well re-

marks that Kant merely asserts th1s here and intends 1 t as an

hypothesis to be established in the transcendental deducti on.

It

must be provls1oSJally accepted here for .Kant to ahai the relationship between the consc1ous farms of judgm.ent and the categorie8. a5

It should be noted tbat limlyt·1c unity is not the same th1ng,
indeed. has nothing wbatever to do w11h:t.he 11JD1ted class

ments classed as "analyt1c judgments."

And

o.f

jUdg-

s1m1larlJ there 1s

only an analoG' between the spec1f1c synthet1c Judgmen.t and the
synthet1c u1iy wh1ch is found at the bas1s at all acts of know-

ledge. 2e

Bere again ..e have an example of Kant;____ ~p~ use

of terminology.

i ':"""""

::-",.

,.. v

23a 79--B104 ....105 (112).

24 Pa tOtl, I. 285. Concept 18 cons1dered here, of course, as
an emp1rical concept and not the category.
25Ibi' •• 285-286.
26c1'.
_. 301.
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Bant Dever says that tIle synthetic unity invol:ved behind

a nalytic consciousness ls preoonsci cua or nne onsc1 CUB.

O\l'r

But impli-

cit in all F.ant' s arguments in this line of thwght 1$ the :necessary conclusion that a t least such unity is not explioitly ad-

verted to.

Otherwise why all the long "transcendental" analyses

and arguments?

It will be necessary to return t

Q

this quest! on

again.
From what we bave seen ot the "c.l1.\e" of the metaphysical de.
ducti on it 1s clear that the duality bet.een the preconscious aDd
consei ous!'1 1s a leg1 tiDa te and tundamen tal e 1Ea.edi in Kent t II
system. as
This fundamental duality is confirmed by tba general purposes
a ud conclusions of the transoendental deductions.

Rant expresses

the purpose or the transcendental dedUctions in many places in tbe
Cri,);lgU;1 and in several ways, but probably the most general is put

in the torm:

How can the subJeoti ve:Condit ions ot thought. (the
"

.

2'1For Q good oonsidera.'tion ot the relation ot the metaphysical deduot1on to the transoendental deduction and to the transcendental schemata, see d;h14-. 296.
28.rhe duality seen. 1n the metaphysical deduct10n is Ule same
as that expressed in the distinction between general. end transcendental logic. 'Goneral logic treats at the pure forms of thou.ght
w1thout aD,J oonsideration ot either the oontent or orig1n of knowledge. On the other hand. transcendental logiC deals precisely
with the orig1n and rules at pure thwsbt of &n object and how we
have it RltPD knowledge a t all. See A. 55-56-B 79-80 (90-96),
A 13l.....B70 (1'16), lllncl A 135--B 174 (1'18). Th1s distinction 18
nothing else than the distinction between. the rules ot conSCiOUS
judgment (general logic) and the rules for the consti tut10n of the
object at A prl9.fl knowledge (transoendeutal logiC).

~------------------------------------------~
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ea tegorlea) tta.ve obJective val.:1dltJ?29

The answer 18 the in'Yol;"e4

reasonings ot the transcenden'tal deductions.

It would be well be.

yond the purpose and scope of this paper to ana17ze in detail the

arguments ot the transcendental deduct10ns of both the first and
second editions.

The obJeot! Ye here is simply to show that the

dua11 ty between preconscIous const ltnt ion of the Kant ian ob J80t
and the conscious knowledge of that object

ot Kant '8 cri tical system.

is an essential aspect

Therefore our procedure will be mer.ly

to summarize the fundamental arguments ot both the first and

edi ti on Tersi ona of the transcendental deductions.

aec~

Some of Rant t 8

particular analyses will tind their way later into this dIscussion
when

considerIng some

or

the other texts on schemati ...

'1'lle transcendental deductions can be summarized as follows:
1. I am conscious of an object of knowledge in Sloee.ding momenta

of time.
2. :3ubjecti vely there is required tor: SU.o1"l C onsei oueness of an

ob jec't ,

a. that the percept10ns of the manitold be syn1hesized by some'"

thing prIor (logically) to it in 'the knowing tunction.

aOA 89--B 122 (123-124). Ct. Paton. I, 240: "Tbe Transoendental Deduction wn1eh i8 a Just1fication rather than a deduction, shows how l t 1s poss1 bla, and indeed necessary t tor eate- .
geries 01', such an orig1n Lthe unders'teuJd1ng--from the metaph;ysical
deducti ox!} to appl.l to objects 61 yen in Intuit! on. It 1s, in
shart, concerned with their Obiect1ve va11d1tl. and so with their
e~ifl and w1th thel~l" of heir 16ililmate use. rt Italics in
or
nal.
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Th1s is synthesis ot apprehens10n in the I. ],1rior, form of:
inner sense.
b. This synthesis demands
sentat1ons.

til

reproduction of the prev1 ous repre

Such empirical reproduction could itself be

effected only by something prior to it. 1.!!.- pure synthesis

ot PI" oducti ve imag1m t 10n.
c. A recognitIon of the preVious reproductions in the unity of

one consciousness.
~).

now there is 1mplied a transc$nden tal syntllesis ot pure apper-

oeption 1n:
a. The processes ot p1' educt1 ve 1uagtnat1 an just ment1omd.
which can synthesize percept10ns not arb1 'trar117. but 1n

necessary conneotlCl1.

This synthesis 1s acoord1ng to the

uni versal law or norm of transoen.dantal apperoept1on.
b. The reoognit1on.

or

prev10us reproduc tl ons spoken

or

which

.,

demands a unity of consclousneas.~.

c.

~he

const1tution or the in1t1al oonsciousness of an objeet ..

Th1s 1s expanded 1n the tollow 1ng step_
4. The consciousness of anobjeet

or

knowledge imp11es and denends

the conscious unity ot transcenderltal appercept1on.

os 11y ,

0 onsci ousne ss

knowledge.

Reclpro-

could. not be w1 til au t an d> je ct ot

In deta1l:

a. In knowledge there mst be a synthesis of the :::snitold of

experience with the

undera~~nd1ng

unity to that Dlnltold.

by the applIcat10n

ot a

This unity is not that or the

37
oategory, or how could the category it self be synthesized

experience?

b. This un1 ty 1 s none other than the transcendental un1 ty at
flpperce:ptlon.
c.

'1~here

is an analytI0 unIty involved here (I am I).

turn demands

Ii

This in

synthetIc unity in the same ins tan t, that at

the apperception witll. the r;lan1fold 01: experience.

:E'or

again, there could not be consoi GUanase; unless there was
sOlne content to this unity.

5. Three conolusions necessar1ly tollow from th 1s analysis 01' apperception:
a. The un1ty spoken ot constitutes a.n objective unity.

For

the combIning of the representatIons of a manIfold into one
consciousness constitutes the relation ot these representations to an object.
b. The logical forms ot judgment

d~ ..not

merely join concepts,

but constitute a unIon in the object according to the

di verse subjecti Vtl tnncti ons lib len are 'lbe categoriee.

c. The synthesis of apperoept ion wi th the ;:uanifold th rough the
diverse fUnotion of the categories lim1ts 1hese categories
to the realm of that synthesis, i.e. tu sense elPerlence.

Consequently the categories are valIdly used only in the
area of that synthesized sense experi enee. 30

30rrhe principal sources tor this summary outline, according
to the diVisions ot that outline, are ss tollows:
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'1'he duality so important to this thesis is evident in this

summary, in the subJeot! ve deduction ot point two, tor example.
and in apperception' 8 constitution ot the ob ject of
]~ven

in the repeated emphasis on

smt+u1s

knON led6e.

as a tundamental '00 sis

of tnought, we oan pereeive the difference between the logically
prior constitution of the object, and consequent consciousness

of that Objeet. 31
The third and last instance mich shruld be considered as
pointing out this dual1ty in Kant' 8 thwstt t 1s the double teudenc

1. A 98 (131).

a. A 98-100 (131-132).
b. .A 100-102 (13~133), A 11S (142-143).
e. A 100-104 (135-134).
3.

B 160-152 (1M165 ).

a. A 1.19-123 (143 ...148).

b. A 123-126 (146-147).
A 11~-119 (141-143).
c. A l04.... UO (134-138).
4. A 104-110 (154-138), B 131-136 (152-154).
a. B 129-131 (151-152).
.~ .
b. B 131-135 (lti 2 ...104 ) •
".
c. B 136 (154-155).
5.
a. B136-140 {155-158}t .A 120-J.28 (147-14.9).
b. B 140-142 (1.58-159,.
c. B 143 (160) J B 146-149 (161-164).
Ct. :~1th.. espeCially for the second editi an of the transcendental deduction. PP. 284-291.

31we are not aware of'sYnthesis as sueh in. our conscious experience. If' we accept Ra niT;;"" starting points (and it is beyond
the scope 01' this thesi. to challenge ~em.) we will b!i va to discover this as the baaia 01' the un! ty we find in knowledge. J~ven
outside the Kantian context we must admit that in much of OUr
knowledge we s:~lUUl some of what is sub jective to the g1 yen at
experience.
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to bottl subjectivism and pwnamenalism which 3mlth attributes to

MIlt.

Pdton preter$ to call this dual pencilant in IJmt's thought

"empirical_realism" and "tranacendental. 1deallsm."

For 3m1th th,i

is a blind tendency in which iant constantly vacilla.tei,h

aub-

ject ivism is pred anlnate wlum all uppearances and empirical objects are mere modifications of wbjectlve sensibility.

In this

view the synthetiC aotivities are mere cognitive processes ot the
individual mind.

When the phenomenalist tendency is predomlm.te.

appearances gain an existence independent ot the mind, the synthetic activities tak.e place before cOI18ciousness can exist at fAl
and are of a. aoUl1l8Dal cllara at er .32
Paton objects to this interpretation and says that thas& two
"tendencies" instead or being contradictory are mutually depend-

ent.

"Transoendental idealism" (subjectivism) 1$ merely Kant's

continued emphasis on the fact that human. knowledge is not of objects as they are in the.tnsal vea but a~ they apP,ear to the )l\unan
"

mind.

":&I.pirical realiemtt (phenomena11_) is merely the 1"&ot the'

hl1lD4n bcwl'9dgo as the Joint union ot things and the human mind
shows us that real substances and accidents truly interact and a
d1rectly prea.nt to the human mtnd. 53
Whlc.b.ev~r

"View 1s correct. the tendency serves to show that

Kant was constantly ooncerned with both sides or our cognitional

31Sm1th, pp. 83. 274. 270, 271.
33paton. I. 582-583.
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duality.

Not because the double tendency express •• neatly and

directly the dual aspect or cognition, but because in such
ency Vie see clearly

too t

,~

tend...

.Kant was constantly concerned both wi th

the subjective constitutIon of the cotsnit1onal object and the

hUMan knowing

or

that objeot.

And if 3mi tIc

t S

content! ens are cor...

rect. he often confused the two.
Although this duality is certainly a constant element in

Yl.8nt's thou€')lt,

88

should be evident after 011 that

v~as

just dis-

cussed, we have not yet Been clearly that the 'fttranacendentalft
side of the duality is preconae1CUtH

The fact that all th.ese

transcendental act1v1 ties congi'tion knowl;eO.ss and "malts! 6xoerisnct

l'oss1l;>le'ftseems to prove conclusively that they are preconse1ous. 34
All thIs discussion has not been a digression. far removed
from

!l.'l

discussion ot schemat18l'lh

This dUellty must be clearly

MThls will be settled fiM.lly ].a tel' in this chapter. EVen
if this side ot the duality was not clearly preconscious, it would
not mllterially affect the pOint of this the81~. Since, ho.\'Gver,
tbese activities are to be tak.en aa preconscious ones, then it
would seem that smith's v1ew instead ot Paton's concerning the
double tendenoy is carrect. Moreover, Paton's view or "empirical
realism'· 13 unconvincIng and when formula ted. seems to redu ce i tself either tv subjectivism or to the same contradiction attributed to Fant by smith. It seems there is no denying this contradictory tendency in Kant, and indeed it was impossible to avoid
ont!e l'~an t had determined that we do not know the ~ an a1 ch.
Consequently. i8 Smithts vie.. of the transcendenti'Iactrvitles as
noumannl also correct'? That is a question that it is 1m.possible
to answer here since 1 t would invol'Ye unravelling YlAn t t s obscure
and controverted doctrine concarn1ng the noumenon and the "transcend.ental object." It does not directly sfreet this thesis and 1s
outside its ltmits.
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understood and 1ts existence

justl~led

before taking up Kant's

first definition ot the transcendental schenK't.

see that to a large extent

sc~emat1sm

FUrther, wa shall

is essentially only the

transcendental act1 vitia. which are the product! VEt side of the
duality outlined in the deductions.
Kant's first real definition of the transcendental schema

occurs in the fourth plrtlgraph of' his dla;lter.
most in the form of a syllogism.

It is stated al-

The maj cr is, "The concept of

Understanding contains pure synthetic un1 ty of' the manifold in

general. n

This 1s a thought whi<il. 1s repeated throue.,hout the

cri$lgul, especially in the transcendental deductlons. 36 The
minor gives the nature of time:

"Time. as the formal condition

0

the manifold ot inner sense, and theref'Ol."e of the connect! on ot
all representations. contains an!! Ui2£i m;:::.nifold in pure intui-

tion."

This repeats what JCd:mt has said about time in the nAes-

thet1c.,,36
The conclusion of this syllogism is stated and elaborated

upon in the following words:
Now a transcendental determination of time is so tar
homogeneous with the (:ategorYl which constitutes 1 ta
unit1. in that it is universe. and rests upon .an !.
priori rule. But, on the other hand, 1t is so tar
homogeneous with appearance, in that time 1s contained
in every empirical representatlon of' the manifold.

35 Se8 for example, B 144-145 (160-161).
36Espec 1ally A.34. ...-B 50-51 (77) a nd A 46-49 ....-B 66 (86).
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Thus an app11cat1on of the ootesol"Y to appearances becanes possible by means ot the tranacenden tal determ1nat10n of tim.e, which, as the sChema of the concepts or
understanding. mediates ~, aubsumpt10n of the appearances under the catego17.
rrhe 8l"€)1ment 1s not dift! cult to to11ow.

UnderstaD11ng which

tunct10ns through the categories 113 natively orientated to some
sort or object or man1told 1n general.

Time 113 the formal con-

di t10n of the man1fold and 113 at the same t 1me an !. Rri orl rule
connecting all representations in Slccess1on.

Thus it is logIcal

that time should be the mediatlng factor between the category ot
thooghtand the empirical manifold, since it is both !.

P!"10f.~

and

em.plr1cal.
But the noteworthy thlng aboot tim.e as the media t1ng factor

is tihat It is a "transce:ndantal

Paton translates the German word

glt!lm1~tIon

p,t

le'tbe8tl~lYlS

1t","

or as

more 1Iterall,-.

"transoendental time-determinatIon." 38 Now hare Kant seems to be
explIcitly talking abalt the transc.fd~tal !..c}:l.l.,39 and n,ot
transcendental lcb.mMt1Eb the preeoIlSoi QUa p;roductlve process ot
the tormer.

But in tbe present chapter of tll 18 paper the precon-

scious schematism process is to be prlnarl1y cons 1dered.

Shalld

not then the consideratIon of the transcenden tal t1me ...determina3'lA, l:S8-139--B 1'17-1'18 (181}..8 tor the whole fourth

paragraph.
36PatOl'l. II. 29.
39trhe transcendental sehem or t1m~~el.p1i~tlon from its
objective side will be discussed in ei. I i.
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tion be relegated to the next chapter?

Decidedly not.

It was

ment10ned ear11er that 1t would be dl:f'tleult to abstract the precoosci oua schematlsm from 1 ts product. the consclous schema. What

Kant tells about the latter 14111 teach us much about the farmer
and 11ce

vellA~

Moreover. as atlall be seen. l(ant often contuses

the two considerat1ons.

Thus we m.ust consider some texts in both

chapters, but each from Its l'espe cti va point of view,

Thus the transcendental determination of time is explicitly
the transcendenta.l scile:na.
t:l,

The bent1mD1BY of the compound m.eans

determ,iMtlon but can also mean the determ1n1y or the aotual

determination a t this moment and not

!JI!t rely

1 ts completion.

Some

d1cti maries give the first meaning of bestll!!!!U!S as a tt:f'lxing.
fIxatIon," 1ihen only a ttdeterm1nation."

A Geman dictionary pub-

11shed 1n 1611,40 Just twenty-tour Jears attar the publication

or

:tant·s seoond edition glves the f'1rat det1nlti on of besti!@'!WS aa

au.

"d1, handlgs

or determin1ng."

bel~i • •h"

or "the action ot the determination

Consequently. there :~.s muoh to be found .concern-

ing the schematlam process in the implicatIons ot the def1n1tion

ot the schema.

Sehematiam then can be sald to be a process whlch

determines41 t1me (or aots upon time) In Sloh a way that the
40J'ohann C. Adelung. WorterbucA m. gochS!u-;sgp.e,p KuMar".
3 vola. (W1an t 1811).
41Cf. these words about scbemat1sm wh1ch I<ants gives us else

where 1n the W:lkaUS!: F1rst, "the categories require in addition
to the pure concept ot: uDierstanl1ng, determine. t1 an ot their appllcation to sensib111ty 1n general \the schemata )." A 245 (263) •
.Kant also tells ue t.hat the "acto of' understand1ng are. without
the sche'i11lta

ot sensibllity, Bll1eterP!imd." ;\. 664-B 692 (546).

Itallcs in original.
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application ot the category to appea:tance. 1s !!lid. possible" 42
This is an initial definition whiCh w1ll be r1.lled out in the
course of subsequent analyses.
Paton interprets this time-determinuti on not as a characteristic of t1m.e ltself, but as characte-r1stlcs of objects as tspor
This leads him to his typical "uni.
versal charaoteristics" interpretation or the schemata. 43 Al-

and aa combined in one tlme.

though Patents interpretatIon contains no positl.. discrepancy
canpared with the interpretation to be evolv»d _ret hia pat1tioa
excludes the su.bject1 ve condit 10ning slde of the duality
being found in Kantta tex1;.44

trOll

Yet from 'What bas been seen above a d

from what :Kant tells us abrut the transcenden tal schema in sub.equent pa:ragraphs it sa8me all but absolutely certain that
thili d!t.t,n1~to1'\ coptYIU!t1J.l fl.tllIn!. }l2;tefl

~u;t!D.

,1S!ft s:L !W!. 4ual.tt. a

pro-

cess of determin1ng 1n time and the determination ot time which
results.

In another p9.rt ot the schematlsm chapter ltant tIllks

a bout the schemata as

na. RJ."lor!

de tar mine. ti one

or

t 1me

in

Ii coord-

42Eyen if iant had _ant only the p-oduet here, the determi.
nation would lltve demanded a determining and something to do the
determin1ng, and even a fo:tm or rule according to whicb the 4e·
termlned was so effected. and we would stl11 be able to argue muc
concerning the produotive process :rrca. a description ot its COIlplett on.
.
43paton. II. 29.

"ct.

below, pp. 07-68.
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ance with rules,u45 which seems to support this subjective determining interpretation.

I/or tliere must be something determin1ng

(an agent in the act of determining) in accordance with the norms
of these rules. 46

This interpretatIon i8 consistent with win t Kant tells Us
about sehematiam in the

mn

(fifth) p!lragraph.

Atter summa:rlz1

the conclusions ot the transcendental deducti on, the lim! tatlon
to sensibility mich t11e categories involve, Kant tells us that

the categories must ncontain !. Pliox:& oertain formal conai tions
sensibility, namelytthoae of 1nner sense. tt47 Kan.. equivalatea
these conditions to the

tr~llSeendental

0

schema by telliDg us.

nThese conditions of sensibility constitute the un1versal condltion under which alone the category oan be appl1ed to any object.
This fQt'mal and pure condition of ,enstbl11ty to

whlch~ -the

emPloy-

ment of the concept of underainnding is restri cted. we shall entitle the SOS!mI ot the concept.

Th~ 'procedure

ot understanding

45A 146--B 184 (185).

4 61t is strange that wi th all til e emphasis Kant puts upon the
definit10n ot the transcendental schema as a ti~-determinatioll
throughout the whole achemat1sm clJapter Smith does not oonsider
this even worthy ot mention. Marechal is mere concerned VJitil a
lesa mentioned aspect (forma.l condi tion ot sensibility) and eveD.
Deval, who makes schemat1sr!1 80 important, does not capitalize up
this definition, as he m1gb.t .ell M .. in his interpretation.
47Cf. it 181--13 224 (212) where Kant tells us tha.t the category "contains the unity of th 1s scheml" and that it is substituted tor the ,category when apply1ng tile latter to appearances.
The schema 1s the key to the category fa empluJment, "or rather set
it alongside the category. as its restricting conditt on • • • il
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in these schemata we shall entitle the sohemat1s. of pure understanding. ,,48
Therefore to summarize Kant t a th rugb. there. schematlsm. 1s the
procedure of the unders tanding whereby the entegorlas are senslb17
condit10ned (thrOUgh the formal sensible condit10ns they conta.in)
so as to I1n1it them to sense experience.

What preCisely Is th1a

formal cond1t1on of sensibi11ty which Kant equivalates to the
transcendental schema. and m.ore 1mmedia te to the problem of th1s
chap'ter. what 1. the "procedure of
feets 1t?

~e

UDderstanding n Wh1ch et-

Kant himself tells us that it 1s based on the transcen-

dental deduc'tlon.

And he .baa also just told us tha' the schema at

the category 1. a. tra.nscendental determlnatl00 of time.

Indeed

there 1s nothing strange 1n equ Ivalating -formal cond1tions of
sensibility" to the "transcendental. determination at "time."
1n the "AestJaetic" Kant does almost this very th1ng.49

the form of inner sense.

F01"

T1me 1s

But inner ti.,se (t1me) includes .the de-

term1nations ot outer sense (space) and so is the !. prl,or1 condition of aU a.ppearanees.--micb is another way of saying "the for-

mal conditions ot

sens1b111ty.~

The transcendental schema then 1s a transcendental determ1nation of t1me which as the formal condit1on at sens1bility lim1ts
the categories to sense experience.

All of this is effected

br

4SA 139 ...14o--B 178-1'19 (181-182). The limitation aspeot of'
th1s paragraph hae 111s proper treatment in eh. III. Here we a.re
only concerned with the "formal oondition of sensib111t,y.rt
49A 34--B 50 .... 51 (77).
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the activities outl1.ned in the transcendental deductionth

For

Kant implies throughout the fifth plragraph that all he is telling
us, about the uforml conditions ot sensibilityff 1$ a repetition or
extensi on of the transcendental deduction.

this deduction confirms this.

'What we sa:w earlier ot

That deduction can be summarized

essentially as a synthesis of the manifold according to the rules
of the categories in apperception.

In many p.Ulces throughout both

first and second ed1 tions we parcei ved how the minifold is de1!er-

mines and. aUJAlIUHU,zli through the categor1esin the, uni t;t 2.!. !,R.RercgtiQ!h and how a,s !. it6!y:lt the categories receive val1dit,

only in the realm. ot: sense 1ntu1tion. i.a. are thereby limited. to
this area of experience. 50
/

Marechalts view of achamatism 1n general talls in completely
wi ih this interpretation.

We saw alr$ady how he baaes schaUB t18m

upon the synthesis of apprehens10n of the fi :'st edt t1 on at the
transcendental deduction.

He tells U;s:tbe given ot external sense

is unified by the internal sensa at time.

•

Unity in tile multiple

50Typlcal instance. in the transcendental deduction which
correspoDa w1th tbe sensible cond1tioning ot the categories and
determinations ot t1me as aspects of scb.e:natism are the following:
A 105 (135), the unity of rule determines the l1'8n1told; A lle-US
(141-142), apperception funct10ns throuf#1, a sya'thesis of all the
manifold; B 143 (160), tne manifold 1s determined. by the categories; B 150-151 (164-165), figurative synthesis at the sense manifold conditions a. nr12£1 knowled,ge. The fo11C»iing two references
are of primary signif1cance: B 160-161 (170-171), categories prescribe laws whereby there is a determined uni t1 ot the mani:f'old in
accordance witll the categories; and B 146-149 (163). without
&lsnaib,s. 1njlll~*2A .or detarm1naii on in time knowledge is not valid
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elements ot representation 1s possible through a princ1ple of'
/

antecedent un1fioation.

Cri tical. reas ooing confirms. Marachel

says, his psychological analysis in pOinting out the fact that the
original synthesis is by no means simple, but supposes a union ot
cOfllplicated associatIve processes whldl is construct1ve irmginati on.

The unity ot consci ousness i.poses certain conditions upon
the ob jecti VEt synthesis Just menti omd.

F'rom the point ot view CIt

the understanding these COM i t1 ons are the categories t the "antecedent unificat1on" mentioned above.

From the point of view at

1mginat1on these are the pure transcend8l'ltal schellllta. which

a8

we saw in Chapter I, Illlong wi ill the empirical schemata. mediate
between consciousness and the synthesis of imagination.

or

all

the conditions far object! va knowledge, the schema 18 the solder1ng point. 51
I

The content of Ma.reellal's psycho1.0g1cal a l13.lys1s of s..chematit:1tn a l'pears idan t!

00+ with

in the "deduct1 ons. rt

"

.

the transcenden tal a ctt 1'1 ties outlined

We cannot agree with the llhole ot Mareohal'.
"

interpretation of schemstlsm,52 but his psychological analysis
cOIl1.'1rms one vary im.portant ooncluslal which shruld have been
obvious in the correlation pointed out above between scheaf.lt1sm

51Ma~cha 1. III.

52gspeclal17 1s there difficulty with his pr1marily subjective view of the schema, at least as it is described in general.
cr. pp. 12-14 of th1s paper, and 011. III.
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and the transcendental deduction.

It is simply:

transeendenta.

schema tii'i1 • ..2£ ,the ,m:0gedure 2£ 9!£. trans con 1en,tal ac. ti vi tie!
l.imlti~

the CfliiUHEie.l

determinations,

2£.

~

.u. notbJag m.,ore

.u.

obJes,tt

~hrousa

ReeD

J.a

.!!!

jibe sonsibla conditions of time~

the subjective constltuti!!}

thi transcellden tal

d~ducti

'fhe :\mpli-

on.

cations of whut Kant tells us l.ibout the transcendental schema de-

mand

this.

,

M~.l"ecb.al' s

interpreta t1 on cont irma it.

It is utter11

consistent with what we saw in the wal aspect and tendency of
Yantts syatOOl.

And it will be conf1rDBd by the rest of the text

on schama tism.

The meanIng or t1U"1\eterm&na't101 is a 11ttle clearer now.
:Paton is correct in remarking that 1t is not a characteristic at
time. 53 It is :rather the determination C1l somthing in time.
Tha t sOIoothing is the object known.

The III tura of the transcen-

dental SChema or time determination taken objoctively, :from. the
side of conse! ousnese. will be elabo.ia_d upon1n the
ch{.~ptAr.

complete.

:t'ol~ow 1ng

OUl" picture of Schamf:ltisrn is necessarily here but halt

The important thing is that we perceive in the dlClptar

on achematism the contusing dUality so characteristic of Kant: he
tella us more about the preconscious constitution ot
\linen he explicitly treats

~le

Object

ot its correlative oppOsite, the con-

sCi ous object.,

In the next section, in the sixth am the first llalf of the
seven th paragraph, Kant 113 most successful in hiding his meaning
53See above p. 44.
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from his reader and rreeipltat1ns an endless maoa 1n interpreti

schellBtisn.

In the second paragraph which discusses the problem

of heterogenelt,. Kant was quite emphatic in poInting out that
there was a need ot discussing sUch a problem only In the 1nstance

ot the categor1se. ftIn none ot the other sciences is ibls necessary.ft 04 How is 1t then that in. this sect! on under consideratlon
YUint g1 vesus an explanatl an of schena tlsm of emplrical and ma'themtlcal concepts?
The openins statements of t.be sixth paragraph are simple

enough and presumably concern the transcendental schena.

It Is a

product of the lmag1natlon55 a..nd 1s always dlst1ngu.lab.ed from the

image.

The reason

tor the latter 1s tba t the synthesis ot the

imaginat10n in producing the schema alms at no special intuition ...
'the implIcation 1. tbat such would be an lmage·-but merely at
uni ty In the determinsti an of SEmslbI11t,..

'fhere 1s nothIng new

here except far the tuncti.on ot 1magiDaU
on In producing the sche
.
"

(wh1ch was implied 1n what MS already been seen concerning the
transcendental schema).

But in the next sentence Kant goes on to

descr1be the schemat18m of a m1ibematieal conoept. the thinking of
the number tive or a hundred or larger numbers.

~ln.

in the

first halt of the seventh paragraph Kant desert bes the schema t1sm
of the geometrical ooncept of

54A 13S--B 1"

8.

tr1ansle and 1. ts rEtlat1 an to an

(180).

65For the tunction at tmg1mtioD in schematism see belay
pp_ 55 to 6".

51
lmage ot a iriangle. and the aohemai!sn ot the sensible cmcept
a dog. 56

0

Now schemai!sm. 01' anplrleal CODCepts57 seems to be outslde

the 11m1te ot this thes1s ..hlob. is concerned onl.7 nUl the schema
tism ot the caiegories.

Mare'Ver. even it this ma:tter talls in 1ih

realm ot this thests lt would seem bettalr to treat 1 t in the next
chapter where we are oOJICerr.ted with the oojectlve scbemata ot con
sCiousness.

It would seem that schemat!sm

or

Gnpirieal concepts

would be a conscious process or at laast evident upon reflection.
Nevertheless, .Kant's insertion of ih1a trea1im.ent bere might in-

volve eome significant 1mpllca1ilC1ls tar transcendental sehematl.
Consequently we must at least determ1ne the purpose of the treatment of the empirical concept.

The tact that Kant denied earller

there was any problem. tn the applicability of emplrioal concepts

to their. object. does not neoesaul11 preclude a treatment CIt
schematism. ot such concepts.

It is utterly lUl11kely that ~nt

would flatly contrad1ot h1mself so explicitly within three paragraphs.
But here lt 1s precisely that a great problem. arises.

doe. seem apparently to contradict himself.

56A l40-14l-B 179-180

Kant

He did say that there

(182-100).

it

57By 1IR,;19
:rRC'~1 without fUrther speCifications i.
meant all matb.ema c
an what Kant calls "seSibJ,! .col!ce~p...
In Scholast1 c terminology they would rOUSlly c arreapond
u.n1versal ldeas, while the categories would correspond, again rough
wi th the analogous concept. ot n:e tap!lyslcs.

wr

I

II

was no problem of heterogeneie'ty tor sclences other than transee
dental.

Scb.ematisU1 was postula ted to answer this problem.

then treat sChemat1sm 01' empir1cal concepts?

~~thermQret

Whf
the

de1'1nl tlons ot schema ta Kant gives in this passage involving empirical schemat1mn are vague and extremely difficult to analyze.
Ii is here more than elsewhere that the oommentators run r10t in
contradiotory exeS881a. 58
It 1s evident that no com.plete or valid explanation ot trans
cendentsl schematlam can be had unUl these. quest10ns are
answered.

The faot tbat tant lncluded e. trantaent ot schenat! ••

01' empirical coneepta must bay. one

Either the cauldeation

0'[

at two possible significances.

empirical schematisrn throws 11ghton

8chGmatiaa in Its general aspects aDd

C CIlSequently

on transeemen-

tel schematI_ as well, or emplri:cal schematlsm. was Insert ed bere
as a point of contrast with transoendental scheDlit1sm, showing

:nesstl VEtly what the schena t1sm of the .::ate€:;"Ories involves ••
Now since Prlcnard found vary notable contra41ctions between

"bat he thwght to be tant's treatmeD:t at schenat1sm in general
and the transcendental sdlem&,59 since we saw similar inconsistencies in l-lar&oba1 t a treatment of the same two .subjects. 60 and

-

5Srhe dlverse opin10A8 outll:oad ln Oh. I are mare otten than
nat concerned with the definitions of schematlsm that Kant gives
when descrlbina empirloal sohsl11'ltl ...
59priCbard, pp. 252-254 and th1a thesis. pp_ 11-12.

60see this paper. pp. 13-14.

53

since Paton t1nda that supposed considerations ot sCbematlsm in
general "throw • • • little 11g11't on the nature 01' the tran.cencl.J:~
tal schemata. tt61 1t would seem that Kant's consideration or the.

schematiam of empirical concept 8 i8 not direoted toard

ampl~r,.

ins our knowledge of sohematlam in SCleral, but rather it 1s a

eons1deratlce ot what transcendental schem.at1sm 18 not.

SUch an

interpretation would l:Il ve 1tJ.e advantage of sk1rti128, the dlffiCulties outllned above.

ADd since sohe. i1 sn.

or

epi:rlcal cOl'lCepta

and all that 1s involved In It. cODIJidera't1on would be negative 1n
its relat10n to transcendental sohematlsm.no detailed analysis or
justlf'lcation ot Kant'. treatnen't would be del8nded.

But such an

interpreta'tlon would leave oontradictary the tex't. involved

Qf'

at

least would make qu1te a .1l1U tb.1nker and poor p1111osopber out

or

Kant himself.

are

80

For expliolt cOlVJlderatlo:tls ot empir1eal scbemat1am

interwoven with

sta.t~nt.

that must re81rd transoendental

aOhemat1srn,68 'tha't a _s8tl 'fe 1nterpr~)ation at empiriOal 1!chematl am doe s a complete inJustioe to the cons is'tenor which l\ant d1s-

plays elaewhere.

The negat1ve 1nterpreta't1on at empirical set.ma-

t1sm cannot. therefore, aately stand.

What then at the man1fold

d1tf1cul't1es out11ll$d above when the statements concerning empiri-

cal schemtiam are regarded as val1d tor achema tlam of the categories?

61Faton, II. 3&.
62For example, the sentence stating that sohelllltlsm is a "concealed art." A14l--B 180-181 (183). It w111 be diacussed below.

04

A way out 01' the marass seems

t~

be the following.

We will

f1nd that &.int t ,. treatment of Empirical scheRB tlam is indeed Intended as a consideration of the general aspects of scneDlltism.

It 1s so i.n a different oontext and trom a 'd1ttere nt point
than it has been usually interpreted.
show

or

vi.

But it 1s also Intended to

that there are 80me dlfferences between the two schemata.

lbplrlc:al knowledge 1n general and emplrical sohe.ma tlsm in partl-

cular as seen In thls interpretation wl11 ciroumvent the difficulties 01' the

commenta~rs

caUy conslsten t.

an tioned abO'1e and leave Kant basi-

The carelessness 01' KfID. tts expression am not

confUsion in h1s thougbt w111 be found to be the source of tbe
d1:ftlculties in the interpretation of th1s pissage.
Now, it w11l be seeil that empirical schem 't1 am falls deti-

nltelJ an the objeotlve and cognitional aide of the essential
duality ot this thesis.

Tberetore a de'ta.11ed analysis of Kant's

detinltlons at empirical schenatiam

Ii~~

the objections to·them

will be rightl1 considered in Chap1ter III.

Nevertheless, as was

seen above, the general sIgnificance ot empIr1cal achenat1. must
be here clar1tied 11' tranacendental schemati $11 fran Its constl tu-

tive side is to be seen in its rig,.t perspectiv..

This general

consideration will involve two interdependent points:

a brief

analyst. ot the function or iBaglnation in schematl. In general
and the preCise place ot enp1rioal knowledge (and empirlcal
schena t1_) In 141e Kant1an system and in the tuIJdall'8ntal duality
outlined 1n th is paper.
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We ea_ alrciUt41 ttlat tbe aGems wa. a product of the 1reg1na..
t1oo. 63 E;'-en it kat 41d not teU UtJ that throughout the schemat1
chapter, we would bel1eve that SUch would bra the caee after tollowing the arswaen'ta
first edl tlon. 61

or

the deduotions. espe('J.alll those ot the

There 1. perl'ltlpa noth 1Dg 1n l.s.nt's expositions

of the 1'11".' 9ZlS'911 that 18

80 ComDlOD.pla

eean4 Jet

80

vague ••

the tunc:tlon of transcendental 1m.glnatla:;. 1n producing the
l'.antlan object of knowledae and thl sd'1emata as well.

us tbat t-ant gives us no clear anner to
t1on.

Whether

Paton tel

ttl 18 Pl'lblem. of

in'rlg1na-

transcendental uag1natlon exerta some Influence

upon the tOJ!'lUot though, as some at leant'. later llfri.tillgs seem t
Im.Ply. or whether 8""1"1 sYDtl'u,als of 1re slwJ tion followa a demand

of thCUe';ht. aa l(ant'. words in the

Q£&t~snUt

repeatedly ossert, is

a question which 1t 1s imposs1ble to settle here.
certain:

Only this 1s

transcendental il;eglmt1on concerns s1D:thesls in time

and 1$ an aspect at synthos1s 1n JUd~ t. 66

This much is oerta1nly true alao--&n impression oonstantly

lett by analyses ot the trari.8C8udental deduction sudl ns was outlined earlier in ttl 1s chapter-that tran seen de tal 1rlJl gina tion
(and consequently OIIPu1eal or reproductive lus.gtmtion) 1s inter

-

•

63aeg1nn1ng ot a1 xth

p!l ragra pb

ot text.

See p. 50 ab Of ••
.

.~

MF01' exaaplet A 116-121 (141-144) but also B 151-152 (165).
65.Pa ton, II. 71-72.

II
!II
I
I
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u;.ediary between the categories of understanding and the sense

munifold.

Amung uther things this was certainly the burden of

synthesis of apprehension and the whole t:ci-fold synthesis in the
66
l>irst edition deduction.
Rant expressed this much Lloro
succlntly and clearly than he ever did in the 9ritlqu9 in a letter

to Bec,L

D

few years after the publication of the critique',! second

edit ion. If intuition provide~ .a manifold for knowledge and if'

understanding binds and determines knov,1edga. then it 13 thG

fUllction of imagination to structuralize or compose the former
according to the determinations of the l,} tter.

sorts of' representation.s ure demanded:
~)bject

Hl"or knowledge ·tv;

(l) intuition by which an

is given and (2) the concept by ;vhich it is thought.

'1'0

make t.hese two elements of' knowledge one knOtdedge, an nct is
;3till required:

to organize the manifold given in intUit ion, con

formed to tile synthetic unity of consci ~)USness which the concept
expresses. ,,67

If Lnugination 1s lnttirmediary • it 1s not q.ifficul t

to see ?:hy its product, the schema. is also intermediary.
I!llilgination (sp,eciflcal1y transcendental or pure imagin{ltion)
well

<113

its produced schema vlill be

Inper progresses to· be . the can'eral

SEHHl
hl11!~e

more and more as this
joining the two

hotor()aneVus poles wl1ich involve the Ini tial problem. of'

66A 98-102 (131-133).

67Letter to 13ecl; ot January 2J, 1892, Kant's schriften,
J?rusaian Acudemy of 3cience, (Berlin, 1902-I9'08r; xl', 305-!502,

quoted and commented upon in naval, p. 90.

a~

5'1

schematlan.

It ls also the hlnge where eet the two sldes of the

dUality wh1ch solves sehenat1sm·s dlfficult1es.

Returning now to that dua11ty. where does emp1rical knowledge
as d1 stlngulqhsed from transcenden tal knowledge fl t 1nto 1t. strue!"

ture?

l!m.p1rleal knowledge lnvolves the cons 01 QUall abstracted

general concepts of common sense 1ntellectual knarledge.

The ob-

ject ot th is knowledge 1 s som determilJfl te aspect at the prevlous11' cond1t1oned and constl1llted. PlWl9llnQ,D which 1s the product at

all the transoendental acttvities molding the materials at sensibility.

Empirical knowledge is not l1ke transcendental knowledge

wh.tch 1s philosophical and does not so moh 1nvolve abstract10n
from the known object as refleetive insight into 1t.
tal knowledge is

Transcenden-

ot a h1gher level a nil more universal. penetra tlng

Int 0 the ob je ct known; It does not advert to

~e

ot knowledge on thi\t direct enpiriesl level.

Thus empirical know-

_pirieal con1tem

.,

ledge (whether It be ot "sensible" or qetbem!lticalconcepta) aDd
the an.pirical schem tism it involves are dependent upon and subor-

dinate to not only the preconsc1 aue and transcendental constl tut1011

of the known universal cbject,

rut

slao to the conscious

philosophical or transcendental knowledge had when applying the
categories in consc1ous JUdgments.&6

68rhe dependence of the empirical part ot knowl$dge upon th.
I. Rrl,ort is oert.alnl7 8 conaon aspect d: KBntta doctrine. Probab17
its mos trenohant explanation is in the subjec'tive deduction Of
the first edition transoendental deduction. A 115-119 (141-143).
'I'he three elements ot knowledge, sense, lmg1Dl tion and intel1eotion. are seen to havepa1"alJ.el functions on both the empirical an

58

A.ll 1his 1s a brief sW'JlDa17 at the oon:lual CDS of Chapter III
the Objective s1de at the Kant:Ja.n duallty_

Yet 1ts conslderat1an

1s demanded to' percel va the s1gnlt ica.nce of iant' s Insert 10n of
emplrlcal 8cbematlsm where 1 t is taUlld.

Kant can sUddenly descend

to B%WD.ples ot e.mpirloal schemata. even when d is CUB sing trans cendental schematlsm s1.mply because the act which constitute. and
molds the known cbJeot. is the same act which enables b1m to know

the categor1es 'lnvolved and schemltlzed In this object. and 18 tlB
same act by wh 1& he can aba-.raot a certain plrt

emp1r1cally.
schema.

This latter

cessl tates an intermediary empirical

The difficult1es ot interpretat10n ar1se preclsely, .e

shall see, because the
pecta

De

ot that obJeot

CIle

transcendent

a ct, with its dual as-

ot tc:rmlDg the kXlOwn and l<nowlng it both

and Empirlcally,
express10n ot the

~ran8cendentallJ

could not be claarly percei ved in 'the lIl1aleadlng
scb.enat1sm chapter and ,d tbe det1D.ltiona alJd

examples of 8I'lplr1cal schemata. in pert~.~lar.

!. prlpn -a1des. In ea.ch case the empi r1cal functlon depen48 upon
the correspondlng transcendent.l one. It shwld be noted that in
the reason1ngs of the traDscenden tal deductions Kant begins' w1th
emplrical knowledge, presclnda trom. 1ts material content to dls*
cover the necessar3 and universal ln emplr1 cal e onaOlwSDiUJS, a~",,,,
proceeda to the transcendental activities and the categories as -.wl
only legltlftBte explanatlau ~ our lntell$ctual knowledge. But th.
procedure in oo:natructlq the object lIIlat be Just the opposite (1n
order ot oausal tuaCtloll, not of t.paral sucoe.81an): the cate·
gorles Blust through 1mag1uat1on ayll'lle81ze raw experlence lnto the
transcendental object (in which tbe oat8corlea, DCI'l sohemat1se4.1
11e) and tram. this object at length 'the m.1nd can abstract and far..
i
mulate the concepts ot empirical knowledge. Further cons1dera1;1011s 1n tn1.vein are ODe ot 'the _in objects ot Oh. III.
!

59
lan, 1II18t .Te bad fb1s transoendat un1t, ot knowleAge 1n

mind when he treated alterm tely detinl tlona which eTiden'tly have
onl7 to do w lth emp1rical concepts (tor example the rrequ.ent d18-

al8s10n ot the

amS' Which

emp1rical sehemata.

consideratial8 ot tranacendental achematism.

DB.

ke possible) Elnd

An instance

at

tbe

lst_r 18 \be ..11 known statemfllt or Kant that schematiS1l ot tbe
Ulld er s taDd1l1g 1a a htdd en art.
Eant DeTV use4tb.e term. "schemat1sm of the lmders tanding"

unless he meant 8e1uunatisn

cendental schematiD.

ot :the

IQrO

understanding. i.e. trans-

The least tl1at can be sald ls that 1n it.

t.

context 1t must refer to acmematlsn 1n gemral.. bo1ib. transcendental and emp1rlcal.'fl1e sctence is one f:£ :Kant

1I10st quoted.

ftThis schemat1sm ot our unders1Dm1ng in its app1ica1;ion to appeu
ancesand their mere torm. is an art cone ealed in the depths ot
the haen soult whoae real males ot actlvity DlWre i8 001'017

11ke17 e'Yer to allow us to discover.

~d

to lave open to our

~.e.tl&9

Th1s sen:tence seems

~

prove what wa. sta ted above abQ1t the

69A 141--B 180-181 (lS3). Note that t11e sentenee tollC1l1ng
br 1.Dgs baok the discusslon ot empirical concepts. It the cop.geal!i W. sentence 1s to be interpreted &s referring to tranaeendental. ache.tUm primrU 7 a. it seems necessary to do. we can
easily perceive the d1tt1Cl 1ties fbis parasraph bias brougb,t to the
lnterpretati on or sChema t1sm. This very en1gma ot !{ant fS text
serves to empbasize the 1nterp1'e,t8. tion that the dual 1 ty of transcendental cc:ndlt1oniug and Empirical knowing was ever betore
Mnt'a mind.

60
schematlsm process be lng preconso1 aua. '0

Now schemat1 .. 1s 8een

to be rreeonselous nOli only be_use 1 t 1 s equiValent to the
transcendental determinat10n of the object as seen in the transcendental deduction. but also because .tan t 8lq)11cltlr desorl'be.
schematlsm as "conoealed in the depth. ot the soul tt etc.

This is

further confirmed by someth1ng Kant said about the synthesis involved in kno\lledge in the section on meiaph),slcal deduction,
words so similar to the present ones as to make one belie,.. that

Kan t had them exPlioltly in mind when he wrote the <ilapter on
schematism.

ftSJnthesls in general. as we shall. hereatter see, 1s

the mere result

or

t.he PQter

or

1magi:Dilt.1on. a blind but indis-

pensable function ot the soul, without wh1dl we shwld ha'Ve no
knowledge

whatsoever. but or whid! •• are scarcely e'fer con-

sc! ous. ft 71
This quotati an, 1"o\Wd

~a

11

l.$

.!Jt ~ q.lids t

QL'

tie

~ !eRhls &

cal deducttoaj confirms that such 8yIittl.6Si8
ia px-econac1w..s.
"
.

It

also strengthens the conten1i1oIJ. of this the sis that the synthetic
actl vitles spoken

or

1ntranscendental sche matism are the same as

those detailed in the transcendental deduction.

But it especlal1

shows that these acti"'! t16s are the same as must be implied in tb.
metaphysl00.1 deduct! en where un1 ty 1s discOV' ered be tween our mude

?Ocr. Paton, II, 73 and later in tiae present anapter.
71A78--8 103 (112).

61

RD.sa::6 pr1ncd.pkta
sect1 (Il or the leng1ibl

of judgment and the !.
In the last

*leh ette,t them. 72
seTen1ih paragraph Kant

s11ps formally agaln into a discuss10n ot
ti_u. '13

tl"(in$ean~en tal

schema-

Here we are given a closely pa eked sen tono. whlch f as

Paton remurl{ti. Fant 1s apt to present a t
argt.un.mt. 74

at

eNolal point in an

This sent.me exp11citly gives the oharacteristics of

tb.e transcendental schema aa

diBtl~ul&t\.d

trom o\her types of

$cb.~ta.'~m1th

breaks 1 t doe well tn his tra.nslation 1nto aev-

eral sentenc...

Because it is

80

involved, It will be quoted here

d1v1de4 and subcrdlmted accc:.rd1ng to the sensa.

On the other hilld. the sell ... or a pure ooncept of underataa41Dg can . Y . 'b8 brought 1nto 810' 11'll88 whatsoever.
It 1s aimp1.7 the pure syntbeala, det.. mb:red br a rule of tha1
un1 '7t lZl .e.or48110. with coDe.pta,
to whioh the oat.gory g1ves expreaa1 al.
It 1s a 1ranaoe4ental product of lrragii6'1oD.
a product 1h lob ®ncerna tho determlmtlon or 1llJ'l8t' ae. It
In geneX'dl aco crc11ng t" eolld1 tl ona of 1t. tOrtm. (i1.),
1n respect at all representations,
10 tar as ih88e reprfJsen.ti 0D4 are to be COfJ.D!)oted

tnRc!ii~t;n: 1::~:' wi1". of appenIJ'1

....

I

Qt.

7.5

i -It

71er. Paton, It 263 where he teUs Us that 1hls plssage "ls a

aWIlCf.u:y statement of doctrines vAllch Will bo elaborated in the
TraDacendental De4uctlClh" PGtoa baa•• 'this ~at._nt upon, smoag

other things. Kant' a sta .ment ln the passage quoted, "as •• slBU
hereafter •••• " Cou14 not thea. werda of l~ant JUst aa ,.ell rtis
..1in§.
{lRift .91.
U. 08110 C i.d ll1 s 1n(l e we mv e noted . e
i1m"Il:ar '1
_ _ ne wo ...t . . uta?

ft

II

!eSU1;»

,aA

tinal d lscusa1 on ot emp1rloal aehot!ltltlarn toll",. the ,"op"
Ct. n.. 69. The tact that the subsequent
passase is ln.t rcdUoe4 by "~on ~tbJt 0Ms~.M·t fur ther jus tlf18 II the
distinction "'ween emp1r1C1i'l'""i'iit ~ iJ'iii";fe:ntal schetnatlsm. Of.
Ch. Ill.
'14Paton, LIt Z7.
~!a,laJl

!l.1 sentence.

76",U4z-.B 181 (183).

62
In interpret1ng th1s "PIIr1 d 1fti cul t passage it 1s nece.ss17

far the most part to tollow Paton, who a1anda alone in attemptlns
to analyze this sentence cr even dl$OUS8 it.

or which

F.ant l1llkes three points, the 1b1rd

another three.
ing image.

Aco<rdlng

to Paton

1s subd1vlded 1nto

.FIrat the transcendental. schema has no correspond-

This

a.

1~

:fact lant diaou saes throughalt the Wi ole

sect10n on empirical achemat1sm.

Only empirical concepts can

mve

imges corresponding to them or to their schemata. 76
The second point causes more dif'1"1culty.

I\ant

seems to be

equi vala t1ns; the transcendental. scheua to a synthesis.

Paton ad-

mits that perhaps the best interpretatl al of Y..nnt's meaning In the
words

HS

given 'Would be that the schema'lsa ru:\!

as 1s the. anpir1eal schema.
sp6cl1' ic kind of !!

RF~

ae

at

lrm{!.1mtlon

preters to think that it 1s a

51'.& oc.mbinati an »rodu cad by pure synthesi.

of IJ.mgination and is in eOnformity ltith the rule conceived in th

category.

That f its well with

paton'~.. int

arpretat10n ot the

transcendental schema thus t~r, but 1t does not expla1n :Kant IS
words. 77 If the transcendental scl1e~ is a synthesis in an act1"
or opera ti ve sense, then we e.as i11 pereei ve the difficulty ea..toa
seems to be trying to explA.1n away:

an activity and its product?

But

hOlt can the schema be both

~Dth!!1a

is an ambiguous word.

It ca.n be also ta.ken in a pa.ssive sense, namely that which bas
bGer~

synthesized.

Such an 1nterpretat1 Qll

EI

volds the d iifle 1.l1ty

•

76Paton, II. 37.
77

37-38.

Kant says boldly it

II

§.. S
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paton toresa.. a8 ..ell as reD:1ers the Kant1an text more oons1s tent

and 1ntel11gible.
pratat1on.

The rest of the sen ten os bears out th 18 1nter-

For 1 t i . a synth. es1. ttpttlma.!I,d by a rule ot 'tilat

:!!.!a. concePts.,,78 Moreover, the vera- ambigu.DU.aI,il In 1b is sen tence points out once again

unity, in. 8pcQra!!Bcl

ity of the ward
tluat Kant

1\,IaS

constantly kl:Jepl:ng in .mind boths1des of the cogni-

tional duality.

He talk. abwt the product. tne schema, but aa

something that baa been syn1h •• 1zed. 1t1s been determined and eondltioned b1 the rule of the cate80l'1.
this ambiguity seems to be barne wt in the third po1nt where
after telling us again tha t the' transoendental schema 1. a prOduc"

of the 1magtm t1 en he d•• er1 be. wbat seems to be more the characterist1c8 of the condl'i tiling process at
duet.

He apeaks of the sche.

a.

SCl1EUJJil tism.

than its pro-

OODOC' nins the determ1Ul tion ot

tlme with respect to aU represeD:tations.

This see_ 1;0 be cm17 a

rehashing ot the synthes1s at the manlf'Ql,d in time so as

stitute experience ("in respect to all representatl <*lett).

tp

con-

FUrther

he SaY8 that these representations are oonnected a priori in one
ooncept in conformity with the unity ot apperception.

Does this

not seem to be the schema'1sm pro08 •• '19 as unifying experience 1n
accordance with the law. ot appercept10n (the categor1es), eaoh

-

...
faA. 142--B 181 (l~).

Italios not In tr1g1nal.

?gor, in the hypothesis ot this thesis, the transcendental
activi ties ot the deductions.

M

produced aahemaSO corresponding to one or other

or

ttl. ca'.gcr1_

This 1s certainly a possl ble int erpl"etatl on and It tlt. in not

w. bav. seen ot the pure schena '1 an prooes8 1ib.ue

only w1 th what
far but also

gl. ve. U8

once agaIn evidenoe ot the ooDt'Uslng ambIgu-

ity which characterizes Kant's treatment.
In the eighth para8l"8:ph .Karl't Bakes a trana1tion to a con-

aideratlon ot 'the tran scendeni4l schemata in partlcular.

In the

brief p81'9graphs nine to suteen lnclusl'VQ Kant descrlbes eaoh ot
the transcenden tal s& emata It

In the seventeenth

p1 ra gra ph

.Kant

summarizes the trans cen den tal schaats, as we saw, as "transcenden
tal determ1nat1ons ot tl_ in accordance wi th rules."

All of this

treats the objeotive side at tbe ache_ tism dual!t,. exclusively
.
81
and will therefore be d1scussed 1n the next chapter.
t.rben in the beglnn1.ng of the eighteenth paragraph, Kant gives
us a d8f'int t1 on ot scbema t1 am. of' the UDiers tanding based on wba t
he haa sald abQlt the transcendental

s~ernata

as various ttme-de-

"It 1s endent, theretaL"8. tllat what the schematiam

terminatlons.

at UDderstan1iDg etreets by !leans of transcendental synthesis

of

imagination is s1mpl, the unity of all the manifold at intuition
in inner seltse. and so ind1rectly the u.n! ty of appel"ceptlon which
•

8OW1tb Paton, these are the universal characteristics at experience, as we sl:f111 seo 1n the next chapter.

65

as a function corre.ponds to the receptivity ot ilU3er sense. nel
This again is tellIng proof tbft'li the fUnction at the soh."tisru process 18 the same 8s the constitu t10n ot the phenomenal ob-

ject, or Uthe u1'l1ty of all the manifold c£ intuition."

Kant tell.

us that this is done in 1Illler sense 01' course, and says that 1nd1rectly this erreota the uni t1 of apperception.

This

~galn

1s

not only consol1flnt w1 th the transcendental deduct! on but an ecbo
of 1t.

We

recall that especIally 1n the second edition deductlce

Kant p01nted out that my having an object at knowledge demands ep-

perception and that in turn I could not have th1s unit,. ot eonsCiousness unleslI there was a n object conformed to 1t. 83

the empIrical :slde

or

apperceptiVe cCllscloUSMS8

Y!8S

Further,

the recepti.-

vity of inner sense. 54

lmmediatelyafter 'tal1s sen'tfmce

}Cant

spe&it$ again abwt the

11mlta:tlon of the ca'\egorles whicil results trom transcendental.
"

.

82. 145 .....B 185 (165-186). Again Paton, interprets this I'll th
rei'erence to its ult1nate result and not what it 18 in itselt or
from. the poInt ot view or the proCHs whIch proCilc8s 1t (II, 7375). lie admits the passage is obscure but thinks that }~ant means
different ldnds at un! ty or comb 1nat1 on of the tEDporal manU,'old
corresponding to 'the categories. He claims that schematism involves an obscure SUdgment. tThis product of transcendental synthesis is an instance ~ which tho pure category app11es. t It is
not explicit in ordirary eXp:1r1ence. He deniee. as we sh!9.11 see
again. that It 1s preconsci cus: "I. .... still less a description
of the sucoessive stages which precede experience_"

83B 131-135 (152-155).
64B 152-159 (165-169).
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sehematism. 85

These last sentence. ot this paragraph and the sig...

niticance ot the lill1 tat10n aspect at scnematism as a mole have
their proper treatment on the objective side of schene. tlsm in t be
following chapter.

The final paragraph ot the dlapter. the 1;wen-

tleth,86 also treats explicitly the transcendental schemata, the
objective side ot our dUa.lity, and will be ana17Sed later.

There

1s remaining only the one-sentence nineteen th paragraph t9 dls....
cuss, ,which "serves

8.S

an apt s'tlmJlllry of the point ot this chap-

ter.
"All our knowledge taUs w11t1in the boWlds ot possible experience, and just in this universal relation to possi ble experience consist. that transcendental truth mich pl"fIlced!1 all empirical truth and makel .11 P9!Sllb!*,,87
In the midst of h18 treatment of the transcendental schemata
Kant tells Us 'that 'laycmdent9i:

i£Y'tP

our knol'Jledge wh ioh f'alls only wi ttl 1.D

perience. sa

Rt:Scegel B;nsl !l2 kes Dosalbl t

~he

bounds ot possi b;l.e ex-

In the metaphysical end transcendental deductions

S5A l46--B 185 (l86).

eGA l46-147.-B 185-167 (l86-187).
87J. 146.......]3 185 (186).

Italic. not in O1."lS1Dal.

~ot. the similarity ot this paragraph to a' statement made
by Rant 1n his treatment otsche. i18m 1n the Prole~omena to ~

l!&:!au:, !!~apm~e •• t1:ans. Pet er G. Lucas (ManChester. 1~5'!T.p;'T7:
"The object contorm.1n6 to the schema 1. encountered only in experience {Sh1! HiJ!g ll:lt.. p£!:!dUO; at the Unders1~lJJl1ng out at the
mater1als ot seiiIliIl1t71. ItaliCS not in original. The paren~ ...
ais is ambiguous, but context seems more in favor of join1ng ale
with the !;rtal:!fW making !xpe£lemt the product, not soh_.

6'1

Kant had told us tbat

~ere

are certaIn!. priori Pl"1D.c1plea aDd

synthetic activit1•• whlcb make possible and cons1;1tu.1;e the phe-

ncmenal object ot our knowledge and ?hlch accoUJlt for the unIty
and necesal ty of that knowledge.

This source d

wh1ch In the ra41cal Kantlan sense of' the

W 01'4

Oll.'r

1s tlans~en4ental

truth 1s preconscIous in 1ts condItionIng activ1ty.
ing us the same thing we

114'11'

knowledge

Kant 1s tell

in the deducti ODs in the cha pter on

schematIsm, where t we ahall see. he 18 deser1 blng tor us the lUliversal characterIstics

01' exPerience 1¥h1ch jUstify the conscious

applIcation 01' the ootegor18. to

tm t

experience.

'lbe schemat1sm.

process which prov1des and proouces these character1st1cs.1s
noth1ng mere than the transcenden tal .,nth esia or the m.an1fold 1n
general w1 th the unIfy1ng and leg! ala t~ng pr1nciple. 1nvol ved. in
apparcepti on.

Consequently. this 1. a preconsci ous aot1 v1:ty.

The

>

po1nt of: the schena. tlsm e1l8p1;81' 1s that the categortes do provide

the transcen dental sOh ema ta in tbe 11' a'0'1 1vi t 1es.

,

'.

The tact tba1; the schemat1sm proce•• 113 subconscious or pre-

conse10ua has been repea1;edly emphas1zed throughout th 18 treatDent.

It may be objected tbat Kant neTer explicltly mentions this

tae1; In etther the dedu.et! alB or the chapter on seb.ema1;1sm.
sim1larly objects to the interpret .."1on that 1tle S?neealed

Fa to

!.l1 8S-

peet or schemat1sm proves that schemat1sm 1s unconscious or eYen

posstblI 'M refers back even to
.enttal y-cnange the meaning.

0RJAAl,--but

this would not es-

68
nOWJ1fUlal. 89

Yet from ~at we saw of thi$ 1ft ;)tII.lge sbove, ani troa

J1l..arely tbe !!l$anlng of the
h~

cancet V8

c.rd llIAl2H4fB Ul. this writer

eann~

su.ch ne_in tiea could pcs81b1y be consCious, at

least exp11citly so.
.Ri2qPQAg~0».l

the word

li

The :final determiDAtion

or

must be the tol101linf.

It 19 that mldl

the meaning

at

at...

fac'ts or baa some influ.ence en cOMo1018 kl1owle4ge, bu.t ot t1b.lch
I am not explici ~11 a_re_ At beat. it 1s 1m.pUclt90 in consciousness ot an object in such a -7 that 1:

ledge ot it anlJ
consciousness.

at~r

COM

to beve

};now-

long anal,.••• and reflection ooncernlng th

That seems to be wbl t .Kant

~a8

dolDg 1n all tbe

transcendental actlvit1e. Q1tl1D!d in the deductions and implied

11'1 the sellem.atiam chaptS'.

Consequent1r. 1t 18 c.-talnly not 1n-

volved in the expliclt and direct content uf cr41nary lau:&'f ledge.
It the achema.tlz1ng QC:'U vi tlea are the same

88

those out-

lined in the deduct! one, tb.en 1s the cha pte:' on s cbe mtltls~.'l super ....

fluous'

That 18 a question which

can:~

Qnly be answered after eon-

aid erlng the transcendental ad:! el'l8 in :'the

....

'"

C

oneret ••

...

89;patoll. II, 73-75. cr. p. 64. D. 82. It ahcu.14 be ncaecl
that 1'8to1\ BUlk·e. mdl in this section of tho pOint. tbtlt tu:m.ettiltl
111 not Wlcoasolcue. Yet be make. no a ttempt to pro,," thu. The

final iSSUG Of the position or l\ik'ton's general 1rtterpretat1 CIl at
scbemati_ 11111 be cons1dered lAter.

90tant implies that we do 80;'18t1• • be ve a_reM •• of 8l1oh
activities when he says that we rare17 if over are aware CIt the
echem t1z1ne actl 'Y1tJ. A 141-8 180-181 (10:3).

0BA.PTl£R III
THE SOLUTION. PARr II:

THE OBJEClfIVlC

SCHEMATA OF CONSCIOUSNESS

"Phenomena are nothlng more tban the pure conc.pia
sehemat1sed • • • and the world of ,cienes 1s
a world ot schemata • • • "~
The task 01' th1s chapter 1s to demonstrate the objective slde
01' the dIla11ty wh1ch Is the essence 01' this thesis.

our

conslder

atlon must now turn to the products of the transcendental schema ...

t1z1ng process.

These are the characteristics.of our consciOUS

experience whlch enable us to apply the categories to appearances.
The accomp11shm.ent ot this 'task will be cons iderably less labor1ous than 1n the preceding chapter. because the 1nvestigat ion must
concern 1tselt mcre with Kant's expl1.c1t and prima tacie state•

ments concerning schemata. and it is ntit so necessary to delve extensively 1nto the transcendental implications of some of h1s obscure defin1tions.
In the first Mlt' of the solution 01' the problem. of schematism Kantts statements were considered principall,. in the order 1
which he presented them to us.

This was, in a sense, necessary

1,1'.J. weldon, e~:roduct10t1 to ~..!. Critigue
( Oxford, 1945) t p.

as

.2.t FUre ReasOll

'0
lest by Juxtapositlon ot oertain unrelated texts a misinterpretation 01' the continuity ot his argument might result.

But now

since the general lines ot his argwment bave been outlined, the
goal ot this Chapter w111 be much more clearly accomplishe4 by
dividins the arS\l.lB.eit.ts and :Kant's texts under tive important head

lngs.

lll. ot Kant t • essential statements concerning the

will be treated acmewbere in 'lhose five sections.
are:

(1) the transoendental sohema in general

a8

schenau

Those headings
the solution to

the proble.m. 01' heterogenelt7, (2) the transcendental schemata in

partlcular, (3) the schemata as limitations 01' the categories,
(") 1ihe function

ot empirical schemata, and

(5) the significanoe

ot the tranacen4ental achemata In tbe Kantian system.
Flrst, to the transoendental sche. as Kant's 801ution to the
problem 01' heterogeneity.

.Pure catego17 aDd aen •• appearanoe. are

too completely dlverse in their respective natures to allow an unmediated application ot the tormer to~ ~~e J.a tter.
O8lls upon

fl

Theretore }(an'

tIEl!1l9!pdenta. »!M-de1!l!1ns:t1 gp a. a mediating tac-

tor, because time i . both !. PEion and thus hc:mogeneou8 wlth the

pure ea tegary, and 'the torm of sense manitold and thus homogeneous with a ppetUtance •• 2
In conerete consoious Judgments wbat doe8 th1s mean?

t..ant

haa proven 1n 'the M.e\8phys1oal and Transcendental Deducti one that
the categor1es aa 11sted in the former are the .al.,. things which

.

.

:\
'I

I

'11

make exper:1ence pos8:1ble and bring unlty, necesalty, and unlyeraa
11 ty to our knowledge.
causes smoke."?

How then, can I say empirioally. "Fire

How can Newtonts laws, so lmportant tor Kant,

neoessary and universal as they are, be applied to the PUt'ely sen
slble charac1erlst1cs ot experience?

Or, philosophically, how oa

I say that causa 11 tJ or sUbstance or un! ty a.re verifiable in the
objects I know?

All the above are

e~mple.

of "the

subs~ptlon

of intuitions

under pure concepts, the 8PPA!oatlon of a category to appearan081h,,3

Kant answers 1n the sohematism chapter that we can apply

the categories to senae exPerienoe in such judgments
transcesdental
ve~sal

,~lm~-4.et~n:mlna'19Y,

char.at,eria'1, •.<#.~

consCiously.12 a:rm1Z

~

~own

oatescr 1es

p1pdiati~

8.1

object

whI1,~,

beca~se

f!1ctors,

1al

~~

Mable .2Bl. m1n,d

l..2. ;t!lese 9b Jects !2.

~.!l.ru:-§cter-

1!!l1Jiow to the 'proof of Ulls statemen"*
"

We sa.W in the preceding

chapter that the transcendental time-determination which media tea
the subsumpti on of appearanoes under the ca tegory4 was first. "de-

termined by a rule of that unity • • • to ¥.h1ch the categtry giv ••
expression. t't We saw tha t the transcendental

SdlSlla

was a tttrans-

cendental product ot the 1rD&g1.m t1 an, a product eich concerns the

determlnation at inner sense in general • • • in respect of all
representations •• _

ir.l.

3A 138--B 177 (180).
4A 139--D 178 (181.).

conformity with the unity of appercep.

'a

tion. H5

secondly, we saw that "what the schema"ism at understand-

1ng eftects by meana 01' the transcendental synth.s1s

tion is simply the unity

or

all the manitold

or

at imaglDll-

intuition in 1nner

sense • • • tt6

We saw both these texts previously trom the aspect

pr1ori, constltuti ve

0

01'

-Now

the a

onstructi en of the object at know ledge.

we can see 1n the same texts an obJectlve produot wnich the category as

it

rule IIRl'II!'. a determination

all reptesstat;1op,l-

01' t 1me which conce1'118

With Paton' these two texts must be inter-

preted as pointing out tbat the traDScendentalschemata are objective characterist1cs 01' objects, which, since produced by the

imagination according to the categories as rules, allow these sam.
categories to be applied to such Objects. 8 Fer the express10n

whioh the oategory ettects 1s nat merelY a subjective product in
the inn gina t1 on, but 1'a t:b.er the lmaglJJ':l t1 on produces t11 is schema

ln the §lpthesi, £t

lil

p~ject1vt I!~t~.

Furth9r, the categorles, Kant tells us in the context of 'the

schemata. "serve only to subordinate appearances to universal rule

ot synthesiS, and thus to tit them tor thoroughgoing conneetial
SA 142--B 181 (183) and cf. this paper pp. 60-63.

6A 145--B 185 (186-186) and

cr.

this paper pp. 63-64.

'Paton, II, 37-39 and 74-70.
SCt. alec as we saw preYiw81y (in Ch. I) naval's double
aspect of the schelM as a concept determining, and the determ1ned,
projected schema t pp_ 90--96.

73
in one experience." 9 And 81nce Kant has repeate4ly told us
througb,Q1t the transcendental deducti c:m.s that one of the main
tuncti ems at the categorIes is to objectity the manifold at sense
th!s subordination 01' appearances I<..ant speaks ot must certalnl7
an object1ve

one.

There 1s one more text w1thin the sdleaJatism chapter which
espec1ally demonstrates that Kant meant by the transcendental
schema an ob ject1 ve aspect of the known, even the universal characteristics 01' experience.

"But it is alao ev1dent that althwgh

the schemata ot sens1b1l1ty first real1ze the categories, they at
the same time 'restr1ct them, that ls. lim1t them to conditions
which lie outs1de the understanding, and are due to sensibIlity.
The schema Is, properly. only the phenomenOD. or sens1 ble concept
01' an object 1n

agreement wlth the category.tt 10

The llmitaticn aspect of th1s quotation w1ll, of course, be
considered in the ttlir4 :pa.rt of this "-chapter 'a cons1derat1.ons.
What attracts our interest here are Kantfs words:

of sens1bi11

t,. t,l;rs,t rea1;'•• the

properly, only the
8&teemes

Wlen~()1

eEl tegOl"les tt

tttbe schema'.

and ttThe schema ls,

or $en§l b1e concept .2t !ll

.9bJe~1

.!.U.i. l!!! g&t,soU."ll Firat. the fact that the

!!.

schema

18 called an aspect ot sensibility objectIfies It, tor even though

9A l46--B 185 (166).
lOA 146--B 18& (lSe).
U 1b1g •

Its.l1c8 not in or Iginnl.

"

the torma ot appearances, space, aDd t1l1e. are !. priSE1 ••enalbill tl1s DOl'18thel••8 ob JEtctl ve

so tar as 1t 1. the only pas-

ill

sive element 1n }{ant'. knowledge.
i t1 t1rst realize. or

the sohe_.

ma111t••

Secondly. the tact tbat senalbiJ

'8 the ca te,aryU a"me to objeot1t,-

Th11"417. the tact

tna t

the schema 14 called a pilAS-

ill9D 1n agreement wlth the category pol11ts out th1s objective
character1stic l1kewl...

Adm1ttedly, there 1s d1ttlculty ln call-

lng the transoendental aehema a concept.

But Paton lIel1 pOints

out that the schemallkeanyothersenslbleCbarac.eriat1c ls
capable at being coneei .,e4. 13 Further, aa we adv_ted to earlier14 and as will be especial11. aeen again 'below w1 th respect to
empirical adJ.emata. J.ant otten, lD4••el, 18 almost neceasitate4 to

glve a repreaentatloual nomenclature to his

the schema as a

obJect.~

But ahartly

J:ePIoQ!AA~t,9!.\ aa well as a character1stic of

object wl11 prove to be not qulte

80

en1f9D8t1c.

the

The point here is

that Kant haa Etquivalated the transc~dental schema to the Ehenomenoa. whlch. !ant e1s...here tell.

\lS", ia

the aRR!!IIl'1ce

i.h .!2 t!E.

!.!. .u. !ilhought yg,r .at 9 1$1 .st ll!.l gat rUSSl\1,tE,.15 This is as
objectl "e aa one can be in Kant'. sls'em. Clearly then. at th1a

lIar.

mare properly perhaps, the achematized category. s••
th. discusslon ot this 'erm below.
13Paton, lIt p.69, n. 4. Paton also confirms the objectlve
int.~reta'lon or th1s text. ct. also Ib1a., p- 62.
14see above, p. 24, n. 10.
15ft.A.pposranee., 80 tar aa they are tllwght .a objects accor4ing to the unity ot the categories, are called ph!enomena • ft
A.

149 (265).

ot. the distlnot1 an b.t....n appearance (ifPsche,n!y)

and l?henomengJ. which Smith haa broue'llt to light In his

75

point 1n our argument. the treu::ulcendental schemata are at least

aspect ot the obJeo.t, known lntelleewally through the
gor1ea. l t)
ODe

Cla'.-

Betore pass1ng formally to the "omraentators who subsoribe to
the above 1nt.rpretation, one laat and perhaps moat important text

may be considered.

Betore the Bchematism chapter itself, in the

introduction to the "Analytic of Principles. tt lant is diBella.ing
the 41tterence agaln b.t....n general and transcendental loglc.
General logic, slnoe 1t considers only the torma 01' thought without content. can supply no rules far subsumpt10l1 ill jUdgJlell't. 17

But transcendental logic oan give not only the rules ot Judsment.
but ''It can also speo1ty !. R11ox:l th,

!I.

toO

in§f~nce

!2 which th, IllY:!.

l?.!. 8.l1pl&,d.·t Further, he say8 tha t the transcendental

soience "must tormulate 01 means 01'

!alv!~sa~ ~u,

!utricle;t mark!

Inglish translation and 1n his QomDl!Q'arz. p. 83. Melkl.ejphn and
Muller had mistranslated Er'scheiauns in' their translations as

"phencmenon. "

leer. Weldon, p. 94. who malnta1ns that 0JlCt ot the reasons
tor the contusion 1n the interpretation ot the chapter on sohemat1sm 1. that; Kant 414 not make clear what is a real intent10n in
his system, namely. the notion 01' Rhenomenon aa the objective order ot things. Ue 18 also author of ilie opInion quoted at the
head of th1s chapter and here quoted in tull--an apt summary 01'
the polnt being made 1n the present argument: "Phenanana are
nothing more tha.n the pure ooncept. echemat1zed by the transcendent
tal raoul1iy ot 1me.g1..'ioa, and the world 01' SCience is a world at
schemata. senerated in a senae by our own activ1ty but none the
less objeotiye in contrast to the t subjective play ot representations' whieh mskes up our unreflective consc1ousneS8.~ Ib1d.,p.95
17et • Paton on general and transcendental logic. II. p. 21.

'1&
the condition under which objects can be g1 ven. tn blni'mon,. with

the.e concepts ~e ca tagOr1es] • "lS

It wauld seam tba t the aapee"

of transcendental schemata as univeraal characteristics has its

most explicit textual verification W!,lslt the tormal treatment at

schematlsm.

This tact should not be strange to a reader fami11ar

wlth Kant.

In this instance he 1s talking about the "Analytic 01'

Principles tf a8 a whole, and we sball see there is an intimate connectlpn between the schemata and the uPrinciples, tf or doctrine 01'
judgment 11'1 particu.lar.
A number at repUtable commentators ba ve pointed otlt this objective and universal Characteristics aspect 01' the transcendental

schema.

Jfol"emoat among them. 1S t at owr88 • .Paton. and this ia the

most significant aspect 01' hi8 Intel"pretati on 01' sohematism.

He

sees this interpretatt on as the only Clear solution throughout the

twisting detlnitions Kant gives in the schematlsm chapter.

He

drives his point home tb:rcughout 8111;h"e chapters in mieb he
"

tree. t8 .xplio i ill"

his post tion:

or

schelUl t1 sm.

Far inata nee. as a

SUmrlll ry

at

ftThus tor Rant the transoendental schemata are uni-

versal characteristics which. he hopes to show later [in the "Prin
c1ples~, must belong 'to all objects as O!2Jects

.!B.

~im!.

These

universal characteristics belong to objects, not as given to sensation, but as 5HpbiaeA by the transcendental s;ynthesis ot 1mag1-

:natlon 1n one time.

What we have to do at present is to learn

leA. 135....136...-B 1'14-175 (179).

Ct. Paton, II, 21-23.

Italics not in original.

'I'

what these transcendental schemata are, and to see, 1t we can,
whether each transcendental sahema falls under ita oorresnanding
08. tegory. "lg

There is one Qther 1nstance In Paton's

t~eatment

whlch we

must cOBsider 11' we are to 40 jUstice to his interpretation and It
will add 11ght to the

ar~ments

ot thls thea 1s.

Speaking of the

schematism process, aDd rete.rrlng to the use ot th18 term in other
i

ot Kant's writing., Paton oa11a transcendental schematism a k1nd
ot eIBlb1tIog otthe Object to which the category app11ea. 20 It
seem.s to this wrIter that this is

Ii

very apt sllrl'IMry of the relli-

tionot schemat1. to the transcendental schemata.

The!. Pllor!

constructlon at the object 1n conformIty with the category results

in the ealbU1S>1 of that category 1n the envelopment 01' sense
data. a ua1versal characteristlc ot that object, the transcenden-

t8 1 _cnema. 21
In th1s tirst and m.ost important argument
01' thls chapter,
.
"

19Paton. lIt 19-20.
37. 39-41, and 73.

ItaliCS in original.

See also pp.21-24,

20llU:.9.., 73.
2113e81de8 Paton. 1)1ya1. Mal"'chal. and Weldon hold posit1ons
which are s1Jn1lar to an "universal characteristics" 1nterpre'tatlO11
In considering 'the transcendental schema an objective reality.
For DElval product! va lmaglDat10n jOins the forms or unders1and1ng
to that of intuition, incarnat1ng the tormer in the latter. 'me
result ls the sehema. (pp. 92.... 93). ~e schema i8 the concept 1"8:'
turned and transmuted 1n experience and is synonomous w1th the
phenomenon. (pp. 100 and 101) • For M8r'ehal the transcendental
schema reveals the constsn" re1a tlon of the categories to experience ln the
~ tor this application.
(III. P* 184).
a s an
a ghniry near to Paton's. Yet the
conflict of such a statement w1th Mar6chal's earller lntsrprete.-

rec2ltetl. gem*11

'18

1mere rema1ns only to c ona1der p:r,oj. 881y wha.t the oonec1ousmaa ot
the transcendental schena lnvolves.

or

ject1ve and oonscious a14e

We are cons1der1ng the ob-

the schematlam duality and before

look1ng at !ant's descriptions ot the individUAl schemata, 1t will
be ".11 to- perceive more clea.rlJ how the transcendental schemata
enter into our jUdgmen1Hh
We saw above €tampl•• of philoaophlcal Judgments in which 'She

transcendental

SCMma.

"'0114

pr~ld.

an intermediary representation

as an answer 'to the prdllem of heterogeneity.
that

~e

schema

~8

Now we have seen

objective and tbat speo1fically lt provides the

universal- characteristics whieh allow the application of the cate-

Let us look

gory.

examples earlier.

agal~

a t the three types ot jUdgments used as

First, two empirical judgments 1n which the

ea tegarlea are involved, the tlrst expliCitly, the second implic1t
ly:

nFirecauses smoke;-

and ft'fba1; tree changes eolors. f1

The

category ot causa.lity is evident in the first judgment and., that at
'.'

substance is laten" in the seoond.

.

The empirical concepts in-

vol ved --troe, t lre, smoke--have their

schemata but these will be cQlsidered

Olm

resps ct! ve empirical

bel(~h

Both these empirical

jUdgments involve analysis and abstract10n trom previously constituted experience, perhaps over a long success! on of' temporal moments.

I have learned from that experience that it possesses

tlon ot the 8chema 1n general w1ll be discussed again below.
Weldon's expltu,1II 1f1 on 1s seen in hi s p Os 1t 1 on on the phenomenon.
t=iee abave, p. 75, n. 16.

'19

oertain characteri.tios ot

1191''1£1 ISSSIIIlga22 which enable me

to apply the category ot cause to 'thls 4a'tum ot experience.

Thus

! formula te the PI' opos 1 tion tba t am OMt is caused by, a nd follow.

in neoe.aary succeasion from tIre.

SIm.ilarly. my analpable ex-

perienoe haa shown me that tb.a t whieb. is the aubJe. of chanse 18
aubsistent, because I have recognized the general ohtlracteristlc
of

UIMnSe in the changing • ts te of tb. tree.

Thus I impllo1 t.

11 apply the category of IU.bat6nce to the datum I 0811 "tree."

True, there are other, indeed all. categories implicit in tho ••
a.nd other Judgment.. That 1s c.r~a1nl)' .II.ant'. I11n4. 23 The polnt
here 1s tbat the categories are involved even in empirical judgmenta. and they are appl1ed beoause of tbe unlver8tll characteris-

tlc. which Rant gi vea

US 1n the 11st

at the transoendental schema t

•

This same polDt ia true of wba t Kant wwld eo.1el.r the s,.nthetic !..

PORE'

judsmenta

or

Newtonian phys 1 ca. "In all • • • motion aot10n and reaction IIlUst alway•.obe equal. flt24 cause, sub•

stance, actuallty. etc. are lmplicitly·involved 1n such a law and
are applied to experience because of the un1veraal characteri.t10.
whiCh are found imbedded in tbe object as known.

But thIs i$ above all evident 1n the philosophioal or 8xpllei
. transcendental JUdgments sudl a8, "herything whioh bappenahaa
ita cauae,"ao or "Substances and cauaality lIre element. taund in
•

..

IU

..

21See the transoendental sebea tor cauaalltl below, p. 83.
83S•• Patm. II, 43-44-

&in 1'1 (64).

25A 9--a 13 (50).

II
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hll.8JEin experience. It

In theae the ca t8gorles are seen 1n the ob ..

jects of experience because of \he universal character1stics of
such experience, and thus we are able to apply the categorles

'0

those objects explicitly and tully.
But here 1s the point whlch 1s of prlme 1n?partance:
transcendenta.lschema. as a PA2;.om.!DOP"

the

is both the universal

ehnracterlstlc 01" the object known, empowering the knower to applJ
the category to thert ob jeC't, g

.!!. also the vehicle .2! that est.-

.5.9IZ !.!. kpown. tn! phantaaa .!a. which the catesory; .!!. consciousll
eX;Qresged w1tniD '.he kp.0Mr.

The represents. tl onal note found so

frequently in Kant's object no longer puzzle,S us.

It is an es-

sential characteristic of Kant's crltical system and the preCise
proof ot the poInt being made here.

Thus.

Vie

see why tha trans-

cendental schema is the hinge, the meeting place, and the soldering polnt t 26 between tile precollsc ious and synthetic constl tutlon

of the object on the one hdnd, and tb.~ ,an'11yt10 and

C CIlso1!ous

ex-

presslon of that knowledge an the other.

In this Identi'J between the characteristic of the object

an~

the subjective carrierS" in which the category is
, :first known
("the schemata • • • first realize the oategaries,,28) we see one.
26Marbcbal, III. 16Z.
27Ct. ~oleeOm,na (Lucas, trans.)j p. 77 where Kant talks
about the flO ject conforming to the schema" encountered in exper1.
ence, and the schema as being 8ubst1tuted for the category in ita
applicat1on, flor rather set it along side the category • • • " in
the ft.Princ1ples" --A 181--a 224 (212).

28A 146--B 180-186 (186).

81
agaIn the fence :r:ant is attenpting to straddle between pure subJectivism and phenomenal18~29

We are never certain 1n Kant exactly where subJeotive knower ends and phenomenal object begins.
The typ1cally Kant1an dual tendency to subjectiv1sm and phenomena
ism shows us here Jllore t:tan elsewhere the essential Kalltian duali 1;1 which this theai. proposes.

It seerna too t the schema as knew

and as an objective onaraoter1st10 is what Paton was getting at
the distinction he postulates between transcendental schema and

schematized catesorz.

Kant never uses such a term.

Paton main-

tains 1t is implicit in his doctrine and describes 1t as a concept

of a synthesis of an object 1n time, where the category unaonemat1zed lIould be the pure synthes1s w1 thou t involving the time element. 30 This writer d008 not see any neoessity far such a new
element and it is d1fficult to see exaotl,. what Paton means by tile
term.

The use of the terminology "schema t ized cate60u" though,

seems to be an excellent way of
oa tegory) !.!. !BoSh or to the

retel;Ti~

Cia tegory·

to t he schema (am the

.ae limited in t:ime;

Fa ton

seems to bave been torced to postula te such a new element to avoid
the subJeotivism which is latent in Kant's system and thus put the
critical thinker on a firm phenomenalist fOUndation. 31

29cr.

above, pp. 38-39.

50See espeoially, Paton, II, 41-43.
31with reeard to the !chemat1l!d caye~El mention wlould be
made ot Patonts critioisms of wbat he . thin . are smith's identification or the schemata with the categories. In referring to this
mil tte:r, Paton seellls to include an at least seeming contradiction
to his own critici . . ot Smith, in the interval between the first

~e

f1rst and most important

been demonstrated:

ar~m.nt

ot th1s chapter haa

1t has been shown that. in general, the object

ive side ot: the schema tiam. dU-al1 t1 calsis ts in the tran a eenden tal
sohema involving tlle universal characteristics at the known objeot
enabling the mind consciously to apply the categor1es to these objects in contorm11ty with 'Uleill. and that the schema, as a phenan.e....

non, i8 not only the exhibition at the

08 t880ry

the vehicle of its being known in the subject.
mediately tollows:

in tbe ob j..,ot f but
The question im...

what are these ua1versal characteristics in

contarmi ty with the :respective ca tegories?

The various schemata Kant 11st. are logical lmagina tlve construction. 01' the respective oategories in the succesaive moments
ot: tim~.t.

The treatment this paper wl11 give to them will hardly

be more than an abbrenated paraphrase of Kant's list.

Tbe reason

Kantts list of the individual schemata 1s ad-

for this 18 sound.

mittedly art1:t:1oc1a11n the extreme, and its art1f1oiallt71-s that
of the metaphysical deduction.

I'

Paton, lantts Most sympathetlc

commentator. Impllcl tly adm1 ts this wben he attempts to recon-

struct ii.ant's dootr1ne

or

schemat!sm.

The various transcendental

scb.flDI8ta (and the categories) are based upon the judgments of forma
logic as well as

have tallen.

.1pon the nature

or-

time.

'!'he forner seems to

What is important is that the categories ertect

and second volume ot his wcrk. The vb ole issue is at 'best confusing and dQ)s not seem to be of manent tor the purposes ot this
thesis.

I'

See Smith,

'I,

Ii

pp. 339-340 and Paton t I. 298; II, 41, 63-54.

68-69.
I'

i,

sartain kiadl of oharacteristics ot objects to conform with
them. 32 It the twelve eat.series S.nd their partIcular schemta
are a bit artifioial, the general doctrine involving the unIfying
principles of unders tanding

stl11 r EIIla ins •

Therefore the analyst

of the veri GU8 schemata found here will be Bufri elent merely to

show the general characteristics ot objects synthesized in t1me,
8S

contil'!Ifl.tl (Il ot the general doctrine of the liu!hem9 outlined

above. 33

The transcendental schema for the tbree categories ot quanti

toy is nHJ!be.l.. the generation of succes.ive unity in tim.e.

The

schema of the tbree categorles of quall \1 1s the successive till·
iag up and emptying of sensatim in an Object 1n tine.

That

or

substance 18 the perm.anenee of an d:> jact through alecess1 ve

cbanges in t1me, ot causality 1t is the .. oe8881"Y succession acoording to rule, of canmun1t1 it 1s the coexistence according to

a un1versal rule of the dete'rm1nat1ai .,9t different 8ubata1l.ces.
The schema of poasibl11,ty 1s the agreement of the qnUlesia ot
representation w1th the general conditions or t1me, ot actw11t1
1t 18 existenoe in sane determinate

existence ot an object at all times.

t~e,

of neoessity 1t is the

34

JI.'ven so cursory a. s1J.llJ.1'Jlary reveals the artiticiality ot the
32Ps ton , II. 15-78.
33 cr • Karner, p. 75 and ~ith, p_ 341.
34A 142-146--8 181-184 (183-185).

ct.

Paton, II. 44-60.

ind1 vldual schema'ta.
pect.

K.ant seelllS to be forc1ng the temporal

8S-

Thai quality t for example, should be bOUDd to successive

moments of t1me for its objective verification 1s d1fficult to accept, even in Kant.

Paton points out that quantity and quality aa

described seem to have mere ot iynth!$l, abCllt them than unlversal
characteristics of an object.

But lr3 adds that Kant's Slmmary at

the close ot Ule list C8 sChemata appears
such schemata are objective producta. 35

to

retain the view that

In that aummary of the list of 1be traDScen.4en'tal schemata
lant 'tells us that the 8chema'ta ot quantIty relate the ordar ot
t1,m£t"'serle'J of qualIty, time-eontet,
and of malall t7 t the scope .2!:

or

relatlon, tlme-£fder;

l!!!.!. !!! ream ct

of aU pos81 ble ,S&.-

Jects. 36 Sm1th pointa O1t that Kant gives only one schema. for the
three categories of quallty and one tor the three ot quan'ti1;J,
whIle he glves a dltterent schema tor each of' the three categorles
,

of relat10n and modaJ.itJ.

He uses

th~~

as an example to shOll that

Kant 1s s11ent when his architectonic haa fai led, 81 thoutjl he 18
37
most voclferous when it corresponds.
Paton orters somewhat Wlconvincing argum.ents to just1!)" this. 38 Grant1t1g the artificia11ty of the 11st, the dispute does not bave lIAlch consequence.

In

35.Paton. II, 61....62. Paton mus't m.ean synthesis in an a.ctive,
constructive sense. Cf. abora, Pp. 61....02.
36A, l45-B 184 (185).

5'1Sln11b • P. 341.

38Paton , lIt 63-65.

general, it would seem that the list ot individual sollenata 1s an
antiCipation ot the "Principles" where Kant's purpose is to give
the rules for the applicati an of the categor1es in judgment and
the .! Rri 9£1 judgments tllemsel vas. 39

The purpose of the schema-

t1sru chapter is rather to ahow the oop41t&onfJ (the schem ta in
general)

fOl'

such epplicati en and to demonstrate hem these univer

sal character1stics result trom imagiBl tlon in conform1ty with the
categories.

The th1rd

liB

in point

or

our cons iderati on in this cbapter 18

Kant's recurrent insistence that the transcendental
the categoriss to the renitold of sense a xper1ence.

sche~qta

11mi

We saw in the

preceding chapter how the categor.ies are l1mited to sensibility
"

because the fcrmer"contain !. pr12£J: certain formal condi tiona of
sensibility, namely, theee 01' imler sense."

Then follows a defi-

nition 01' the sebem'ita as the conditions to which th.ecategory 18
40
restricted.
Later l~t tells us ~at . the transcendenta~ sche"

rna ta are the only condi t1 ons under vb iOO the

eEl tagar

ies obtain ob-

jective significance. TherefOre their employment is l1m.ited to
the empirical. 41 Hia most trench an t proof of this aspe ot of ttle
39 ct. A 135--B 174-175 (179) and A 148-'.8 187-188 (188).
Smith concurs with Sloh an interpretati an of the indi vidUal sche·
mats.. See Smith, p.341.

40... 139-140--B 179 (182). "Th1s formal and pure condition of
scms1b111t;y to which the emplo)'1l1elD.t of the concept at Wlders1anding i8 restricted, we shall en title the schema of' the concept.,.

(d:P1A.)

Cf. above, pp. 44 ...46 and Paton

ii,

31-32_

41A 146--B 185 (186). "The schemata 01' the pure concepts of
underst8 nd1ng are thus the true and sole oond! t1 ens under which

i

I

II
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schemata aeeme to be the passage quoted ear11er where the schema

119 equlvalated to the phenomenon:

ttBut it is also ev1dent that

although the schemata of sena1.bl11V :first realise the categories,

they at the same tIme restrict them, 'that Is. limit 'them. to con.d1 t ions which lie outside the und ersla II11.ng. and are due to sene i
bl1ity.

The schema Is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible

concept, of an object In agreement with the category.n4S
The reasoning 1s not difticult to tOllow.

Sdlematism eftect

the el.-pressi on of the categor1es (pnenan.enon, realizat10n otthe
categexy) in the sensible cblracter1sti os of the Cbject.
sensible expression Is the schema.

This

But the aooellllta. as the solu-

t10n to the problem of heterogeneity are the cond1tions Which
alane make the applicat10n of the categories to senslble object.
possible.

Therefore the only leg!. ti_ te object for such categor-

ies (or t KtUlt m.ight

say. the represen ta t1 on of such an

ob ject)

are

the sellsible objects so e oo.dI't ioned. ,.'
From such limitation

Kant draws some conclusIons sim.ilar to

the ones expressed in the cha.pter on the phenomena and nwmena.
Apart from. the conditions of the transcendental schemata, the
categories apply to thinga !!.
sent them only

~

.lh.U.!!"!., mIle the schemata "repre-

lBll ap»Ia:." 43 It would seem, therefore, that

these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess signif.iIn the end, therefore, the categories have no other possible employment th.an the empirical."
cance.

42A 146--B 166-186 (166).
4~A 146-147 --B l86 (186).

';~f}lin we see the transcendental

87

the pure categories give
rel1117 the oaae.

8

much wider knowledge.

Such 18 not

For the meaning of such categories is merely

10g1cal and thus haa no objective content.

"The categories,there-

tore. without achemata. are merely functions of the understandIng
tor concepts i and represent no object.

This ob jecti ve meanillg

the~

acquire from aen81bI1it1. which rea118es the understanding in the
very process of restrictIng 11;. ,,44
The fourth subject to be considered as pointing out the meaning 01' the objective schemata of consciousness is a final settle-

ment of the problems of

~he

empirica 1 schema ta.

fhat Kant really

intended auch a distinct10n trQm the transcendental schemata 1s
clear frau the text and this will be pointed out during 'libe analJsia 01' the Sixth aDd seventh paragraphs where Kantts doctrine an

aueh schemata 1s contained.
cal achematlsm is

chapter.

br

no means

The real signifioance of such empiriSO

clear, as we saw in the precedlag

The present treatment wl11

.~~

divided into two parts:

what the empir1cal schema 18 1. it. own sign1fioance and the rela-

tion Of the empirioal sohema to the transcendental one.
schema from a conscious or representat tonal aspect as well as an
objective condition.
44A l47--B 166-187 (~.6.187). ct. smith, p. 342. Cf. also
the !!£~esomeM.. p. 7": tt ~Jhe senses only provide the pure ooncepts 0 the understanding !a ,consye jp• n This latter ambIguous
phrase in context must mean the tS ng as thOUght, 1.e. the unknowable jing !!!~. John watson baa a very 100d explanation ot how
the s~ta IliiIt the categories, 1n!!m! a~d !!!.!. English CritiC!
(Glasgow; 1881), p. gl.
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Fir ai, 1t i8 clear ihs. t the snpir1cal scb.ell1& I along w1 th the
transcendental .one, 1. a product ot the 1mg1m tion and 1s dis ...
tinguished from the image •. If I lla ve t.1 va dota alongside ot one

another, I have an WI! of the number five.
hand, 1t I

_,Ilk

But on the oUler

of the nWlber five or any other number, 88.1 a

hundred .. I need aometb1ng mare than an 1ndividual Imge.

Let us

also take the example !\ant used a little later, ot the empirical

It 1 have only an 1mage ot an ind1vidual dog,

concept of: a dog.

it is clear that I cannot think the em.pirical concept ot dog in
genel'al with the aid ot sueh an image.

In

tn..

case of both the

number and the dOS, there 1s no com.par1aOD between tbe indi v1dual
dog or inage

or the number ti ve and the universal concap is.

Ke.nt gives us his definition

ot the empirical schema:

Thus

it is "the

representation ot a me1ihod whereby. a multiplicity, fur instance a
thousand. l'Aa.J be repro se n ted in a n ina sa inc ant orm1 t Y wi th a car ...

tain ooncept" or the "representation

o.~

a universal procedure at

lrraginat10n in providing an i.mage far a concept.,,45

Kant must be using the wcrd
this paragraph.

1mAi..

1n two dIfferent senaas 1n

First there 1s tho 1nd1 vIdual i1M ge trom wh iolL

Kant distingl,ishes the schema and to which the empIrical concept

1s nat adequate.

Seoon11y, !ant used the vHrd baSI as the gener-

al structure at the

SOhOOIS

it selt in

1111 loh

the imaginat10n repre-

sents its method. or proc.dure adequate to and in confo:nn1ty with a

89

certam ooncept.

Th1s 1s evident trom the tollOlli:ag para.graph.

f\8lli ahoold have distinsuished tbe 1Bdi!ldual

reproducti va imagtm 1;1on) from the I.ematt 0

&eS! (product or
.i~ B..!

(product ot

productive 1naglmtion).
In the beginning of the seventh plragraph :Kant clarifIes tbe
rele t1 em of the emp1rical sohema to the 1ndl vidual lmage and
individual ob ject.

I a.-

The disjunction ot th1s 14811 sentenoe is tn-

tended and must be esta.blished betere

fU.r~er

sohena IS relation to such an objectcr 1.r.mge.

eons iderat1 on of Ule

There was occasion

to mentIon earlier. that at tinea :lant g1 ves a ;representsti ona~

note to 'the object.

We saw this In the id.entification of the

transcendental schema with the phjnOll¥'non and in even calling it
"sensible concept" conformed to the category.

We saw this also i

the preceding chapter where Kant in setting up the problem. 01'
heterogeneity says that non-transcendental sciences do not poss ••
general concepts so heterop,eneous trO~.those "which represent it
('the objee!J !a cppc;£etg. fl46 It 'Was rezmrked that. bec3use of
Kant's denial of any knowledge of th logs a s they are-we know on!
their appearanees ... ·xant 1s almost meessl tated to EUch a
It is in the consideration of empirical schemata that this is evi
dent more than elsewherE..,

This p;3culiar Kant1an ambiguity 1s es-

tablished here between the 1maS of an individual object and the
object itself.
.,

-

±

For :Kant tells us after stating the incongrulty

I
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between

8

geometrIc concept and It. 1m ga that

.9bje" !?t.. ener1etlC!
c(Jlcept ...47

j£

ill

'maa

tt

[sl t111

leS8 i8

a

ever adequate to the anpirieal

Thls amb1gu1ty is confirmed by the best commenutors.

Daval poInts out that the 1Dfi ge corresponding to epirlcal ooncepts Is really the eJi!!.pl, or ins tance of alch concep ta and sa,.

the t th 1s 1s c cnf irmed 1n Kan t t S elji t 19:"..'

qr

Jl1ds!!!nt. 48

Pri cha rd

oomments that Kant unquest1oJ'lably makes an i.ma ge out at what shrul
have been an instance or Ind1v1dual of tnEt·,cancopt. 49 Theretore
when Kant is talking abQ1t an individual 1nng. in the context of

the empirical sohemata he can be Just al well 1nter.prete4 8.S referring to the individual objeot.
Returning now to the relet10n ot empIrical schema to indl vidu
a 1 ina ge, we d 1s c over Kant telling us tila t "1 t is aChe_ ta. not
images of objects whlab. UDderlie

Our

pure se1l8ible concepts. It

He

proves this by the example that no image could ever be adequate

the concept· at a triangle 1n general;50
"

4'it. 141--B 180 (l~).

.

1;

For an 1n4i vidual. tri-

ItaliCS not 1n or iglna1.

4800va1 • pp. l02-l0~.

49Priohard, pp. 261-252.

II, p.25, n. 1.

Cf. Pa"ton on a s1mllar ambiguity,

50There is an app~~:rent difficulty in baving ma:.thematlcal concepts among empirical ones. Is not quant1ty OM ot the categories? The answer, of cwrse, 1s that the category of quanti tty etfeots the sohema or universal cba:racter~8tic of extension as a
necessary characteristic of aU object s, while the empirical,
mthemat1eal cancepiis are abstrac;ed. analyzed from the transcendentally scheuatized experience. Daval mkes much of Kant's
theorJ Of mathematiCS based on his descr1ptlons of the empirlcal
schema ta. SeG pp. 105 ... 165.
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angle coUld not expre •• the universality of 1b.e concept ot tri.
angle which makes it valid and adequat. tor all 'nee of tri(Jngle

whetner rlght ... ngled., obtuae ..ngled, or aout • ...e.ngled.

Continuing

the example, he tella us tna't lta 8Gbe. . can exiat nowhere but ill
thw.gh't and that lt i8 a

lJI6tSl.. ..lluP.1. ot

1_81Ilt1t1011.

i'la"-

ther, aa regards pure empirical cone ep ta aa d 1& t lngu i.bed fr QI the
_th~ma'1.1 one •• tl1 he descr1be. 'the a • •me. "as a ru.le for the

determinat10n or our lntultlO11t in aoecrdanee with some 8]»cltle
univer .. l concept."
1118 how

WI"

The he clt •• the example of the

lms1natl <m . a t delineate

.ome

d~&

show-

vague flt;ure of a tour

footed animal in Ql.'der to think ot doe in contrast wltb. aome part1cular des of expertence. 52
To the denn.! 'tiD Of the empirical schema lJint gave prev10us
h. haa added the Dotion ot .1ll"thes1a accord1ng to rule, which

glv•• m..... e

content to the .tsthCld" or "procedure ft of lmu glnation

ot the previoUs deaor1ption.

FUrther •. ~e taot that an lad1vldua
"

1s no't an adequa ie object tor a universal concept 1. oont1nua1l7
emph... ized by lUlnt, no doubt
01' emplr10al schema.

liS

be1r.t.g the reauan tor the enatenc

Thus 1t is 'that t.he empirioal schemata

"under11e our c CIl.OOp'." 1n the a.u•• tha t ttle), are subjective
1

.it

51. . . . s noted ear11er the term "8p1r1081 ooncept" haa bee
u.ed. throughwt 1:h18 paper In the w i4. se •• ot' all non-transoendental ooncept., *1d1 includes both. • tnernatioaJ. ooncepts and
str10t empirical or what Kant someUmes calla "sensi ble H coneepta.
At t1mes Kant al.o .Mma to us. the term emplr&oal COPS!2' In 1ta
w1der significance.
alA. 140-lU-B 180 (168-183).

Italios nc.$ ill orls1nal.

98
instrument a in which .e can think and by which ..e oanapply em.pirical concepta.
Kant in his tinal considers t1 on ot the em:pir1ca 1 sehe!1ti ta
tells us tblt these schemata m9ke in1ages possible.

The productiv

imgimticm results in the schemata, the reproductive results in
images, but only through the instrumentality
schema.

Kant tells us that the empirical

IS

or

the corresponding

chema ls a n.!p.onos+:llm.

0

pure !. priori im gil'll tian.th l"OUSl which. and in accordance with
which. ina ges themse1 ves first be oome possible •• 53
A few

interesting corollaries follow :f'rom 1ttis rinal descDlp

tlon by Kant.

First. Paton tells us 54 that, traa 1be meanlng

nlS!lmrp had in Kant's tlme, tbe empir1cal sche_ must be a sort

ot wavering or schematio image.

Secondly, the tact that theae

schem.ata _ke images poasible and enable the connectlon ot concepts wlth sue imag•• proves the dis1;inctlon between transcanden
.,

tal and emplrical schemata.

For the

have no correspond1ng lntui tlon

8.

~'egorle8t

Kant has 'tOld

mong appearances.

us.

Th1s d1stlnc-

tion 1s contirmed b1 the wards 1mDk:ldiately follow1ng the tinal
desert ption ot empirical s ebemata that we .ha vebeen cons IderiI@_
nOR ,b!! other hp~., the schema of a

S$Jl ~v!I

n

PYE' concept ot understanding

brol!Sbt into!.!!i[ !maSI whatl08vex:_tt65 The empirlcal

schema 1s then, tinally, a product ot !.

:en 0ri

imagina tion which

53A 141-142--B 181 (183).
54Paton, lIt 35-36.
55 A 1/2..... B 161 (183).

With exception of' tt~urelt italios not
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cOllal.'. or a aohema ti. 8YD\h •• 18 01' _ thad of tbat 1DB 81m 'lOll

.hereby 1

08ll thln~

d,lvltlual instance.

emplrl 08 1 c one.pta and a pply them to 'he 1,r 1n
C1I:

1nage.

Tbe latter. produc'h ot reproduc-

tive 1rIla81m tJQn, are p08s1 ble only because of the general cona,.truotl"e model ot the 8chema. 66
Now tba t •• have speoified mere in detai 1 the exact nat\a"e of
~e

empirical achema in ltaelt and ha". seen In flek11 the nature

ot the transcendental schema, tbe quest1 CI1 of the relation bet"..
~ea.

two daalJlldaa aore preClae auwer "than ... e one tbat oould be

Si'9. 1n the prece41ug eaptar.

Flrat of aU, how do •• tranaoenden tal achemaan4 the .pl
oal acnema 4Uts troll one another?
8888nt181.11 a obaracrterlatlc of

~e

The tranaoenden'Ml schema 1.
pbenceenal

pb~'S!

empirlcal aohema 18 a IMllJ&Ul'&l1 rule ot 1.magiMti on.

wh11e the

It 1. true

!
I

that the present allel1IJia bas e1l.phaalaed tbe tact that the trane-

eendenial aobe. 1. a.19 the V8b.lo1eO! the eat.gar,. as known,
18 there tON 1n a

8J1

"De. sub j eotl". aa well.

If suoh a th 1118 1.

o.\_..n

the subject kn<MiDg

e.,e posai bl., draw1JJg a clear lin.

anet tbe known objet' ln Ken tIs sy$ tsa ls, at best, dlft1cult in
I,

the 8xtreme.

Here, we eaw. 1. evldeeed prec1ael1 IAn t fa double

56!:Unce tbe 1ndly1dual image and the Instance or object of
empir1cal celloept bEtv. been equlvalated. and since the empirical
ache. ake. 1m.ag•• po.slble. dee. the empirIcal sohemtl lake the
obJeot of the concept possible? Yes. 1t one remembers tbat both

emp1rioal s<:hema and object depen4 on transcendental achemat:!s.
(as eQ.ui valent to the eonst1tutlon of knowledge) and there 18 onl,.
one unified act ot knowing. no a tteron .bat level. 1t 1s dl:rect •

tendency to subjectivism and phenomenalism.

Nevertheless, despite

the ambiguous character of the transcendental schema, greatest _ ..
phs. 81s see1'n$ to be pla ced by Kant on its object! va characteristicl,
the temporal aspects of what is intellec1ually known, and there-

fore, in this respect the transcendental schema is to be distinguished f"rom the emplri ca 1.

The second point

or

difference between the two types or

schema. ta 1s the poles between v.bich each is int ermedlary.

The em-

pirical schema is intermedlarr between any universal concept
("sonsi ble tt or matheJlll ti cal) obtained from the manifold of experi-

ence by analysis and abstraction, and an instance of' that concept
or its image.

between ,Alieh it mediates.
in the mcment

On the subjective or preconscious side

The transcenden tal schenll. bas two palrs of." poles

or

the constitution of." the db ject of knowledGe, the

schema is 1ntermediary between the pure category and 1be uncond1tione:ld m.anifold ot sense

appe3raree~...

In this case, thE! trans-

candantal schema is time in general, in the very act of being
term1ned.

de-

On the c onsei rus s ide of." the dun11 ty, the transcenden-

t'3.1 schema mediates the category in its application in Judgnent to
conditioned sense

~ippe<':trances.

tal sche:na points two ways:

In this

in3t~nee,

the transcendan-

to the object Imown in the p:lrticular

t1m.e-deterrnin.a ti ons whicil are characteristi cs of the object, and
to the knowtng subject as the

category.

types of

ve~icle

All this is a surtllll9ry of'
scheM~ta.

of the knowledge of that

Whi:lt

we have seen about both

The transcendental and empirical schem.a share 1n beIng products of the imag1na t10n, as tEmporal, and as e leae nts of COI1scious exy.er1ence that mediate the apnl1catlc.!1 of some sort of in
telligibl11ty to sense appearances.

In a sanse It can be said

tha tone lJ..cb,ma~l!Q ef'focts both types 01" schenlil ta.

In the pre-

ceding chapter we for all practical purposes 1dentit1ed transcendental smemi;l't1sm with the transcenden tal actin ties which con8truot the object of knowledge.

Since the same categories effect

the phenomenon. no matter what the formal a spa ct at 1t known.

whether it be empirioal or the categery, fl.ud since the categ01'ies
are aU present 1mplici Uy In every object ot knowledge, even the
most empirical. suoh a $Ynthesis seems to have clear validity.57
'rhls unity in soheIlllt1sm despite the diversified sch.e.ma ta es ....
sentially contains the answer to the dittiwlt1es some ot" the com-

mentators presented, as we

38'W

earlier, in whtlt they thwght were

the contrad1etiCllS betVJeell

scheJ1atis~

,In general and the transOEJn1

dental .schema ttl.
dif:l'icul ties.

"

Vi$ are nCM' in a better position to answer those

Prichard, we recall, listed wurac teristi es

or

wba t

he thought to be the schewa in general which did not square 'with
the dEmands of til e tra:n.scendeIl tal
i.raag1mtion la subjective,

rela te to objects known.
the

ftgener~ tt

~.a:lile

schem~ita.

.1?'ir at .. t!19 rule of

the transcendw.tal scherlla.ta must

3ecomly, time seems to be subjeoti va ill

c onsideratl on, v..b 11e obje cti va for t.he transce:nde!l.ta

57cr • ..Javal .. p_ 167 an the depe ndence or elllp11"ical s aha ira t1_
upon transcCldfBl1al SolUUB tism.
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achema. 58 We s88 now that these descript10ns ot general schemat1am were re&l17 Character1st1cs at the anp1rical schema. and tbu
subjective. as .e saw in the d1stinotions made above.
There was no oontradiction w1th the transcendental schemata.

cause such empirical character1atles had notbing to do with
transcendental scheat.

be.
~.

Prichard's 'third objection resolves 1tsel

into the familiar object1on to the schema as a "third thIng" &.n4

will be anawered shortl,.
S1m.1larly. Mar'ahal's ohange ot pos1t10n from. the subject1visl1e deSCription ot lhe schema 'in g• • raJ. to the rather objecti
vist!c analysis of the transcend_tal schemata,59 and Paton's re-

marks that considerailems ot the schema 1n general t.hrow 11ttle
light. on the transcendental schema, eo are both based on the inter
pretation tilat

~e

descr1ptions of the sdlerra as a rule or imagi-

nation, as a .olloer_. and. as a .'Ulodor presenting an image to
a concept, .ere to be applied to treuis~~ndental. SCeDIlta aa .eU

as to empirical one..

SUch an i:aterprelatlon is cer'talnly excuaa

ble seeing thecontus1ng order ot Kant's treatment. 61
,

But the

I

eSCf. PrIchard, pp. 252-254 and 1h1s paper, pp_ 11-12.

59cr. Mar'chalt III, 178...185 and this paper, pp_ 13...14.

SOct. Paton, II, 36.
61Smith could also be listed among these men. He did not
percelve the contradiotion between what the others thrught to be

the schema in general and the transcendental sdlema, but he conceived the rule or lmag1nat10n aspeot as pr1mrU,. desc:rip.tive ot
the tranaoendentaJ. schema. He does, thwgll, consider that an,.
treatment by !ant ot senalbleconcepts 1s wt ot place. ct.
Smith, pp. 338-339.

9'1

position adopted here .eems to be tar l'8arer the truth:

b..nt

mixed in examples ot empirioal schemata and their def'1n1tious ..1'
considerations 01' transcendental sel'hlmati8Dl, first. beoause 01' the

oonmon characteristics which .e saw sowe. and secondlr. beoause
botn types 01' schemata result trom one unified act of knowledge

transcendental apperception.

But Kant also wanted to

empirical schemata differed from the transcendental ones.

With

a 11 this in }{ant t s terse expression. amblgui', and cantua ion of'
interpretation was certain to result.
The above suttlce·. tis a Justification ot the position adopte

here on the empirIcal schemata and their relation to transcenden-

tal schemata.

'the fitth and tinal portion of this chapter must

give a general view ot the signifioance at the transcendental
schema ta. in !\ant ta 9£;\ t19UJ-

OUr purpose a t this momst 1s not t

3iv8 the tinal ana178is 01' sclumatism-·that is the task of the
.,

follOWing chapter-.but simply to

the

dUB

shoW,:~hat

the objective a1de

or

lit1 involved in schemat1sm is an integral. part of :Kant t8

systenh
Probably the most trencMnt objection to the significance or

the transcendental schema 1athe posit1on of 3Jnith. Prichard, and

cairo.

t]:)a

t no schema or "thir d th ing" was neoessary to media t9

categor,v and appearances.
answer unnecessary.

Therefore the problem 1s talae and the

The answer to such objections was implied 111

the distinct10ns made above, but formal treatment of this 1mpart-

ant quest10n has been reserved t111 now.

..
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We recall

~ha' Sm1 'h

leveled

'''0

ob Jeet1 CIl8 asa1nat the

whole etruc1iUre at the schemai1em problem:

(1) schel'ltl t1_ 18

n~

a process ot aubaump1iton, and (2) 1ihe sehem 1s no1i a "1ih1r4
thing."
tectonic.

Bath ot lhe.e Dl1atakea are tarced upon Ran' by his arch1
We also saw tba.t the first objection reduced itself to

the secom. since !ant never says that schemat1e

.!i. subsump-

t1on. 62
To SmIth 'a second object! on we must reply:

lant says that

the transcendental schem. 1s a third thIng and he is correct.

deed, it is sum t as we saw above, in a dUal manner.

In

On the

transcenden tal and. preconsc1 QUa s 1de tlll'B roo d 1ates as a til trd

thing between the pure category a nd the manifold ot sense data to
be determined 1nto an aot of knowledge.

This is eYldent tram the

transcendental deduct10n alone and should be clear h'om the preeedint:; chapter at this thesis.

On the conse1 ws Side, in determi-

nate judgments, the transcendental sqbema is the third thing be~

tween the category and the now determ1'liate end condl tioned sense
appearances.

On this side of the dU'i lity the transcenden tal

schema haa a double lite; it involves universal characteristlos ot

the object and 1$ the vehiole ot the category a s known.

This

ambiguity he1gb1ums the point of the schema as a third thLng.
to the influence of Kant t II arch iteoto:o.ic upon his

arg~nts,

As
the

flnal determination ot such an issue 1s being reserved tlll next
chapter.

91

C81rd t s po.ltlon, 81ml141r to 8m1'th's, we recall, hold.1;hat
the rela1J1on of perception and concept1on 1s such that no 14111'4
thing is really needea.

The act ot knowledge 1s so unifled. that

acnemat1sm 1s no longer necessary to glve the categortes synthetio
necessarIly leads to an alteration at
the premIse ot the heterogeneIt7 problem. 63 PrIchard likewise. in

value.

Thus. his

ar~m.n'

the third d1screpauoJ he claims to exist between genera.l schematiSlTl and the transcendental sehemata, says that aim. the process
of sehematism actually subatmGs the manit old \Ulder the category,
it perfOrms the very Impossibility 'for whlch the schematism was

postulated in the tirst place. 54
The answer to Caird's and Prichardta objection. besldes the

answer just gIven to smith, 11es truly in tbe whole duality that
has been outlined thrOUf!')lout this paper.

Kant stated his problem

in terms of suosum.pt1on, i.e. judgment. and therefore in terms
more of the conscious side of this duality.

He answered it in

terms tha t were sometimes eclloes of the trallscenden tal deduotion
and thus in terms or the preconsciOUS, constitutIve

knowledge.

side of

Yet in other parts at his chapter }Sant answered it 1n

terms of objeotive characteristics of c onsel OUa knowledge in jUdg-

ment.

A.t

bast- hls argumelit was difficult to tollow.

Consequentl,.

the obJect1ons of the c anmantatcrs are understandable. 65
.t,

63Caird. It 402-406, 421. 433. Cf. above. p_ 10.
64 Pr lchard, pp. 254-255. Cf. above. pp. 11-12.
65 A tinal resume 01' the significance ot all the standard com-

mentators will be tound 1n the final chapter belOW.
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Neverthele••, the schema'lsm chapter conta11UKl

11Dk in the cr1 'tleal arstem.
tilftt the

oa:tesorl••

Hr8

8

ver"l e••• tial

Rant had praren 1n the 4.4uo'10118

tbe

8Q1Z'Ce

our intellectual experience.

and ultimate explanat10n of

lie b_ tlltt tbe content of aueb.

categories muat ulUmatel7 be. ud could otlly 18&1 tlm 'ell 'be,

.ellS. lntuitlona,.
the on. was

'0

But he bad IWt 18' &n_e.t:'e4 ,be problem at

be

tbe tren8e.n4an~1
Ute deductions.

o~cte4

to the oUler.

!sL

The ref ON he 10oke4 to

ao'lv1 tl •• and the eategories he bld outlined

lIe 88_ that in constitutlng tbe object of know-

ledge, the cat.sor1e. aDS 1maslnat1on must prodUce an ettect upca

the object suoh tl:lIat thaa. _'e,or1 •• could be

le~ timllteq

&pp11

to ". 1'b.ef _art. prodUce certain eh6ra"'.rist1 c. ln ,bat ob jeet,
"third thlngs" bet...en tbe pure 1n.tell1g1 billt,. ot the catesorr

and the indetermlD11te •••

or

appearane...

Thea. uDlveraal cb.tl",o

'eriatles are the transcends tal eoheDlta, .. whole greater than tb.
two const! \,,'1ve parts.

The subjeotive transcendental aoU vltl ••
"

,

outllned in the deduotions, when looked at under the aspect of
producins "uGh cbaractar1at1ca contcrmed to the oategories, ..ere
oallod SElH9SstS~&. Uiu'lI»lih ill. products, :ll!aIPSa!p:telr

._.M1I·

At the conclu.J.on ot the la.st chapter \;e a.ked l t the sOh. .t1sm. chapter lOaa $UptSl'tluQUs. since the const1tutlon at the object

of the tranacenden tal deduotion was the same aa tIle actl vi ties 1m
p11ed in tbe 8000ustlsm chapter.
on scheDr3t1am waa not superfluous.

It 1& olear

DQ'I

tbat the chapter

Kant needed the transcendental

achemta to eel' the ar01mmta ot the deduct1 aus.

CHAPTER IV

EPILOGUE
The wr1 ting ot the illustrious sage of Koenigsberg,
The founder of the Crit1cal Ph1losophy, mere than an,.
other work, at once inv1gorated and disciplined my
understa.nding. The orig1na 1i tYl the d.epth, • II • the
adamantine cha1n at' log1e, and I will venw.re to add
(paradox as it will appear to those who blve taken
their not1on ot Immanuel Rant from ReV! ewers and
Frenchmen). the clearness and evidence of the Citi tlgue
of Pure Res;Qn • • • took possession of me with a

giant' 8 hand."

.-001er1dge1

The purpose ot this paper MS not been to instUl an opinion

as vehem.entally favora.ble to Kant as the one Coleridge expresses

here.

But it 1s hoped that tals 'thes1s has shown that there 1s a

logic and 1nner consistency in Kant's

Cr1t19u~

wh1ch, 1f it were

more widely recognized, would embarrass those cant11entators who
~

"

ala 1m to t ind sa much that 1s inconsistent and contradictory in

Rant's thwght, especiall, in re€f:1rd to the problem of schemat:ism..
The initial pages or tllis peper pointed out a few 01.' those un..

favorable opinions concerning the sign1ficance and interpretation

of Kant's chapter on schematism.

This doctrine was supposedly

formulated to anner the problem of the eanp.le te heterogeneity of
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eategory an4 "nse 1ntuit10n.

But far

the objectors tbat hetero-

geneity does not even exlst; these two are rec1procally orientated and no intermediary Is needed.

Scbematism Is postula ted slm-

ply to fill out the parallel with tbe arch1tectonic structure or

tra.ditional logic and 18, consequently, artif1clal in the extreme_
Sehematism ia the answer to a non--existent problem.

problem haa any signiflcance, the answer

8S

Or' if

the

hant formulates it is

so involved with contradiction and obscurity that the chapter is
ultimately meaningless and or no value.

This has been seen all too frequently, but it bears repetition here so that

8.

summa.ry signif1cance of' schematlam. ean be per-

ceived til clear eonu-ast.

On

the oontrary, this paper has main-

tained that the cha:pter on scbemtism is an integral part of

Kant's arauMent and the purpose of the C,itiQue.

And the ke.r to

the understaIll1ng of that s 19nit1canee 11e s in a du.:J.lst 1e outlook
which 1s "the eenter ot Kant's crit1cal,.,sys"tem.

-.

Kant needSd the a

R£1or1 categories to eave sci enoe :!'ran Rurnean soept1cism and Benslam in general; he needed to limit the knowledge engendered 07
these categories to the realm otsense eXl>erience to save the mind
trom the metaphya1cal pitfalls of rationalism.

But the dlscussioa

of' such oaiegOt-ies dem.anded a. duality such as that pointed out in

this paper.

To prove conclusively the existence and necessity

or

!!. Brion concepts, Kant had to refer tothe content ot human mow-

ledge and show tha t the categories explain these taots ,ot know-

ledge.

But _tnce the categories are !. P£ lor1,,. i.e. pri or to the
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given ot experience, he lBd to delve deeply inw an explAII8:tion
of "transcendental" activl'ties. syntheses, operatlons ot pure .anc1

reprOductive lmginatlon, pure intuitions of space and time, aDd a
dozen other elements which entered into and aided the oonstruction

of our knowledge. even betore we were aware of it.
It was shown how the duallty between the subjective constitu-

tion of the object ot knowledge and the cc.nscious awareness

or

this object is imp11ci t in a very poignant way in the meta.physlcal

and transcendental dedueti ons of the Citegorles.

It can be said

that it was the precise purpose of both these deductions, especial
17 the latter, to demonstrate the I. Pii.l, preconscious side of

Kant's cognitional dua11ty_

It was 11kewise shown that the oft

discussed double tendency ot Rant to subj activism and phenOIlenaliam. where knowledge is regarded merely a s the product

C1Z

modifi-

ca1;ion ot subJecti"e apprehension on the me hand, or where the
.,

products of the transcendental

actl"1~.1es

take on some

SOl't

or ex-

istence ot their own on the other. signltlcan1;lr retlecta thts

duality.
only w1th it 1n mind could the schena t1 sn chapter be 1nteUl

gibly and consistently in'terpreted.

Time and its determlna tlons

..ere proposed by lant as the 'tj!ird th1pa which would mdtate cats
gary and lntui tion.
blguOUlh

But tlme-determ1m t1 ons were seen to be am.-

As products of a synthesis they would later be seen as

kiDds of temporal determinati ale, unlversal characteristiCS

object.

As the form of inner sense and the formal

OOM itl an

or
of

'tll

lO4

a8nslbl1lt,.. 'theae t:lme-d.term.1.t1oaa implied an !.
sis omtormed to

8

rule.

BASE'

8J!ltb..

This mle oould only be the oategory.

and the synthesis ot sohenatism was the synthesia 1Ibl<b _. U1e
The tact that the sohe1YJl-

heart 0'£ the transcendental dedl.ll.ltion.

t1zing process is a hidden art pointed to the preconscious and
subjective side.of the duality and its relatla1 to the transcende
tal syntheses.

This was contirmed by Ktm t'a emphasis in the

achematlsm chapter on the word JXIltllsai" itself' and
with or determination by a rule.

ctl

conform.it,.

The fact that seham tism effect

"all representations" and the unity of' the manifold of intuition

l1kewise impl1ed tlle .!. Rr;J.2l& consti'tution of

t11$

object It

Schema

tism can be said to lim1t the category only because it must involve some !. nrl9l,l construction in the object.

Lastly, schema-

tism was seen to be connected with the "transcendental truth'tt
which precedes empirIcal truth and makes exper1ence possible.
If such 115 achemat1sm,

wlla t

of

tnt

transcendental scl\ema?

".

\

Schemat1sm was seen to have an eN'ect upon the ob.1!!t, upon all
representat1on;

this effect was an eXRl!§s!on of the category.

This. the text calling the schema a phtlsmenoa. and espec1ally th
statements before the scheu:l8tlsm chapter that it wculd deal with

the "slane, and the ua1vssal

Mrk,.

sufficed to prove that the

transcendental schema must involve universal characteristics of
the object • . Only in this way could schenatism be sald to exeble
us to apply the categories to that object.

Kant 'a list of the·

1ndividual schemata, artif1cial as they m1r-,ht be, confirmed that
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~e

eohemata were objective grounds tor 'the

C4~.&ory·.

applioation,

But 1t tit. banaoen4elltal schemata were Obj...1"8, the proll-

lera of Kant's d••oript1cm.e ot 'the sohemata ot empirical coneep'.
a8 subJeotive 8rnthea,es accord1ng to .. ru.le. procedure. ot the
~Slno.tlon 1n proV141aa an image to a concept, waa a Gordian lulot

that had

"0 be 'Wltlfi..

In as mucn aa

or ObJec'1ve oonaclouanea••

too

empirical schema 1. part

it oan 1n Aunt be considered obJeoi1ve

j

but it was o•••nt1ellJ a subJectlV. sohemat1z1ng process prov1ding
a vehlcle tor the thinkin6 ot an abstract universal. emp1rical

concept.

It was, aa 1t were,

schema trQll which it

_5

Q

OJ-product of the transcendental

to be d1stingu tahed.

'1'110 reason tor \h1e

was th.ut the latter involved the un1vel'sal characteristics of .11

Objects, prior to

a~

abstraction.

Sinee these characteristlos

are implicitly known in 8rq object, no matter how emp12,-1cal. 1t
must be involved ln the object! vet 1ntelligible cootent ot
Ott!'t tha t 1$

'll batra.t.ed

by anal,si.

~om

i;tl17

COD

tha t ob jflct •

.'

candentsl sohema. nevertheles., bad a 81gnlt1ca noe all 1ta own
a1nce it alone proY!....4 the o'b jeoti va rafereDce whlch aUowe4 the

application 01' the categary to objects, closed the gap between pur.
~tesory and ~ppe6ranoea. and fulfilled the anticipatiODs of the
deductions.
Having .<ten th.is summary 01' the argument. of thi8 theais. the
necessary baokground 1. prav1.ded tor a tlnal anewer to the obJections 01' the

c~ent6tor$.

Norman Kemp Smith's objeotions, probably tbe m.ost perauaa1ve
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ot all, merit first consideration.
the transcendental schema

It Mil already been shown that

a ,third th ing and tba t the relati'ou.

i~

of category to intuition does not preclude such a mediating factor
Yet his objection 1s not a superficial cr1 t101m; it is based on a
deep understandiIlg of :Kantts tihwgllt.

Smith's insistence tbat

category and intuition are related as form and matter t and are
therefore mutually orientated toward each other, is precisely tbe
subjective and !. PlLA9El side of tbe duality Emphasized'in this
thesis.

Even on thiS, side,

sidered a third thing.

t~e

could, it was shown, be con-

But the far greater

overs1~t

on Sm1 ttl fS

part was the tact tba t he failed to see that Kant must answer the
problem ot heterogeneity on the objective, eonscious side as well.
In the metaphysioal deduetion Kant had gone from the logical torms

ot judgment to the categories which must be !. »rio[1 to experience
In the transcendental deduction he went trom the necessary element
01' conscious experience, both subJecti.:v.e aId objective, to these

same !. l!ri,ori oa.tegories.

make the step back from the

Now, 1n the ttPrInc1ples, tt tant had to
~

prlorl and preconscious into the

realm of ex:)llci tly conse! ous judgmn ta, to see preCis ely how
these categories entered into knowl edge.

Smi tb. failed to see that

hantts purpose in the schemat1sm ch:)pter was to point out the ob-

ject1 va grounds which the subjective and tr.tmscendental pi';1entation ot category and intuition must construct, the products of
these transcendental· scttvi ties.
would be no conceivable way

Wi tbout Slcn grounds, there

or jU3tlfying the application of suoh'

10'
categories to objects in the judgments ot consciousness.
The failure on smith's part to see the necessity of Kant returning to judgment through scbematism 1s also partially the caus

ot his repeated calling upon an artiticial architectonic aa the
real basis ot Kant's ohapter on schematism.
seem, as Paton maintains, Smith

WtiS

ene ed by Ad lckes on 'ttl is point. 2

F'tn'thermare, it waul

too greatly and

~s11y

inf'lu-

Fart:rom be lug an arb1 tra ry ac-

cretion to match the chapter on Judgment in tormal logic. the
schem ta were a necessary complement. a s has been shown, to tbe
deductions.

Lastly, the view t18 t smi1b held that the transcen-

dental schema waa the rule or prooedure of imagination, a descrip
tion which, as was seen, Kant used only fOr empirical schemata,
led him to look. upon the schema as a purely subJecti ve
ventlng hlm from seeing Kant's real Intention.
Slmilarly. Edward Caird considered soh erna ti am unnecessary b
cause he was so deeply engrossed In the subJective. consti'tutl ve
side of the duality.

It 1s Calrd's great merit to have perceived

w1th deep penetration the dual1ty between construction and consciousness, \\bieh he preferred to express in the Kantian terms of
synthet 1e and analyt 1c lmwl edge.
he pereel ved the na tive rela t1 on

Mudl. more prof wIldly tha n smith

ot category and perception and

the synthetiC UpJ.tz between the two.

looked upon a discusai CIl of Judgment and the schema ts merely

be

...

Too much so, it seems, slne

,.

ISee Paton, II, 66, n. 2.

Cf'. also Ibl~.f 76.

loa
as a dialectical JrWllnel' of speaking about the .rn\h.tle unian 1D.VOlYN

in l:;,antlan knowledge. so ,bat mee such cons1deratlon. baw

been accanpl1alled, tbe premise (of heWZ'Oi,;enelt;y) whieb.
the discussion beco;llea u.xmecoaaary.

.8.

41'0\1. .4

Deapi to hi. penetrat1ng aDa

of the .Kant1an duall ty t Ca1r4 haa ral1ed 1n em. tundamental.

polnt:
III i1 on

he haa not perce1 ve4 tbe essen'tial a n4 J'8dlcal d 1tt.rent1

between senae an4 in telleet It be _een emplrlcal. lntul tlonal

experience end \ul1fy1n& intelligence.

It was this that Kant was

trying to get at 1n the sehenatisll dlapter..
reduced the l;a nt lCtn 41 all i1 to a

s.1 bJe

Ca1rd haSt 1n etfect.

ctt ve 1 den '1".

It might be

ventured tbat Ca1rd did this because he interpreted !<ant in \Gr_

ot Hesel "ho fol.lowed hint, and

l1e too facilely .yain.sized

the

anti thesis Ji.ant had constructed between moyl edge aa active In-

telllgence and k.:tlOwledge as pasat ve IntuitIon.

11.A. :rIcnaJ.'d 'a lea. protOWld but trenchan'C crlticisms have
been deal' wlth tor tbe moat part tn: the cone lud1ng sect1Qn of \be
previous chapter.

tor

acher&~

Ue too, as _. pOinted out,

tlsm 1f the

(l\

experience under them.

SAW

no mOGssl tJ

_gorlea actu$ll;y dId subsume intu1tional
L1ke3m1th, he fAilf'd to percelve that the

synthesis of ct1tegory and 1ntuit ion mua t

DIM1,~

in some ehartloter

Ist10 of the obJect. or tbere ls no foundatl w tor applying the
ea tegor y tot he

0

b je ct.

'lbe su.pposed

0 a:l tr&d 1e ti CIlS

he 1'1 nd s be-

tween the "schemtll ln general ft aud the transoendental am ermta hev
been dealt w1th sU1'flo1ently ln Chapter III.

Mcreover. Paton

pOints out that l'rldlard, like C81rd, was ill-advised ln ws1ng a
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Kantian canmentary to expound his own philosoPhy.3
/

The interpretation ot Joseph Mareahal, S • .r •• has the

~ea'

merit or expound1ng "hat he believes to be the psycholog1cal gene
sis ot the schema t truly a synthesis ot the chapter on schema t1an
w1th the subjecti va transcenden tal dedlrtion ot the first edItion
But like l?ri d:ulrd he implied tile t l<ant' s

of the Cri tigu,!..

descriptions of the scmmats of empirical concepts, necessarily
sub je ot! ve method 8

ot

1.ma g1 Ie ti va c wstrue

cable to the transcendental s chama ta.

accepted.

th>n, are equally appli-

A.s wa s seen, th1s cannot be

And even thou€,,h he ends up, somewhat contrary to his

in1tial position, seemingly attempting to objectIfy the transcendental schenllta by recognizing them as universal signs far the ap
plication ot categories, they still seem to rem.ain 1n the end pure
expressi oos of the cetegorie s in 1magim t10n llnd not an aspect of
the ob je ct knom.

,

Nevertheless, iiarscb.a1's treatment is fraught

with keen insights into the subjective,·em synthetiC

Kant's construction ot the

pbenom~on.

aspe~ts

of

This writer is primarily

I

indeb ted to Marechsl' II tree too nt .. -despi te Its apparent defec ts--

tor the

inGi~t

1nt 0 the subje cti va and preconscious side of the

duality emphasized in this thesis.
naval'S'1pproach to the problem ot schemat1:::m, it is recalled
is erea tly similar to t he one proposed here.

Clearly then, he was

not an objector to the sicnificance of Beh anati 001 and he need not

3see Paton, I, 17.

uo
be reckoned with here.

terred to
ments.

8S

He was, tor the most part, merely re-

e ontlming the basic insight proposed in these argu-

As was menticned, he dces not take great efforts to prove

his hypothesis, other than to SlOW haw schematlsm gives a. unified

view not only ot Kant's first C£1tlgUShbut also at all h1s
n1 t1ngs.

The last man who msr1ta particular cons1deration here 1s
H.I. Paton.

His view ot the transcendental schemata more than 81

others has been evidenced throughcut these pages.

Th.e greatest

contribution he otters to the schematism problem--besldes the int
tisl willingness to see Kant 'a v1ew--ls the continued em.phaais he
places upon the transcendental schemata
teristics of experience.

8S

the universal charac-

Rant h1mself did not emphasize this sut

1'101ently and it took Paton's 1nsight Into the whole at Kant's
critical v1.8w ot knowledge to bring 'to suft1e1E1lt lietlt this 1mpor'tant aspect ot 'the scilemattsm chapter.

In the view of"this

wri ter, only 1n one th1ng has Paten tailed to do

interpretation of schellBtiSl1!

justice to the

that is in overlooking the subject

lve and c anst1tutlve side of schemat1am and in his denial that the
'transcendental aotivities and the construction of tb! object ot
knowledge is preconsel QUs. 4 All 111i8 ma y be an unintentional
.:ffort on Paton's part to avoid a par1;icularly subject1v1stic 1n-

t .,rpretat1on of :Kant.

This wr1 ter would roo inta1n that if Paton

'Cf. Paton, II, 25 and 73-75.

Ul

had bad aa keen a penetra U on 1nto the

au.. li ty

lnvolved in the

Kantian system as Caird had, his interpretation ot acb.ema'Uam
would not differ essent1ally f'rcm that proposed ln thla tbe als.
As

lt is, if' ther$ is anything lack1ng in Paton's lnterprete:\iloD.,

it is mare by anission tban by oontradiction.

Moreover, i.Xl aD1

event, Paton's continued emphasiS upon the schem.ata aa universal
characteris'tloshaa brought more l1ght to the dif'f'lcult chapter
The crov-n lng corollary ot

than seems to bave been had betore.

such an interpretation is, as was demonstrated at the conclus1on
of the last chapter and elsewhere. that it viv1dly po1nts out the

t.

consistency aDd 10glca11t.r of not only \he schsnat1sm chapter. but
Kant

whole purpose and acccmpllslulaent ln the tlrst halt or the

9r&t&gu, !t ~e 8~aI2l.
Theretore one oonclusion must necessarlly tOLlow trom the

po1nt ot this thesis.

Wlth Paton, the chapter on schenat1arn must
.,

be c onsi dered to ba va ttmore tba n the .va,lue of throwing 11gb t

Ol'l

".

Kant's er;'ors," and "is essent1al to an underst8m1ng of the
Crit1cal Ph11oaoPhy.,,5

W1th Paton too. schematlsn m.uat be con-

s1dered to have 11ttle or no1bing attn. IBrversity attr1buted to

it by h1s crit1cs.

It ls tNe that the der1vatlQ11 of the cate-

gor1as--and consequently the spec1fic schemata-tran the ferms ot
Judgment "is • • • a trifle ingenuous."
y.

5,paton. II. 20.

But Kant's doctrine
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us
not rest exclusively on such a deri vati on. 6

Besides the depend-

ence upon the tarms of judgraents;( whlch after all only gives the
spe91t12, nature ot the various schemata} the categorical charaoteristics ot objects are der1 ved from the tact that all objects
are temporal; in this there 1s a good bit of truth.

ItThe con-

naxion ot' the categories wlth the synthesls or 1mag1.na tion and the
t'orm. ot time is the DlOst important, and the least artific1al part

ot the Cr1t1cal Ph1losophy.M?
This does not excuse Kant trom tb.e mistakes that are ev1dent
in the chapter.

The obscurity of h1s terminology. tbe brevity of

1118 treaim.ent. and according to the interpretation of this thesis,

the lack ot clar 1ty on Kant t s part in pointing out the signiticance ot his descriptions ot sehenata of empirical concepts, all

have contributed to the cantusion tbat he. s arisen in the 1nterprEtiat10n ot this .1m.portan't dlapter. 8 'Besides th1s. the failure or
Kant to _ke clear the essential

dua11~y

which 18 1mplicit'· in his

system, between the !. .;r1W1 oonstitution of the object and the
experience ot that object. has contributed 1n a moat s1gnificant

way to the c wi\ls1Qn that haa surrounded sch \:;:matism.

In this

chapter Kant was building the bridge trom the transcendental and
6ben so, Paton defends the plaus1bili ty at such a der1vation. "To treat tke derivatim of the categories trom the forms
ot Judgment as wJ"CIlg,.headed and inexcusable pedantry indicates, to
my mind, only the failure of the oritic to think himself into
.
n
Kant's point ot view.
~bid •• 76.
7ill4.•• 76. Paton again pOints cut in this section th.e lack
of Vale'dIW at tne objections based on Kant's architectonic.

i
i
I

II.

U3
preconscious side of h is system to calacs. QUe experi enos in JUdgment. from the categories to the universal character1stics of
ex~rience

which Justify the app11cation of the former.

It" both

sides of the critical d iv1de were not percel ved, naturally the
bridge of schematism seemed insign1t"ieant.

But, aa was po1nted out above, even the objections of the
cr1 t1 os a.re not wi thout merit J since they serVe to point out one
er other aspect of Kant's doetr1ne on schemat1sm.

Smith's empha-

sis on the correlation ot category and intui tlon, Sa O'1Jl tter and
farm, structure a nd content t serves to emphas1.2;e the preconsc1ous
snd constitutive side of the duality.

dua11ty, eYen if he reduced 1t to

~

Caird clearly perceived the

sort of Hegeliam identity.

Prichardts criticisms share some of Smith's merits and besides.

point up the d1ff1 wlt ies arising from an erroneoUs interpretatlon
of the empirical schemata.

,.

Marechsl ,M s pOinted unintentionally

to both sides of the duality.

.And Pate-n. of course, has itven

US

the clear picture of the objective side of schematism and its

total 8i gn1ficanee.

The very 41 versi ty of trJe commentators haa

aided in pointing out the dU'Sllit y vm 1eh is the essence of the
present interprets t1 on ot schelnat1sm'
It haa been outside the predetermined limits 01' this thesis

to criticize Kant's doctrines from the point 01' view of a realist,
a Sdlolaatic, or a Thanist.

The purpose here, after all, was to

clarity a small but important point in the thrught of a great

philosopher. and not to point out the errors in hls whole system.
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Yet. granting all the possible er1 ticis£.lS ttmt have been leveled
!i.

t tHe eri tical syste:l, and tIlere .have been many--some that are

penet1't1ting and (,ui te valid, others tl1:1t do

l~ant

a ereat injustice

--there will still be much of vlJlue in Kant's thougbt.

Like

:-.l11 great thinkers, in his errors he veered very near the truth.
It may be permitted therefore, tu point out a few comparisons between what has been seen in the in·terprctation of schernatism and

elements Of a mere realistic and even Thomist philosophy.

rrhis

will not be done very extensively nor prul'oul1dl.y, hut as a. s()rt of

9pi to..!.

dle~

to

thr()v~

vf Lant's th;;'iU€,ht.

an Interest1.l1g sidelight on the consistency

If his thought has parallels with more tradi-

t.ional philosophy. it cannot be

sO

utterly I'alae and inconsistent.

A 1'a ther cbvious comparison may be the one between the empirical schema. and the Scholastic phantasm.

Both are general

tic images which permit the th ou~;:h t uf

ulli versa.l concept and

,Hi

its predic:ltion of an instance vf th~t ccneept. 9

schem~3-

Similarly,
as
.,

the empirical schema presu.pposes the t~anscendental one, ::md since
the eu tegorles are ell involved implicitly in every object of
knoviledge as the s OUl~ce of wha t is intelligible, so the schema ta
of these

C':i. tetr,ories f

tile universal characteristIcs of real! ty, can

90r. 1.. 1:.-. It 84, 7c., ~ •. Thoma,e Aquinatis, Summa Theologiae
::larlett i edit ion ('T'nurini, 1950): ttlmpossi'61ie est 1ntel1ectus
nostru(!1 • • • aliquid intell1gere in actu, nisi convertendo ad
ph(JntaStlltlta. tf The content of an smp1ricnl concept and thus its
schema could be correlated with what st. Thomas calls ltcom.mon
matter," i.e. the material or empirical notes which are corn.mon to
1'111 the individuals ai' a species. Hac'lll Eantts example of the
schema of tbe empir leol concept 01' a d () as the ilnt)gil'lil ti ve deline, tioD of the figure of a four-t'ooted animal in sorne general manner. Cf'. ':3. '1' •• I. 75. 4c.

U&
be equiva18ted to the vague pbantasma which au,'s imaginat1on.
mus,t formulate to think such concepta aa cauae, 8,batance, etc.

Only 1n Kant, because ot his inherent subJectivism, the medium
In which the eatesory or intelligibility is known is Identltled
wlth the characterist1cs ot the object itself,

And as the

schemata are determine. t1 ons in t 1me (8 prime characteristiC

at

sensib111ty even tor the Scholastic) and the schemata limit the
categories to sensibllity, so ytJhatever 1s known intellectualJ.,. by
a Thani.t. is known only in and by reter,fHlce to the sensi ble
paa nta sm. 10

In the Introduction to the "Principles" Kant tells us that
skill in being able to tell the particular applications of the
rules of Judgment 1s an lnborn talent ,11

This and Kant's insist-

ence that schanatism is a "concealed art" can be roughly correlOcr. Mar~chal. V, "La Than1sme ,davant 18 Phllosophte Critique. It PP. 163 and 164 and n. The reason \:hy Vie know ooly by
converting to a phantasm is seen fUrther in the sam.e artIcle at
~.! •• I, 64, 7 c.:
"Intellectu8 autem hUrttlni, qui est conJunctua
1
carpori t ptopr1U1D obJecttg
:s1!,6 natura !! materil1
corp,gra;l;1 6U!tens, at per u us
m uraa vIslnlIlum. rerum.
etiam in inTis 1bl11um rerum. a11qualam cogni tionem a.scend·it • • •
sicut de ratione naturae lapidls est quod sit in hoc laplde • • •
Unde natura lap1dia, vel cu1u~eumgue ~teria*l! l!!, ~ognos~~ nan
fO~"t COlllPJ.~lil et D.U. JWI1 !$!9und~ S,!RSi £wosc1tur in pilrt1eu
"ori §2f..LLtens. Itallcs not in ori na. mr~Cilial wellpoin s
out that tnI. conversion to the phantasm. is true even of knowledge ot 1m.Dri terial things (Of. .§..I.. llU.!l.. and ad 3) and that
l:ia nt • s failure to a4m t le g i tima te 1m. o'"WIidge of any1h Ins bey ond
the' sensible limits of experIence is baaed on his lack of accepta.nce of the SCbolastlc doctr1ne ot ~palogl'

g81 9l!tfi tat

llA 133--B 172 (177-178).

U6
la ted to St .. Thomas t proof by the experi enee ot tbe use ot eam-

ples for the dependence of our inteUectual knowledge upon phantssm. 18 Kant mentions that the use ot examples mal" be or great
help to sharpen this skill in applying a universal rule, but the
"correctness and precision at intellec1ual insight • • • they

more usually s0m8wlll t impair.·

j'or examples are theUgo-eart ot

judgment· and cannot be dispensed with by thQlle lacking in

natural talent.

13

It would seem that for Kant the talented can 4i spense witb
examples precisely beoause of the !. priori nature of the cat.gar
ies.

And it one may be permitted .to expand Kantts hypothesis

a moment, the more t81ented wwld be thos e whose
S8u~S&Qn

HB1 t1 .2.t

t

E1RP!£-

(as the ooncomitant awareness of persoDal thrught) is

mare deeply present throughout all the !. prior,' syntheses of

knowledge..

Thus, because 01' the intimacy of this preconscious

union, such men can mere readily percei. va the correspondence be"

"ween the 1ntelligib111 ty they think (the categor1es sc.b.emat1zed)
and the objeots in which their though1i 1s groumed (the schemata
as the un1versal characteristics of obJects) •

....
12·secundo, quia hoo qu1libet in seipao exper1rl poteat,quo
qua ndo allquls cone. tur allqu1d intel11gere, format a11qua phantasnata sibi per m.odum exemplorurn. in cpibl1s quasI inspiclat qu
inte1l1gere studet. Et Inde est etiam quod quando allum volumua
facers allquid In'elligere, proponlmua e1 exempla. ex quibUS slbl
phantasma ta farmare poss1t ad Intell1gendum.· ..§.I.. It 84, 7 c.
13A 134-B 173-174 (1'18).

U7

a1a, the dual nature of the transcendental. schema as both character1st1cs at the phenomenal object and subjective veh1cle of the
category as known takes on greater significance.

First, the cate-

gories have been hldden, preconsci Qua elements in the subjectiye
knower.

Secondly, in the !. PEigr& synthesis with the manifold,

the categories beceme, aa it were, imbedded in the objeot, as lts
lmlVfu:'sal characteristics, the transcendental schemata.

Thirdly,

the subjeot lmow1rlg Eeo2Sll'l these characterist1 cs aa the
grounds for the app11c a ti on ot the categories. . In this recognition the oategory 1s tirst consc1ously known (i.e. the achematlzec

ga"gc;rl 1n the sehem)
knower.

and as such, returns to the subjective

The appllcation of the category in judt7)D.ent tollows

necessarily.

The mavemant has been from. !. preior1, to synthesis Of

the object, back to subjectlve recogn1tlon at the scheaat1zed
category tar the latter's applicati on in judgment.

In su.ch recog-

.,

nitlon and jUdgment the schema is the ,.conac!ws expression of the
category. the m.iddle point between the he ter ogene OWl poles which

have been also the ;term.ini of the ca tegory 's transformation ani
PI' ogre ssl on. 14

.All this may have seemed mere airy ape Qulatl on and a point-

14w w ld it be possible to correa te Kan t's doctrine ot schemati8m and the "precIsion ot intellectual ins1-ght" which examples
impair with the fundam.ental thesis at Fr. B. Lonergan's book.
iMl.~?
Fr. Lonergan even calls insight an .! prior! synthesis,
which is indeed wha t schematism is. ct. Bernard 1.• F. Lonergan,
s. J' cr, IRtUSh9• !. 3tudx .2L Human Undftrlta pQ. A. (New York, 1957).
p. 406. Yet this author repudiates schemata as grounds for judgment in his own system, whlch they were tor Kant. Cf.,Ib1$i. ,p.340.

us
less digression, but it does help to underscore the partIcular
point of this chapter, that l(ant's thwep.t, with all 1ts conrus1
terminology and eXpression, and desplte Its manlfest errors, has

deep ccnsisteney whicb. makes it applicable to and parallel w1 th
much philosoph1cal truth.

C£, t19g 9.t
the reader

J.>url

01"

The clearness and evidence of the

H!!IOI may not have taken possesslon of e1 ther

this vi tel" with the giant's mnd wltb which'1t dId

Coleridge.

But 1t 1s hoped that 1t 1s at least a 11ttle better

understood

why Coler1dge and so many others have been so pro-

twIJdly impressed by the logic and ca:uJistency

at 11llID9 Duel !ant.

"

.

ot, tbe phllosophf
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